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in support of those who continue to show immense strength through compassion and advocate 
for the rights of those whose voices cannot be heard. 
 
 
In the past two centuries we have improved the length of our lives and the quality of said 
lives to the point where we feel somewhat uneasy if anyone dies as early as the biblical 
age of seventy. But there comes a time when technology outpaces sense, when a blip on 
an oscilloscope is confused with life, and humanity unravels into a state of mere 
existence. 
 
It’s that much heralded thing, the quality of life, that is important. How you live your life, 
what you get out of it, what you put into it and what you leave behind after it. We should 
aim for a good and rich life well lived and, at the end of it, in the comfort of our own 









                                               
 Sir Terry Pratchett “Shaking Hands with Death” (2010) delivered as the Richard Dimbleby Lecture, published by 
Corgi Books 2015. 
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If one death is accompanied by torture, and the other is simple and easy, why not snatch the 
latter? Just as I shall select my ship, when I am about to go on a voyage, or my house when I 
propose to take a residence, so shall I choose my death when I am about to depart from life. 
Moreover, just as a long-drawn-out life does not necessarily mean a better one, so a long-drawn-
out death necessarily means a worse one. 
 
For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he 
ought, not as long as he can. He will mark in what place, with whom, and how he is to conduct 
his existence, and what he is about to do. He always reflects concerning the quality, and not the 
quantity, of his life. As soon as there are many events in his life that give him trouble and disturb 
his peace of mind, he sets himself free. 
 
It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape 
from the danger of living ill.1 
 
Death, suicide and euthanasia are issues that have engaged the minds of philosophers, 
theologians, lawyers and laymen alike for many centuries.2 In the modern-day debate 
surrounding euthanasia, many academics use the recent technological advancements in 
healthcare and the preservation of life as a point of departure.3 Although modern advancements 
in medicine may have brought the issue of euthanasia to the fore and reignited the debate 
surrounding end of life care, there exists a long history of moral, religious, philosophical, ethical 
                                               
1 Seneca Moral Letters to Lucilius: Letter 70 (LXX On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable) Epistolae Morales. 
2 JD Papadimitriou et al ‘Euthanasia and suicide in antiquity: viewpoint of the dramatists and philosophers’ (2007) 
100 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 25-28. 
AJ Van Hooff ‘Ancient euthanasia: ‘good death’ and the doctor in the Graeco-Roman world’ (2004) 58 Social 
Science & Medicine 975-985. 
3 AM Diaconescu ‘Euthanasia’ (2012) 4 Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 474-483.  
JF McDougall & M Gorman Contemporary World Issues, Euthanasia: A Reference Handbook 2 ed (2008) 6. 
I Dowbiggin A Concise History of Euthanasia: Life, Death, God and Medicine 1 ed (2007) 7. 
 




and legal debates preceding the 21st Century discourse on euthanasia.4 As a result of the 
technological and legal developments internationally in the field of end of life care, several 
jurisdictions have moved toward a permissive regime in which assisted dying is sanctioned 
through legislation. However, not all countries have been receptive to these ideas, and even the 
countries that have allowed for legalisation of assisted dying have done so only in limited 
circumstances and under strict conditions.  
 
Traditionally, South Africa has been reluctant to deal with issues surrounding end of life care and 
assisted dying.5 However, since the advent of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa, the 
debate surrounding assisted dying gained momentum, as the rights enshrined in the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (1996 Constitution) provided a platform upon 
which these issues could be debated. In 1998, the South African Law Commission’s Report on 
Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life (Project 86),6 which included a Draft Bill on 
the proposed End of Life Decisions Act, was presented to the Minister of Health. However, 
progress stalled when the Minister of Health turned her attention to the more pressing health 
concerns at the time, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.7 Nonetheless, many academics and 
independent organisations continued to work toward understanding the complex legal issues 
surrounding assisted dying, despite government’s reluctance to engage further in the matter. 
 
The issues surrounding assisted dying once again became the focus of public debate in South 
Africa in 2010 when Professor Sean Davison returned home from New Zealand where he was 
facing murder charges for helping his terminally ill mother to die.8 Then, once again, in 2015 
when terminally ill Advocate Robin Stransham-Ford applied to the North Gauteng High Court, 
                                               
4 Most of the moral, religious, philosophical, ethical and legal arguments that have been propounded over the 
centuries have been modified and absorbed into the modern debate. Accordingly, an examination of the most recent 
and relevant issues pertaining to euthanasia, end of life decisions and assisted dying provide a full understanding of 
the complex issues that have developed over centuries.  
5  LB Grove (2008) Framework for the Implementation of Euthanasia in South Africa (LLM Thesis) Retrieved from 
University of Pretoria UPSpace Institutional Repository 3-4. 
6 SA Law Commission (SALC) Discussion Paper 71 Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life (1998) 
(“Project 86”). 
7 K Magardie ‘Euthanasia not for SA’ 2001 http://mg.co.za/article/2001-04-12-euthanasia-not-for-sa. 
8 T Holmes ‘Granting a Death Wish: South Africa’s Euthanasia Debate’ http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-
granting-a-death-wish. 




seeking permission for a doctor to assist him in ending his life, without the risk of facing 
prosecution.9  
 
This most recent development in the South African discourse pertaining to assisted dying, 
namely the Stransham-Ford case, was decided at a time of increased legal interest in assisted 
dying globally, with high profile cases being decided in Canada and New Zealand within the 
same year. In February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada passed judgment in the landmark 
case of Carter v Canada (Attorney-General)10 and found in favour of the Applicant, granting her 
the right to an assisted death.11 The Supreme Court of Canada established an influential judicial 
precedent and shifted the onus onto the government to promulgate legislation that will permit the 
practice of assisted dying in Canada. Shortly after judgement was handed down in the Carter 
case, the Stransham-Ford case appeared before the North Gauteng High Court and the judgment 
relied heavily on the precedent set by Carter. The Applicant was thus granted the right to a 
doctor-assisted death. The third case that received international attention following the decisions 
of Carter and Stransham-Ford was the New Zealand case of Seales v Attorney-General12 in 
which the Wellington High Court denied terminally ill lawyer Lecretia Seales the right to end her 
life with the assistance of her doctor.13  
 
These three cases have contributed greatly toward the global debate on euthanasia and assisted 
dying, however, once it has been determined whether there is a constitutional duty to provide for 
assisted dying, the responsibility will ultimately lie in the hands of the South African legislature 
to ensure that a secure legislative framework is enacted in order to regulate the practice of 
assisted dying and to ensure protection for all parties involved in the process of end of life care 





                                               
9 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP). 
10 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 2015 SCC 5. 
11 Ibid 147. 
12 Seales v Attorney General [2015] NZHC 1239. 
13 Ibid 12-13. 




1.2 Overview of thesis 
 
This study considers the current South African position on assisted dying and related end of life 
matters, and argues that there is an unjustifiable infringement of the constitutionally protected 
rights to life, dignity and autonomy as a result of the prohibition on assisted dying. In order to 
remedy this limitation of rights, a proposed legislative framework shall be proposed for the 
purposes of establishing a permissive regime in which those who require and seek the assistance 
of a medical practitioner in order to end their lives are permitted to do so, while protecting the 
rights and interests of patients and medical practitioners alike.  
 
Throughout the legal and philosophical debate, however, it is important to remember that the 
issues pertaining to euthanasia and assisted dying are presented for more than just theoretical 
consideration. There are real people suffering from incurable illnesses who have to endure 
intolerable pain and suffering and are victims in the current prohibitory regime. In a democratic 
South Africa, built on the ideals of freedom, dignity and equality for all, where the rights of all 
citizens should be respected and protected, it is submitted that no person should be made to 
suffer the indignity of a progressively degenerative illness when they have unequivocally 
expressed a clear and rational intention to end their own life, but require the assistance of a 
medical practitioner in order to do so.  
 
Despite having to balance competing, and often conflicting, cultural beliefs and values, 
democratic South Africa has already made progressive and often controversial decisions that 
allow for the realisation of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Controversial issues such as 
same-sex marriages and abortions challenge the traditional and conservative values upheld by 
many cultural and religious groups in South Africa, however, carefully drafted legislative 
changes were made to allow for a permissive regime that ensures the protection and guarantee of 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.14  
 
                                               
14 The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 allows for the legal termination of pregnancy under 
controlled circumstances and conditions and the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 was enacted following the case of 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) in which the Constitutional 
Court unanimously held that same-sex couples have the right to marry. 




Similarly, assisted dying lies at the centre of a debate which requires sensitivity and respect for 
conflicting cultural practices and religious beliefs. The effect of the prohibition on assisted 
dying, however, has such severe implications for those who are denied a dignified existence that 
urgent reform is required in South Africa. Legislation must be enacted in order to ensure that 
those affected by the prohibition on assisted dying are afforded the right to retain control over 
their lives when stripped of dignity and autonomy as a result of an incurable terminal illness.  
 
1.3 Terminology and definitions 
 
In the discourse on assisted dying, there are numerous terms with subtle differences in their 
definitions that, when used interchangeably, cause confusion and blur the lines of debate. For the 
sake of clarity, the most important key terms relevant to the issues surrounding assisted dying 




‘Euthanasia’ is defined herein as the intentional ending of a life of suffering, usually by a 
doctor.15 It can be further defined as conduct that brings about an easy and painless death for 
persons suffering from an incurable or painful disease or condition.16 Euthanasia is usually 
performed by a doctor or healthcare professional, but when the act is performed by a loved one, 
it is usually referred to as ‘mercy killing’.17 When referring to ‘euthanasia’ in general terms, 
there is no specific form of conduct implied, thus, the actual act of ‘euthanasia’ may take on 
various forms.  
 
Under the broad umbrella of euthanasia, there are further distinctions that can be drawn between 
different forms of euthanasia such as ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia and ‘voluntary’, 
‘involuntary’ and ‘non-voluntary’ euthanasia. 
 
                                               
15 R Huxtable All That Matters: Euthanasia 1 ed (2013) 5. 
16 DJJ Muckart et al ‘Palliative Care: Definition of Euthanasia’ (2014) 104 SAMJ 259. 
DJ McQuoid-Mason ‘Emergency Medical treatment and ‘do not resuscitate’ orders: when can they be used?’ (2013) 
103 SAMJ 223-225. 
17 Huxtable (note 15 above) 5. 





1.3.2 Active Euthanasia 
 
‘Active euthanasia’ is used herein to denote a form of conduct that requires some ‘positive act’ to 
be performed with the intention to kill the person suffering from an incurable disease.18 Such an 
act could include administering a lethal dose of medication to a patient in order to end their life. 
Active euthanasia, however, fulfils the legal criteria for murder in South Africa, as there is intent, 
causation, a human victim and an unlawful act.19 Even if the person performing an act of active 
euthanasia has noble intentions to relieve the suffering of another person, the motive behind the 
act is immaterial20 and does not change the fact that the killing was intentional and is thus 
considered murder.21 
 
1.3.3 Passive Euthanasia 
 
‘Passive euthanasia’, on the other hand, refers herein to the withholding of medical treatment or 
withdrawal of previously administered life-sustaining measures when treatment appears non-
beneficial or futile.22 Although South African courts have held that instances of passive 
euthanasia are legal,23 there is much contention around this point. The death of a patient is a 
foreseeable consequence of passive euthanasia, so if a person persists in their conduct and causes 
the death of the patient, it can be argued that they acted with intention in the form of dolus 
eventualis.24 What saves a doctor from facing criminal liability, however, is that the element of 
‘unlawfulness’ in the definition of murder25 is not fulfilled and there appears to be a difference 
between intentional killing and merely allowing a person to die. It has been argued that in 
instances of passive euthanasia, the patient’s death is caused directly by the underlying disease or 
                                               
18 Huxtable (note 15 above) 5. 
19 Muckart et al (note 16 above) 259. 
20 CR Snyman Criminal Law 5 ed (2008) 190. 
21 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure. Volume 1, General Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed 
(1997) 225. 
22  DJJ Muckart et al (note 16 above) 259. 
23 Clarke v Hurst NO 1992 (4) SA 630 (D). 
24 Stransham-Ford (note 9 above) 21.1. 
25 Murder is defined as the unlawful, intentional causing of the death of another person. See Snyman (note 20 above) 
447. 




terminal illness and only indirectly as a result of the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures.26 
Therefore, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not cause the patient’s death 
but merely allows the patient to die.27 Despite the legality of passive euthanasia being somewhat 
arguable, it is currently in line with South African law. 
 
1.3.4 Voluntary euthanasia 
 
‘Voluntary euthanasia’ herein refers to conduct that is performed at the request of the person to 
be euthanized in fulfilment of their informed wish to die if the person is a competent individual 
who has expressed their wishes personally or through a valid, written advance directive.28 
 
1.3.5 Involuntary Euthanasia 
 
‘Involuntary euthanasia’ herein refers to euthanasia that is performed contrary to the wishes 
expressed by a competent person who has either not requested the euthanasia or perhaps objected 
outright thereto. The act of killing is therefore performed against the real and informed wishes of 
the patient.29 
 
1.3.6 Non-Voluntary Euthanasia 
 
‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ refers herein to instances where a person is unable to give or deny 
their consent and, as a result, the wishes of the person to be euthanized are unknown or 
unascertainable.30 Non-voluntary euthanasia could be applied to cases where the person is in a 
coma, is too young or lacks mental capacity through brain damage, Alzheimer’s or dementia.31 
 
                                               
26 D McQuoid-Mason ‘Withholding or withdrawing treatment and palliative treatment hastening death: The real 
reason why doctors are not held legally liable for murder’ (2014) 104 SAMJ 102. 
27 End of Life Care: An Ethical Overview, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota (2005) 40 accessed at: 
http://www.ahc.umn.edu/img/assets/26104/End_of_Life.pdf 
28 P Carstens Legal Aspects Relating to Euthanasia and the Moment of Death in South African Medical Law: Some 
Reflections. 
29 Grove (note 5 above) 9. 
30 Ibid. 
31 BBC Should Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide be Legal? 20 August 2007 accessed online at 
http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000145 




Therefore, one can see that for the sake of clarity in the law, it is unwise to use the term 
‘euthanasia’ in a general sense, as one could be referring to a multitude of different scenarios, 
each with different legal consequences. If one wanted to refer to a situation in which a terminally 
ill patient is physically unable to end his/her own life and thus requests a doctor to perform an 
act32 that would end that patient’s life, one should use the term ‘voluntary active euthanasia’. 
When referring to a patient’s request to remove life-sustaining measures such as a feeding tube, 
one would use the term ‘voluntary passive euthanasia’. 
 
1.3.7 Doctor-Assisted Suicide 
 
As can be seen in the definitions above, euthanasia, in all its forms, requires the person 
performing the euthanasia (ie the doctor or healthcare professional) to administer the lethal agent 
or physically perform the act that ends the life of the patient him/herself. Direct participation on 
the part of the doctor in the death of the patient is required in order for the act to be considered 
euthanasia.  
 
The degree of participation by the doctor is essential in differentiating between euthanasia and 
doctor-assisted suicide. ‘Doctor-assisted suicide’ and ‘physician-assisted suicide’ are terms that 
can be used interchangeably, however, one cannot use the terms ‘euthanasia’ and ‘doctor-
assisted suicide’ interchangeably. 
 
‘Doctor-assisted suicide’ thus differs from euthanasia in that the final, fatal act is performed by 
the suffering patient him/herself, and the act was merely facilitated by the assistance of a 
doctor.33 An example of doctor-assisted suicide would be where a patient requests assistance in 
ending their own life and the doctor facilitates this request by making the requisite medication 
available to the patient, but the patient administers the medication him/herself and essentially 
take his/her own life. Should the doctor intervene and physically assist the patient to ingest the 
medication or administer the lethal agent, it is no longer an act of assisted suicide, but would be 
                                               
32 Such an act could be injecting the patient with a lethal dose of opioid medication. 
33 Assisted suicide in the general sense could include assistance from any person, not necessarily a doctor. In South 
Africa, both assisted suicide and doctor-assisted suicide remain criminal offences.  




considered euthanasia. The degree of participation by the doctor in facilitating the death of the 
patient becomes an important factor to consider when contemplating legislative safeguards. 
 
The following example illustrates the importance of correctly determining the degree of 
participation by the doctor and the difference between euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide. If a 
terminally ill patient experiences paralysis and loses control over basic bodily functions such as 
the ability to swallow, that person may be physically unable to ingest any lethal medication on 
his or her own. If doctor-assisted suicide, not euthanasia, was a legal practice, there would be no 
legal course of action that the aforementioned patient could take in order to end his/her own life. 
If legislation is enacted that includes such stringent safeguards that a patient has to end his/her 
life on his/her own (albeit enabled and facilitated by a doctor), many terminally ill patients with 
diminished physical capabilities would be excluded from the operation of the legislation. This 
will be discussed further under the analysis of proposed legislation. 
 
1.3.8 Assisted Dying 
 
When referring to both euthanasia and doctor-assisted dying in a broad sense, the term ‘assisted 
dying’ is used. ‘Assisted dying’ is used herein to refer to situations in which a patient wishes to 
end his/her life and requires the assistance of a doctor, physician or medical practitioner in order 
to do so. The degree of participation by the doctor is not relevant in ‘assisted dying’, so long as 
the doctor plays some role in bringing about the death of a patient who could not do so on his/her 
own.  
 
It should, however, be noted that not all academics agree on the distinction between euthanasia 
and doctor-assisted suicide. Some academics argue that euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide 
have so much in common that there can be no meaningful distinction between the two 
concepts.34 Moreover, the Project 86 Report commented on the distinction between assisted 
suicide and euthanasia, asserting the proposition that in both instances, the person to whom the 
request is directed performs the act with the intention to cause death.35 
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The SA Law Commission further asserted in the Project 86 Report that there is general 
consensus among commentators that there is ‘no intrinsic moral difference’36 between doctor-
assisted suicide and euthanasia, as both instances the patient gives informed consent to obtain the 
assistance of another to achieve the same outcome.37 It was, however, conceded that there is an 
‘important evidentiary difference’ between euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide.38 It was 
submitted that this distinction could have significant value in practice, as assisted suicide is a 
better test for the voluntariness of the choice to die or of the patient’s resolve to end his or her 
life.39 
 
The ultimate conclusion reached in the Project 86 Report on the distinction between euthanasia 
and doctor-assisted suicide was that both instances are, legally speaking, versions of active 
euthanasia and should be treated accordingly.40 The only distinction drawn in the Report was 
between active euthanasia (encompassing both assisted suicide and euthanasia) and passive 
euthanasia, ie the cessation of medical treatment.41  
 
For the purposes of this study, however, the distinction between euthanasia and doctor-assisted 
suicide will be maintained. As mentioned above, the term ‘assisted dying’ will be used to refer to 
both euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide collectively wherever relevant.  
 
1.3.9 Patient autonomy 
 
Another concept worthy of clarification is the concept of patient autonomy. Respect for 
autonomy is one of the fundamental principles of health care42 and was introduced into South 
African law in the 1967 case of Richter and another v Estate Hammann43 and secured in Castell 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Submission from Prof S Benatar and members of the UCT Bio-ethics Centre: David Benatar, Raymond Abratt, 
Lesley Henly, Mark Mason, Lance Michell, Eleanor Nash, Augustine Shutte and JP de V van Niekerk in Project 86 
(note 6 above) 80. 
39 Submission by Dr W Landman in Project 86 Report (note 6 above) 80. 
40 Project 86 (note 6 above) 4.108. 
41 Ibid 79. 
42 End of Life Care: An Ethical Overview, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota (2005) 55. 
Accessed at http://www.ahc.umn.edu/img/assets/26104/End_of_Life.pdf 
43 Richter and another v Estate Hammann 1967 (3) SA 226 (C). 




v De Greef.44 In the context of medical decision-making, the concept of patient autonomy 
protects the patient’s right to self-determination, informed consent and the right to make 
informed decisions without undue influence from the medical professional.45 The ‘best interests’ 
of a patient cannot prevail over the patient’s autonomy and self-determination.46 These principles 
are all founded on the notion of respect for the right to bodily and psychological integrity and the 
right to security and control of one’s body, as found in s12 of the 1996 Constitution.47 Respect 
for patient autonomy and self-determination is an important concept that is central to many of the 
arguments in favour of legalising assisted dying.  
 
Despite conflicting academic opinions as to the necessity of maintaining nuanced distinctions 
between the abovementioned concepts, the concepts delineated above remain central to the 
debate surrounding assisted dying both globally and within South Africa.  
 
In order to give context to the abovementioned concepts and to highlight the relevance of the 
debate, it is helpful to look at recent cases that have grappled with issues pertaining to assisted 
dying. Through an analysis of this case law, it becomes evident why there is a need to keep the 
assisted dying debate alive and to keep working toward perfecting a permissive regime wherein 
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47 R Britz & A le Roux-Kemp ‘Voluntary informed consent and good clinical practice for clinical research in South 
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CHAPTER 2: RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSISTED DYING 
 
In 2015, three influential landmark judgments that dealt with requests for assisted deaths were 
handed down in Canada, South Africa and New Zealand in 2015. Each of the cases heard 
requests from terminally ill, mentally competent adults who sought permission for doctor-
assisted deaths in order to die with dignity and prevent unbearable suffering. The cases all 
approached the issue of determining whether the request for an assisted death should be granted 
from a rights-based perspective, by determining whether the prohibition on assisted dying 
constitutes an unjustifiable infringement of constitutionally protected rights. 
 
Although Canada and South Africa found in favour of the applicants and granted permission for 
assisted dying, New Zealand upheld the prohibition on assisted dying and denied the applicant 
the right to a doctor-assisted death. Although the cases have not signified a major change in legal 
thought globally on the matter of assisted dying, the rights-based analysis provides new insight 
into the assisted dying debate and indicates that there has been a gradual shift in thinking when it 
comes to matters concerning assisted dying. These cases are central to this study as the rights-
based analysis is particularly relevant in a South African context and will be of great value to the 
Constitutional Court, should the matter of assisted dying reach the highest court in South Africa.  
  
The cases shall be discussed in chronological order below as they serve as the point of departure 
for case analysis, and provide solid judicial precedent by representing the most recent legal 
developments in the debate surrounding assisted dying on request. 
 
2.1 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) 2015 SCC 5 
 
On 6 February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down judgment in the case of Carter 
v Canada (Attorney-General), a case on appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in 
which the prohibition of assisted suicide was challenged as being contrary to the Canadian 










The Carter case was preceded by a long period of suffering for the applicant which began in 
2009 when Gloria Taylor was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a progressive 
muscular degenerative disease which results in a loss of the ability to perform basic bodily 
functions such as speaking, walking, chewing, swallowing and, eventually, the ability to 
breathe.48 Gloria Taylor launched an application to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Canadian Criminal Code provisions that prohibited her from obtaining assistance in dying.49 
Joining Taylor in her claim were Hollis Johnson and Lee Carter who had previously assisted 
Carter’s mother to die a dignified death by travelling with her to the assisted suicide clinic, 
Dignitas, in Switzerland.50 These parties were also joined by Dr William Shoichet, a Canadian 
physician willing to offer his services in physician-assisted dying, should the practice no longer 
be prohibited.51 The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) also joined as party 
to the claim, as the BCCLA advocates for education regarding end of life choices, including 
assisted suicide and has an interest in health policies and the rights of patients.52  
 
Gloria Taylor endured much pain and suffering as her physical condition deteriorated, rendering 
her dependent on assistance for basic daily tasks which Taylor described as 'an assault on her 
privacy, dignity and self-esteem.'53 Taylor expressed her wishes to her family and friends and 
stated that she did not want to 'live in a bedridden state, stripped of dignity and independence.'54  
 
Taylor explained her wish for a physician-assisted death as follows: 
 
                                               
48 Carter (note 10 above) 11. 
49 Specific provisions of the Criminal Code that were challenged included: s14, s21, s22, s222 and s241. 
50 At Dignitas in Switzerland, Kathleen Carter was able to take the prescribed dose of sodium pentobarbital which 
caused her to die within 20 minutes, in the company of her loved ones. Dignitas is a Swiss non-profit organisation 
that advocates for self-determination, autonomy and dignity through education and support for the improvement of 
care and choice in life, particularly at the end of life. Dignitas allows its members who are suffering from illnesses 
which will inevitably lead to death to request an accompanied suicide and, provided all the correct procedures have 
been followed, Dignitas will assist its members to die in a dignified manner.  http://www.dignitas.ch/?lang=en 
51 Carter (note 10 above) 11. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 12. 
54 Ibid. 




I do not want my life to end violently. I do not want my mode of death to be traumatic for my 
family members. I want the legal right to die peacefully, at the time of my choosing, in the 
embrace of my family and friends.  
 
I know that I am dying, but I am far from depressed. I have some down time - that is part and 
parcel of the experience of knowing that you are terminal. But there is still a lot of good in my 
life; there are still things, like special times with my granddaughter and family, that bring me 
extreme joy. I will not waste any of my remaining time being depressed. I intend to get every bit 
of happiness I can wring from what is left of my life so long as it remains a life of quality; but I 
do not want to live a life without quality. There will come a point when I will know that enough 
is enough. I cannot say precisely when that time will be. It is not a question of ‘when I can’t 
walk’ or ‘when I can’t talk’. There is no pre-set trigger moment. I know that, globally, there will 
be some point in time when I will be able to say - ‘this is it, this is the point where life is just not 
worthwhile’. When that time comes, I want to be able to call my family together, tell them of my 
decision, say a dignified goodbye and obtain final closure - for me and for them. 
 
My present quality of life is impaired by the fact that I am unable to say for certain that I will 
have the right to ask for physician-assisted dying when that ‘enough is enough’ moment arrives. I 
live in apprehension that my death will be slow, difficult, unpleasant, painful, undignified and 
inconsistent with the values and principles I have tried to live by. 
 
What I fear is a death that negates, as opposed to concludes, my life. I do not want to die slowly, 
piece by piece. I do not want to waste away unconscious in a hospital bed. I do not want to die 
wracked with pain.55 
 
A lack of funding prevented Taylor from travelling to Dignitas, consequently Taylor found 
herself facing the cruel choice of whether to kill herself while she was still physically able to do 
so, thereby ending her life prematurely, or giving up any degree of control she could have over 
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2.1.2 Statutory Provisions: Canadian Criminal Code 
 
As a result of this predicament, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the following 
provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code: 
 
s14: No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on him and such consent does not 
affect the criminal responsibility of any person by whom death may be inflicted on the 
person by whom consent is given. 
 
s21:  (1)(b) Everyone is a party to an offence who does or omits to do anything for the purpose 
of aiding any person to commit it; or  
 (2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful 
purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common 
purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the 
commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common 
purpose is a party to that offence.  
 
s22:  (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that other 
person is afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to that 
offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way different from that 
which was counselled. 
 (2) Everyone who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party to every 
offence that the other commits in consequence of the counselling that the person who 
counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of 
the counselling.  
  (3) For the purposes of this Act, ‘counsel’ includes procure, solicit or incite. 
 
s222: (1) A person commits a homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes 
the death of a human being.  
(2) Homicide is culpable or not culpable. 
(3) Homicide that is not culpable is not an offence. 
(4) Culpable homicide is murder or manslaughter or infanticide. 
(5) A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being (a) 
by means of an unlawful act; … 





s241:  Everyone who 
(a) counsels a person to commit suicide, or 
(b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada was of the view that s241 and s14 formed the core of the 
constitutional challenge, as those were the two main provisions that ultimately prohibited the 
provision of assistance in dying.56 The other provisions mentioned above, sections 21, 22 and 
222, would only be engaged as long as assisted dying remains an ‘unlawful act’ or an offence.57 
It should be noted that although s241(a) did not directly contribute to the prohibition on assisted 
suicide, it was still included as one of the statutory provisions being challenged.  
 
2.1.3 Constitutional Rights: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
Having examined the statutory provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code that were being 
challenged, the Court touched on the three main provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms that were of relevance in the matter, namely: 
 
s1:  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out 
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.  
 
s7:  Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  
 
s15(1):  Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability.  
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2.1.4 Judicial History: British Columbia Supreme Court [2012 BCSC 886, 287 C.C.C (3d) 1] 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada traced the judicial history of the matter, starting with the action 
that came before the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2012.58 In the court a quo, the trial 
judge examined extensive evidence from Canada (as well as evidence from other permissive 
jurisdictions) on medical ethics and the then relevant ‘end-of-life’ practices.59 The court a quo 
considered the associated risks as well as the feasibility of implementing safeguards to combat 
the risks that arise from permitting assisted suicide. 
 
An interesting finding made by the court a quo, based on the evidence of ethicists, was that there 
is ‘no ethical distinction between physician-assisted death and the other end-of-life practices 
whose outcome is highly likely to be death.’60 These end-of-life practices include palliative 
sedation and the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment.61 The trial 
court found further that, despite a lack of formal societal consensus on the matter of physician-
assisted dying, there was strong consensus that it would only be ethical to respect voluntary 
adults who are 'competent, informed, grievously and irremediably ill'62 and where the assistance 
would be 'clearly consistent with the patient’s wishes and best interests',63 and provided for the 
purpose of relieving suffering.64 
 
The trial judge then examined evidence from other jurisdictions that currently permit doctor-
assisted death, such as the state of Oregon in the USA, Belgium and the Netherlands. The court 
reviewed the safeguards that had been implemented in each jurisdiction as well as the 
effectiveness of each regulatory regime. It was concluded that although none of the other 
jurisdictions had achieved a perfect regime, there had been general compliance with regulations 
and evidence indicated that a system could be designed and implemented to ensure protection for 
the vulnerable in society.65 Moreover, this finding was supported by experienced empirical 
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researchers and practitioners who concurred that safeguards can operate effectively to protect 
patients from abuse, while still affording competent patients the right to control the timing of 
their deaths.66 
 
Having assessed evidence pertaining to the implementation and effectiveness of safeguards and 
regulatory regimes from other jurisdictions, the trial judge paid careful consideration to the risks 
arising from permissive regimes and the feasibility of implementing effective safeguards. The 
trial judge reached the conclusion that doctors are capable of reliably assessing the competence 
of a patient who requests an assisted death, and that it is possible for a doctor to detect ‘coercion, 
undue influence and ambivalence’67 during an examination of the patient. 
 
Further evidence of physicians and experts in patient assessments was examined and the trial 
judge found that the ‘informed consent standard could be applied in the context of doctor-
assisted dying,’68 provided that care is taken to ensure a patient is 'properly informed of his 
diagnosis and prognosis', and that the treatment options presented to the patient include all 
reasonable palliative care options and interventions that are available to the patient.69 
 
The trial judge ultimately concluded that the risks associated with a doctor-assisted death can be 
identified and substantially minimised by means of a ‘carefully designed system’70 with strict 
limitations that are meticulously monitored and enforced. 
 
2.1.4.1  Trial Judge’s Charter Analysis: s15 
 
The trial judge then proceeded with an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The first issue addressed by the trial judge was whether the 
prohibition on doctor-assisted dying violates the equality guarantee enshrined in s15 of the 
Charter. In summary, it was found that persons with physical disabilities, including those 
suffering from terminal illnesses, are subject to a disproportionate burden, as they are often 
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restricted to embarking on hunger strikes and self-imposed dehydration as methods by which 
they can end their own lives.71 This was found to be a discriminatory distinction and could not be 
justified under s1 of the Charter which allows for the reasonable limitation of rights.72 
 
Despite the broad objective of the prohibition on assisted dying being ‘to protect the vulnerable 
from being induced to commit suicide at a time of weakness,’73 the trial judge found that 
Parliament’s objectives could equally be achieved by a 'stringently limited, carefully monitored 
system of exceptions.'74 
 
Permission for physician-assisted death for grievously ill and irremediably suffering people who 
are competent, fully informed, non-ambivalent, and free from coercion or duress, with stringent 
and well-enforced safeguards, could achieve that objective in a real and substantial way.75 
 
2.1.4.2  Trial Judge’s Charter Analysis: s7 
 
In an analysis of s7 of the Canadian Charter, the trial judge found that all three of the core 
elements of s7 (namely: life, liberty and security of the person) were impacted by the prohibition 
on doctor-assisted dying.76 When looking at the first element of s7, the right to life, the argument 
of a qualitative approach to life was rejected and the trial judge found that a person’s right to life 
will only be engaged by a threat of death.77 It was concluded, however, that a person’s right to 
life will be engaged when the prohibition on doctor-assisted death forces one to take one’s own 
life earlier than one otherwise would have if one were permitted to request a doctor-assisted 
death. 
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In looking at the second core element of s7, liberty, the trial judge found that a deprivation of 
liberty (encompassing the right to ‘non-interference by the state in fundamentally important and 
personal medical decision-making’78) is caused by the prohibition on doctor-assisted dying.79  
 
With regard to the third core element of s7, security of the person, it was found in the court a quo 
that the prohibition on doctor-assisted death affected Taylor’s security of the person, as it 
restricted her control of bodily integrity.80  
 
The trial judge therefore concluded that the deprivation of Taylor’s s7 rights was not in line with 
the principles of fundamental justice (more specifically, over-breadth and gross 
disproportionality)81 and thus found that neither the infringement of s15 rights, nor the 
infringement of s7 rights could be justified in terms of s1 of the Charter.82  
 
The trial judge ultimately declared the prohibition on doctor-assisted death unconstitutional and 
granted a one-year suspension of validity, providing Gloria Taylor with a constitutional 
exemption for use during the period of suspension. Taylor, however, died before the matter went 
on appeal without accessing the constitutional exemption granted to her by the trial judge.83  
 
2.1.5 Judicial History: British Columbia Court of Appeal [2013 BCCA 435, 51 B.C.L.R (5th) 
213] 
 
The decision of the trial judge was challenged by the Crown and taken on appeal to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal84 on the grounds that the trial judge was bound to follow the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in the earlier case of Rodriguez.85  
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Sue Rodriguez was diagnosed with ALS in 1992 and was informed that her condition was 
rapidly deteriorating. With a short life-expectancy and knowledge of the symptoms of her 
condition, Rodriguez wanted to control the ‘circumstances, timing and manner of her death’86 
and thus sought an order to allow her to end her own life with the assistance of a qualified 
medical practitioner.87 Rodriguez applied for an order to declare s241(b) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code invalid, pursuant to s24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on 
the basis that her rights in terms of sections 7, 12 and 15(1) of the Charter were violated. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, however, upheld the relevant provisions in the Criminal Code and 
denied Rodriguez the right to an assisted death. 
 
Despite substantial factual similarities between Rodriguez and Carter, the majority of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal read Rodriguez as a rejection of the notion that the prohibition on 
assisted dying infringes a person’s right to life in terms of s7 of the Charter.88 Moreover, it was 
held that the principles of fundamental justice that were introduced subsequent to the Rodriguez 
decision (namely over-breadth and gross disproportionality) did not create a new legal 
framework under s7 and the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the outcome would not 
have changed.89  
 
In the Rodriguez decision, it was held that the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide deprived 
the appellant of her security of the person, in a manner consistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice, and further, that the appellant’s s15 rights were also violated but this 
limitation was justified in terms of s1 of the Charter.90 
 
The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Carter judgment noted that the s15 
equality argument was disposed of in Rodriguez, and the Court of Appeal ultimately concluded 
that 'the trial judge was bound to find that the plaintiff’s case had been authoritatively decided by 
Rodriguez.'91 
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The main issue raised in the Carter appeal was whether s241(b)92 of the Canadian Criminal Code 
(which expressly prohibits physician-assisted dying)93 violated Gloria Taylor’s rights under s7 
and s15 of the Charter.94 Two claims were advanced by the appellants, first, that competent 
adults are deprived of their right to life, liberty and security of the person in terms of s7 of the 
Charter when grievous and irremediable medical conditions cause them to endure intolerable 
physical or psychological suffering. The second claim advanced by the appellants was that 
physically disabled adults are deprived of their right to equal treatment under s15 of the Charter 
as a result of the prohibition. 
 
Before analysing the abovementioned claims under the Charter provisions, there were two 
preliminary issues to be dealt with: (i) whether the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
Rodriguez could be revisited, and (ii) whether the prohibition falls beyond the scope of 
Parliament’s power.95 
 
Although the doctrine of stare decisis is a fundamental legal principle, it is not absolute and a 
trial court may reconsider the findings of a higher court under two circumstances: first, when a 
new legal issue is raised and second, where there is a ‘change in the circumstances or evidence 
that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.’96 Both of these circumstances were seen 
to be fulfilled in the present case, as there had been changes in the legal framework pertaining to 
s7 and new evidence was presented on combatting the risks that arise in relation to assisted 
suicide.97  
 
                                               
92 241(b) Everyone who aids or abets a person to commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
93 The appellants used the terms ‘physician-assisted death’ and ‘physician-assisted dying’ in a context where a 
physician provides or administers medication that intentionally brings about the patient’s death, at the request of the 
patient.  
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96 Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 42. 
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whether the law interferes with conduct that has no connection to the objectives of the law (Bedford 101). The 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada did not even consider whether the prohibition was grossly 
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The evidence before the Court in Rodriguez was based on three pillars: (i) the ‘widespread 
acceptance of a moral or ethical distinction between active and passive euthanasia;’98 (ii) the lack 
of viable alternative measures to protect the vulnerable (‘halfway measures’)99 and (iii) the 
‘substantial consensus in Western countries’100 that a blanket prohibition against assisted dying 
should be implemented to guard against the ‘slippery slope.’101 The trial judge, however, had 
evidence on record that was able to undermine each of these three conclusions. 
 
2.1.6 Analysis of s7: Does the Law Infringe the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person? 
 
Having traced the judicial history of the matter, the Supreme Court of Canada then proceeded to 
analyse s7 of the Charter and explained the two stage enquiry used to demonstrate a violation of 
the rights contained in the Charter. First, one must establish that the right has been engaged by 
showing that the law interferes with, or deprives one of their life, liberty or security of the 
person. Once it has been established that s7 has been engaged, it must then be shown that the 
interference with or deprivation of rights is incongruent with the principles of fundamental 




Each of the three core components of s7, namely life, liberty and security of the person were 
analysed in turn, starting with the right to life. The Court declined to interfere with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the prohibition on doctor-assisted death effectively forced some 
individuals to commit suicide prematurely (fearing that they would be physically incapable of 
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ending their lives themselves upon reaching a point of intolerable suffering), and that this 
engaged one’s right to life under s7 of the Charter.103 This finding established that the prohibition 
effectively deprives some individuals of life104, and thus engages the right to life in s7 of the 
Charter.  
 
The argument for a qualitative approach to the right to life105 was raised by the appellants. The 
trial judge had rejected this qualitative approach to the right to life and held that the right to life 
is only engaged when there is a 'threat of death as a result of government action or laws'106, and 
that the right to life is limited to a right 'not to die.'107 The qualitative approach to the right to life 
was supported in dissenting judgments by Finch CJBC in the Court of Appeal and by Cory J in 
Rodriguez.108 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada stated that ‘the sanctity of life is one of the most fundamental 
societal values’109 but further noted that 's7 is rooted in a profound respect for the value of 
human life'110, and that s7 also encompasses life, liberty and security of the person during the 
passage to death. The Court thus concurred with the finding in Rodriguez, that the sanctity of life 
'is no longer seen to require that all human life be preserved at all costs.'111 It was therefore 
concluded that, in certain circumstances, one’s choice regarding the end of one’s life is a choice 
that is entitled to respect.112  
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on the basis that dying is an integral part of living. 
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2.1.6.2  Liberty and Security of the Person 
 
The Court then turned its focus to the other fundamental components of s7, namely: liberty and 
security of the person.113 It was held that there is ‘concern for the protection of individual 
autonomy and dignity’114 underpinning the rights to liberty and security of the person, as 
‘liberty’ protects the right to 'make fundamental personal choices, free from state interference'115 
and ‘security of the person’ encompasses 'a notion of personal autonomy involving… control 
over one’s bodily integrity free from state interference.'116  
 
The Court examined (and agreed with) the trial judge’s conclusion that Gloria Taylor’s right to 
liberty and security of the person was limited by the prohibition on doctor-assisted dying, as it 
interfered with 'fundamentally important and personal medical decision-making'117, and deprived 
her of control over her bodily integrity through the imposition of pain and psychological 
stress.118 Moreover the prohibition on doctor-assisted death impinged on Taylor’s security of the 
person by imposing stress, physical suffering and psychological pain upon her.119 The trial judge 
had further noted that persons who are ‘seriously and irremediably ill’120 are unable to make a 
choice that is integral to one’s sense of dignity and personal integrity and that is ‘consistent with 
one’s lifelong values.’121 
 
The Court held further that an individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition is a matter ‘critical to their dignity and autonomy.’122 The inconsistency in the law was 
highlighted in instances where a terminally ill person, facing a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition, is permitted to access palliative sedation, reject artificial nutrition and 
hydration, or request the withdrawal or removal of life-sustaining measures, yet that person is 
denied the right to request the assistance of a doctor in facilitating their death. This inconsistency 
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interferes with one’s ability to make important decisions regarding one’s bodily integrity and 
medical care, thus infringing one’s liberty. Moreover, one’s security of the person is impinged 
upon when one is subjected to such enduring intolerable suffering, as Taylor was forced to 
endure.  
 
In summary, the Court acknowledged that s7 recognises the value of life, but also honours the 
role of autonomy and dignity at the end of one’s life. The Court concluded that s241(b) and s14 
of the Criminal Code infringe the rights to liberty and security of the person, ‘insofar as they 
prohibit physician-assisted dying for competent adults who seek such assistance as a result of a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes enduring and intolerable suffering.’123 
 
2.1.7 Principles of Fundamental Justice 
 
Having confirmed the deprivation of rights under s7, the Court had to complete the second stage 
of the enquiry and determine whether this deprivation of rights was in line with the principles of 
fundamental justice. It should be noted that s7 of the Charter does not guarantee that there will 
never be state interference in a person’s life, liberty or security of the person, but rather ensures 
that, should there be any state interference, it does not violate the principles of fundamental 
justice.124  
 
Although there are numerous principles of fundamental justice, the Court highlighted three 
principles that are central to the jurisprudence of s7 adjudication. These principles ensure that 
laws that impinge on life, liberty and security of the person must not be: (i) arbitrary, (ii) 
overbroad or (iii) have consequences that are grossly disproportionate to their object.125 
 
The Court referred to the Reference Question of In Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act126 to comment on 
the origins of the principles of fundamental justice. The core principles of fundamental justice, as 
referred to above, were derived from the essential elements of the Canadian system of justice, 
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which was founded on a belief in the dignity and worth of every human person.127 Hence, should 
a person be deprived of their constitutional rights arbitrarily or in a manner that is overbroad or 
grossly disproportionate, that such a deprivation would amount to diminishing that person’s 
worth and dignity. 
 
In accordance with Canadian jurisprudence, the first step in determining whether a law that 
impinges on a person’s right to life, liberty or security of the person does so in a way that 
violates the abovementioned three principles of fundamental justice, is to first identify the object 
of the law that is being challenged. 
 
The trial judge initially concluded that the object of the prohibition on assisted dying was the 
protection of vulnerable persons who may be ‘induced to commit suicide at a time of 
weakness.’128 All parties to the proceedings, except the Attorney-General of Canada, agreed to 
that formulation of the object. While accepting that the prohibition was intended to protect the 
vulnerable, it was argued that the object should be formulated and defined in broader terms as 
simply: 'the preservation of life.'129 The Supreme Court, however, did not accept this submission, 
as the justices argued that stating the object too broadly has the potential to 'short circuit'130 the 
analysis, making it too difficult to accurately assess whether the means used to further the object 
are overbroad or grossly disproportionate. The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately concluded 
that the object of the prohibition on assisted dying is the rather narrow goal of protecting 
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The first principle of fundamental justice analysed by the court was that of arbitrariness. 
Arbitrariness, as a principle of fundamental justice, focuses on the rational connection between 
the object of the law and limitation that is imposed on one’s constitutional rights (in this 
instance, the rights being life, liberty or security of the person).133 Should a law not fulfil its 
objectives (or if it exacts a constitutional price without furthering the public good that is said to 
be in the interest of the law), it shall be deemed to be arbitrary.134 
 
In the specific context of the prohibition on doctor-assisted dying, the object of the law, as 
mentioned above, is to protect the vulnerable from being induced to end their lives in a time of 
weakness. It was submitted that a complete blanket ban on assisted suicide successfully achieves 
this object, therefore the Court held that the limitation of one’s rights under s7 of the Charter is 




The enquiry into over-breadth, as explained by the Court, asks whether a law, ‘that takes away 
rights in a way that generally supports the object of the law, goes too far by denying the rights of 
some individuals in a way that bears no relation to the object.’136 In the trial court, the Attorney-
General of Canada had conceded that not every person who wishes to commit suicide is a 
vulnerable person and thus, the law catches people outside of the class of persons that the object 
of the law seeks to protect.137 Moreover, the trial judge had accepted that Gloria Taylor was one 
such person: ‘competent, fully informed and free from coercion or duress.’138 The Supreme 
Court of Canada ultimately concluded that the prohibition on assisted dying was over-broad.139  
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2.1.7.3 Gross Disproportionality 
 
Finally, the Court turned to the principle of gross disproportionality. In order to assess whether 
the principle of gross disproportionality has been infringed, the Court needs to determine 
whether the impact of the restriction on the individual’s life, liberty or security of the person was 
grossly disproportionate to the object of the measure.140 This enquiry draws comparison between 
the apparent purpose of the law and the negative impact on the claimant’s rights. From this 
comparison, it should be determined whether or not the impact is ‘completely out of sync with 
the object of the law.’141 The standard, however, is very high and not every law that has an object 
incommensurate with its impact will reach the standard for gross disproportionality.142  
 
The Court agreed with the findings of the trial judge who held that the negative impact on a 
person’s life, liberty and security of the person caused by the prohibition on assisted dying was 
'very severe' and, therefore, grossly disproportionate to its objective.143 The Court held further 
that the prohibition on assisted dying creates ‘unnecessary suffering’144 for affected individuals 
and deprives one of the ability to determine what to do with one’s own body and how one’s body 
should be treated. This, in the opinion of the Court, may cause an affected individual to take their 
own life sooner than they would if they were permitted to lawfully obtain the assistance of a 
doctor in facilitating their death when suffering becomes unbearable. 
 
2.1.8 Analysis of s15 
 
Having reached the conclusion that the prohibition on assisted dying violated s7 of the Charter 
and was not in line with all of the core principles of fundamental justice, the Court found it 
unnecessary to determine whether the prohibition further violated s15 of the Charter and did not 
consider this question. 
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2.1.9 Analysis of s1: Justification of the Infringement 
 
The Court proceeded to examine whether or not Canada could justify the infringement of 
Taylor’s s7 rights under the limitation clause found in s1 of the Charter by showing: first, that the 
law has a pressing and substantial object and second, that there is proportionality between the 
selected means and the object. 
 
On the issue of proportionality, a law will be deemed proportionate if it meets the following 
three criteria: (i) there is a rational connection between the means adopted and the objective; (ii) 
there is minimal impairment of the right in question and (iii) there is proportionality between the 
deleterious and salutary145 (the damaging and the beneficial) effects of the law.146 The Court 
further stated that proportionality does not require perfection, but that s1 only requires the limits 
to adhere to a standard of reasonableness.147  
 
2.1.9.1 Rational Connection 
 
The first criterion of proportionality, a rational connection between the means adopted and the 
objective, requires the government to show there is a causal connection ‘on the basis of reason or 
logic’148 between the infringement of Taylor’s rights and the benefit sought by the law. This 
connection should demonstrate that the means adopted by the law are a rational way for the 
legislature to pursue its objective, and that the absolute prohibition on doctor-assisted dying is 
rationally connected to the ultimate goal of protecting the vulnerable from being induced to take 
their own lives in a time of weakness. 
 
The Court agreed with the findings of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, that the prohibition 
of a risky activity is a rational method of curtailing the risks involved,149 thereby concluding that 
there was a rational connection between the prohibition on doctor-assisted dying and the 
objective of protecting the vulnerable from being induced to commit suicide at a time of 
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weakness. Despite the appellants arguing that the absolute nature of the prohibition was not 
logically connected to the object of the provision (and claiming that the prohibition goes too far) 
the Court found a logical connection between the means and the objective. It was suggested that 
it is rational to conclude that the vulnerable will be protected from being induced to commit 
suicide at a time of weakness if there is a law in place that bars all persons from accessing 
assistance in committing suicide.150  
 
2.1.9.2 Minimal Impairment 
 
The second criterion of proportionality, minimal impairment of the right in question, essentially 
determines whether the limit on the right is ‘reasonably tailored to the objective.’151 The question 
at the core of the enquiry is whether there are ‘less harmful means of achieving the legislative 
goal’,152 thus imposing a burden on the government to prove that there are no means which are 
less drastic that could achieve the ultimate objective in a real and substantial manner. The 
deprivation of rights, therefore, should be confined to only what is reasonably necessary to 
achieve the government’s object.  
 
The trial judge had been tasked with determining whether a system that was less restrictive of 
life, liberty and security of the person could combat the risks associated with doctor-assisted 
death or whether the Attorney-General of Canada was correct in asserting that the risks could not 
be adequately addressed through the implementation of safeguards. As indicated above, the trial 
judge had assessed a plethora of evidence and concluded that ‘the risks inherent in permitting 
physician-assisted death can be identified and substantially minimised through a carefully 
designed system imposing stringent limits that are scrupulously monitored and enforced.’153  
 
The trial judge found further that an absolute prohibition on doctor-assisted dying would only be 
necessary if there was evidence to show that doctors are incapable of accurately assessing the 
‘competence, voluntariness and non-ambivalence in patients.’154Similarly if there was evidence 
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that permissive jurisdictions enabled the abuse of patients, carelessness, callousness or a slippery 
slope leading to the casual termination of life,155 or that doctors are incapable of applying the 
informed consent standard required for medical treatment, an absolute prohibition on doctor-
assisted dying would be necessary.156 The evidence presented at trial, however, lead the trial 
judge to reject these possibilities and it was concluded by the trial judge that there was no 
evidence to support the notion that vulnerable persons, such as the elderly and disabled, were at 
heightened risk of accessing physician-assisted dying,157 or that there was an inordinate impact 
on socially vulnerable populations,158 or that a permissive regime would result in a slippery 
slope. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed these conclusions drawn by the trial judge and agreed 
that the absolute prohibition on doctor-assisted dying was not minimally impairing.159 
 
With regard to the vulnerability of patients, the Court concluded that concerns about decisional 
capacity and vulnerability arise in all matters concerning end-of-life medical decision-making 
and that the vulnerability of a patient can be ‘assessed on an individual basis using the 
procedures that are applied by doctors in their assessment of informed consent and decisional 
capacity.’160 
 
2.1.9.3 Deleterious Effects and Salutary Benefits 
 
Given the Court’s conclusion that the law prohibiting doctor-assisted dying is not minimally 
impairing, the Court found it unnecessary to analyse the final criterion which would weigh the 
impact of the law on protected rights against the ‘beneficial effect of the law in terms of the 
greater public good.’161 
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2.1.10 Conclusion and Remedy 
 
Ultimately the Court concluded that s241(b) and s14 of the Canadian Criminal Code could not be 
saved by s1 of the Charter and justified as a reasonable limitation of the rights protected by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada declared: 
 
s241(b) and s14 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe s7 of the Charter and are of no force 
or effect to the extent that they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person 
who (i) clearly consents to the termination of life and (ii) has a grievous and irremediable162 
medical condition (including illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is 
intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.163  
 
With regard to the constitutional exemption granted by the lower court, the Supreme Court of 
Canada found the exemption was not the appropriate remedy as it would ‘create uncertainty, 
undermine the rule of law and usurp the role of Parliament.’164 The appropriate remedy, as 
determined by the Court, was to declare s241(b) and s14 of the Criminal Code ‘void insofar as 
they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person’165 who meets the 
abovementioned criteria. 
 
The scope of the declaration, however, was intended to deal with the factual circumstances of the 
Carter case only, and the Court clearly stated that they would make no pronouncement on any 
other situations where physician-assisted dying may be sought.166 The declaration of invalidity 
was suspended for a period of 12 months and the onus was shifted to Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures to respond by ‘enacting legislation consistent with the constitutional 
parameters’ established by the Court.167 
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The Court clarified that the declaration of invalidity would not compel any physicians to provide 
assistance in dying, it simply renders the criminal prohibition invalid. Drawing parallels with the 
topic of a doctor’s role in abortions, the Court confirmed that a doctor’s participation in assisted 
dying is a matter of conscience and/or religious belief.168 The Court stated explicitly that they did 
not wish to pre-empt the legislative response to the judgment, but simply underlined that there 
needs to be reconciliation between the rights of patients and the rights of physicians.169  
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada’s thorough analysis of the limitation of rights pertaining 
to assisted dying and end of life decisions provides a solid foundation upon which further 
analysis and debate can be structured. The Carter case is a landmark decision that has left an 
indelible impression on the international discourse on assisted dying, and represents progress 
toward a society in which terminally ill patients can have their right to live and die with dignity 
respected and protected. 
 
Historically, Canadian jurisprudence has had an important influence on the drafting of the South 
African Bill of Rights as well as the South African position on the limitation of rights and, as 
such, the South African Bill of Rights bears great similarity to the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.170 Due to the similarities between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and the South African Bill of Rights, it should be noted that there are certain congruencies 
between the trial judge’s Charter analysis and the limitation of rights enquiry that is used to 
determine whether an infringement of rights is justifiable in a South African context. Although 
the structure of the enquiry is not identical to that previously followed by the Constitutional 
Court in South Africa, the findings of the trial judge in the Carter case will be useful and 
informative when determining whether the prohibition on assisted suicide constitutes a justifiable 
limitation of rights in a South African context.  
 
Modern legal developments in Canadian jurisprudence pertaining to the prohibition on assisted 
dying have also served to inform the most recent South African case dealing with assisted dying: 
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the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Carter v Canada (Attorney General)171 proved highly 
persuasive in the case of Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and 
Others.172  
 




Subsequent to the Canadian decision of Carter, the North Gauteng High Court handed down a 
controversial landmark ruling in April 2015 that sparked both national and international debate 
as the court found in favour of the applicant, Robin Stransham-Ford, granting him the right to die 
with dignity with the assistance of a qualified medical doctor.  
 
Like Gloria Taylor, Robin Stransham-Ford died of natural causes before judgment was handed 
down in his favour, thus rendering the successful outcome of the case a hollow victory, but a 
small victory nonetheless for all those in support of doctor-assisted dying for the terminally ill.  
 
The matter was brought before Judge Fabricius in the North Gauteng High Court as an urgent 
application which the judge agreed required an immediate decision.173 Although judgment on the 
matter was handed down by the High Court, Judge Fabricius asserted the view that it would be 
preferable for the Constitutional Court to pronounce on the relevant principles, and that the ideal 
course of action would be for the legislature to consider the whole topic and produce a Bill 
which could be subject to the scrutiny of the Courts. These sentiments echo the Supreme Court 
of Canada's judgment in Carter. 
 
After establishing that the matter of doctor-assisted suicide should ultimately be dealt with by the 
legislature, Judge Fabricius drew attention to the Project 86 Report which was submitted to the 
Minister of Health in 1998. The Minister and/or the legislature did not give the Report, or the 
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proposed legislation, sufficient attention because there were other, more urgent, matters that 
required attention.174 
 
It was noted that it has been 16 years since the Project 86 Report was submitted to the Minister 
of Health, and Fabricius J suggested that the topic of euthanasia is now important enough to be 
given due regard. Moreover, Fabricius J was of the opinion that serious consideration should be 
given to introducing a Bill on the basis of the SA Law Commission’s Project 86 Report which 
supports the development of the common law in the context of assisted dying and specifically in 
the context of the Bill of Rights.175 
 
Fabricius J commenced with an analysis of the profile and status of the Applicant, looking at his 
education, qualifications and experience. It was established that the Applicant was well educated, 
holding a number of law degrees amongst other qualifications, and had many years of experience 
both as an advocate and as an accountant and a tax practitioner. The Court further relied on 
confirmatory affidavits from dependents, and a report from a clinical psychologist to establish a 
well-rounded understanding of the Applicant’s character. These reports stated the Applicant 
showed no evidence of any psychiatric disorders, that he had no cognitive impairments and that 
he was of rational temperament. It was also confirmed by the clinical psychologist that the 
Applicant displayed a ‘good understanding and appreciation of the nature, cause and prognosis 
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2.2.2 Order sought by Applicant 
 
The order sought by the Applicant was essentially threefold. First, to declare that the Applicant 
may request a registered medical practitioner178 to end his life, or to enable the Applicant to end 
his own life by the administration or provision of some or other lethal agent. Second, the 
Applicant sought a declaration that the aforementioned medical practitioner should not be held 
accountable, and would be free from any civil, criminal or disciplinary liability that may arise 
from either the administration or provision of a lethal agent or from the cessation of the 
Applicant’s life as a result of the administration or provision of a lethal agent to the Applicant. 
Third, to develop the common law to the extent required by declaring that the conduct mentioned 
above lawful and constitutional in the circumstances of this particular matter.179 
 
Several pertinent questions, which are central to the debate concerning end of life decisions, 
were raised by the Applicant. These questions included: 
 
(i) Is it conceivable that the health of a person may deteriorate to a level where that person would 
be justified in wishing to take their own life?  
(ii) Ought this suffering person be permitted to take his/her own life? 
(iii) Should another person be allowed to assist the sufferer to end his life? 
(iv) May this person be a medical practitioner? 
(v) What safeguards need to be in place?180 
 
2.2.3 Analysis of Applicant’s health, quality of life and imminent future 
 
The Court proceeded with an analysis of the Applicant’s health, taking into account his full 
medical history and the rapid deterioration of his health in the weeks preceding the application. 
The Court made mention of a report of Dr RAG De Muelenaere,181 obtained by the Health 
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Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), which was not under oath, but the Court quoted 
the following extract from the report: 
 
There are palliative and medical treatments available which can improve the situation for a 
lengthy period of time. I have sympathy for a patient with widespread metastatic cancer and in 
my work I have to deal with such situations on a regular basis. I understand the patient asking for 
“an easy way out” but there are important factors to consider in a case like this. Wider societal 
aspects need to be addressed, as in the debate preceding abortion legislation. All moral, legal and 
ethical aspects need to be discussed. With modern medicine including high doses of opioid 
(morphine-like) drugs less than 10% of patients will die in pain, regardless of kidney function. 
Hospice doctors and staff specialise in symptom control of terminal patients and this service can 
be provided at home in the vast majority of patients. Most medical funds will allow home nursing 
as a benefit and terminal care definitely does not need to be provided in a hospital setting for the 
majority of cases if that would be the patient’s wish. All in all, I consider this request for “assisted 
suicide” to be against current medical practice. 
 
Stransham-Ford, however, responded to this report by arguing that palliative care was inadequate 
to satisfy his need and his right to die in dignity whilst being fully aware of the moment of his 
death.182 This is an argument raised by many who are opposed to palliative care, as a loss of 
consciousness and awareness of one’s surroundings constitutes a severe impairment of one’s 
dignity and patient autonomy.183 
 
Having examined the status of Stransham-Ford’s health, Fabricius J proceeded to discuss 
Stransham-Ford’s quality of life, looking at the physical symptoms of suffering, the changes in 
his lifestyle as well as the effect that pain medication had had on him.184 The deterioration in 
Stransham-Ford’s quality of life was illustrated by an extensive list of his physical ailments 
which included: severe pain, nausea, vomiting, stomach cramps, constipation, disorientation, 
weight loss, loss of appetite, high blood pressure, increased weakness and frailty related to 
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kidney metastasis, an inability to get out of bed, anxiety and an inability to sleep without 
morphine or other painkillers.185 
 
Fabricius J established that Stransham-Ford’s diagnosis and prognosis had been confirmed by 
both a general practitioner (who lectures and specialises in palliative care) as well as a specialist 
urologist, both of whom had personally examined Stransham-Ford.186 Fabricius J further listed 
the medicine, procedures and traditional remedies that Stransham-Ford had undergone which 
included: dendritic cell therapy, traditional Chinese medicine, surgery, cannabis, the insertion of 
a renal stent for his kidneys from his kidneys to his bladder, the insertion of a catheter fitter, 
morphine, buscopan and other pain inhibitors and finally palliative care.187 
 
With regard to Stransham-Ford’s imminent future, Fabricius J acknowledged that Stransham-
Ford was acutely aware and had accepted his death was imminent, however, this was not an issue 
in dispute. Fabricius J further elaborated on Stransham-Ford's worsening condition and agreed 
that his physical condition would continue to deteriorate with the progression of time and that he 
would, at a later stage, require stronger doses of opioid drugs and painkillers such as morphine 
with a possibility of hospitalisation.188 
 
Stransham-Ford's increased frailty was also highlighted, as Fabricius J made mention of the fact 
that he was in need of constant assistance with regular daily activities including getting out of 
bed, bathing, brushing his teeth and eating. It was further acknowledged that, with the 
progression of his disease, Stransham-Ford would become increasingly more confused and afraid 
and that there was a possibility that his last breath would require the aid of a machine. 
 
A powerful statement made by Stransham-Ford summed up the feelings of many of those who 
are dying of a terminal illness by saying that he was ‘not afraid of dying, he was afraid of dying 
while suffering.’189 This statement strikes at the heart of the debate surrounding assisted dying, 
as no person should be faced with such a fear in the final months, weeks or days of their life. 
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2.2.4 Current Legal Position in South Africa 
 
Having analysed Stransham-Ford’s physical condition and medical history, Fabricius J 
proceeded with an analysis of the current legal position in South Africa.190 It was undisputed 
that, as the law stands, assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia is unlawful.191 Relying on 
s39 ('Interpretation of the Bill of Rights') and s8 ('Application') of the 1996 Constitution, it was 
argued by the Applicant that a development of the law was required.192 Emphasis was placed on 
s39(2) which reads: ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common or 
customary law, every Court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.’ 
 
Moreover, attention was drawn to s8(3) of the 1996 Constitution which reads: 
 
When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a Court - (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right 
and (b) may develop the rules of the common law to limit the right, provided the limitation is in 
accordance with s36(1)’ 
 
With regard to the interpretation of s8(3), reference was made to the case of Bel Porto School 
Governing Body v Premier Western Cape193 in which it was held: 
 
Section 8(3) requires that the court should develop a suitable remedy. No particular remedy, apart 
from the declaration of invalidity, is dictated for any particular violation of a fundamental right. 
Because the provision of remedies is open-ended and therefore inherently flexible, Courts may 
come up with a variety of remedies in addition to a declaration of constitutional invalidity.194 
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Thus, as indicated by the Court, the appropriateness of the remedy would be determined by the 
facts of the particular case. Fabricius J stated explicitly that his personal thoughts and feelings 
were irrelevant and would not influence his decision-making.195 
 
2.2.5 Basis of the Applicant’s relief 
 
Fabricius J highlighted the four main provisions of the 1996 Constitution upon which the 
Applicant's argument was founded. These provisions included s1;196 s7;197 s8; and s12.198 
 
2.2.6 Freedom, security and control to die with dignity 
 
Before proceeding with the Applicant’s argument, Fabricius J deemed it necessary to comment 
on the role of dignity in the constitutional dispensation of South Africa, relying on the judgment 
of S v Makwanyane199 and Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa.200 Fabricius J 
quoted from the Makwanyane judgment to highlight the importance of human dignity in South 
Africa as he confirmed: ‘the recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the 
new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution.’201 Fabricius J further agreed 
with Ackermann in saying that, in the context of s10 read with s1 and s7(2), human dignity, apart 
from being just a value and a right, is also a categorical imperative.202  
 
The amici curiae admitted prior to the hearing of the case, Doctors for Life and Cause for 
Justice, submitted affidavits which were considered by the court. One of the arguments raised by 
Cause for Justice was that Stransham-Ford had merely expressed a ‘subjective view of dignity 
and his medical condition, whereas the values enshrined in the Constitution had to be looked at 
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and determined objectively.’203 This argument, however, was not accepted, as Fabricius J held 
that as a practical necessity, a court must look at the subjective views and the condition of a 
person who claims that their constitutional rights have been impaired. 
 
Fabricius J further referred to Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development204 wherein the Constitutional Court held that the rights 
of individuals guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are also subjective rights and it was also 
iterated that persons should be regarded as recipients of rights rather than as objects of statutory 
mechanisms.205 
 
Fabricius J quoted further from The Bill of Rights Handbook206 on the concept of human dignity:  
 
Human dignity is not only a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and 
protected, it is also a value that informs the interpretation of possibly all other fundamental rights 
and it is further of central significance in the limitations enquiry. 
 
Having looked at the role of human dignity, Fabricius J then raised the question of dolus 
eventualis with regard to the removal or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.207 As the law 
currently stands in South Africa, it is entirely permissible within the law to withdraw or remove 
any life-sustaining treatment that a patient is reliant on, even if it would cause the patient to die 
from natural causes.208 However, Fabricius J considered whether such a course of action could be 
regarded as a good example of intention in the form of dolus eventualis. In order for a person to 
have acted with intention in the form of dolus eventualis, that person must subjectively foresee 
the possibility, however remote, of his/her actions resulting in the death of another person, yet 
he/she persists in that course of action whether or not death ensues.209 Therefore, a person must 
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have reconciled him/herself with the possibility of causing the death of another person when 
pursuing a course of conduct.210  
  
A philosophical argument raised by the Applicant was that there is essentially no difference 
between assisted suicide, in the form of providing the suffering patient with a lethal agent, or by 
switching off a life-supporting device or removing life-sustaining treatment211 or injecting the 
suffering patient with a strong dose of morphine or other opioid drugs, with the intention of 
relieving their pain but in the knowledge that death will ensue as a result of their respiratory 
system closing. The Applicant called the distinction between the withdrawal of treatment to 
allow a natural process of death, and physician-assisted death ‘intellectually dishonest’212 as 
there is no real logical or ethical distinction between the two concepts. Fabricius J expressed a 
view that there is merit to this contention, but that it is best left to the philosophers and thus 
confined the matter to the constitutional debate.  
 
It should be noted that, at a later stage in the judgment, Fabricius J returned to the consideration 
of dolus eventualis and the differences between active and passive euthanasia, and agreed with 
the contention that the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures is a good example to illustrate 
dolus eventualis.213 Moreover, it was reasoned that the act of withdrawing previously 
administered life-sustaining treatment remains an active and positive step taken by the doctor 
which directly causes the death of the patient, and Fabricius J further found the argument that the 
duty of a medical practitioner to respect a patient’s dignity remains the same in instances of 
active and passive euthanasia to be sound.214  
 
In further analysis of the notion of dignity, Fabricius J endorsed the view of O’Reagan J in 
Makwanyane when it was held that the right to life must be a life worth living. 
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The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all other rights in the Constitution. Without life in 
the sense of existence, it would not be possible to exercise rights or be the bearer of them. But the 
right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to existence. It is not 
life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, not the right to human life: the right to 
share in the experiences of humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our 
constitutional values. The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual value of 
each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such a 
society. The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
dignity and to life are intertwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a right to be 
treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. 
Without life, there cannot be dignity.215 
 
In addition, Fabricius J noted that separating moral concerns from the reality of human and 
animal suffering has caused great harm to mankind throughout history.216  
 
Fabricius J then endorsed217 the belief asserted by Carstens and Pearmain218 that the underlying 
values, spirit and purport of the applicable sections of the 1996 Constitution support the 
introduction of the practice of voluntary active euthanasia in South Africa. Such a permissive 
regime requires a system, along the lines of the recommendations made by the South African 
Law Commission in the Project 86 Report, that should be strictly monitored and regulated in 
order to ensure respect for the autonomy of competent terminally ill patients and to guard against 
any possible abuse of the system.219 The aforementioned authors state that euthanasia is a matter 
of patient autonomy and individual choice. This averment, however, is too narrow in its scope 
and should be expanded to include all end of life decisions, and not simply euthanasia.  
 
The notion of dying as a part of living was then analysed by the judge. It was submitted by the 
Applicant’s Counsel that death is not the opposite of life; it is an important part of life and the 
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completion thereof.220 It therefore follows that it is a fundamental human right to be able to die 
with dignity, a right which the courts are obliged to advance, respect, promote, protect and fulfil 
in terms of s 1(a), s7(2) and s8(3)(a) of the 1996 Constitution. Fabricius J agreed with this 
contention raised by the Applicant’s Counsel. Moreover, Fabricius J agreed that the sacredness 
of the quality of life should be accentuated rather than the sacredness of life itself. 
 
In further contemplation of dying as a part of living, Fabricius J highlighted the assertion made 
by the South African Law Commission that a dying person is still a living person and is still 
entitled to all the rights of a living person.221 
 
Fabricius J further noted that there is a large degree of irony in the prohibition on assisted dying, 
particularly with regard to the issue of personal autonomy.222 We are always told to take 
responsibility for our lives, yet we cannot take responsibility for our own deaths. We are 
afforded the right to choose our education, career, lifestyle, whether or not to get married, 
whether to have children or to abort a pregnancy, to practise birth control or to refuse birth 
control and we can even die at war for our country, yet we cannot decide how to die. 
 
The moral beliefs or doubts of third parties should not be the main point in the context of end of 
life decisions, it is the personal choice and autonomy of the patient that should be respected. This 
is consistent with the values underlying the Bill of Rights in an open and democratic society. 
Moreover, there is no duty or positive obligation to live. A person can waive their right to life at 
any stage, yet when they are physically unable to do so, they are denied assistance. There are 
several such ironies in the SALC report that were pointed out by Fabricius J.  
 
A further inconsistency in the State’s position toward legalising assisted dying is that in the 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health223 decision, the deliberate withholding of kidney dialysis 
treatment lead to the death of Mr Soobramoney. Fabricius J noted how it is sadly ironic that the 
State can justify and sanction death when it is bad for a person, yet deny a good and merciful 
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death to another.224 Public opinion, however, is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to 
interpret the Constitution and hold up its provisions without fear or favour,225 thus the ultimate 
decision lies with the Court and not with public opinion. Judge Fabricius made this very clear in 
the Stransham-Ford judgment when stating that due consideration had been given to the views 
expressed in the SALC report and in the affidavits presented by Doctors For Life, but that the 
order had to be made in accordance and compliance with the constitutional imperative.226  
 
With regard to the Applicant’s undignified death, Fabricius J agreed with several of the 
contentions made by the Applicant, namely that there is ‘no dignity in having severe pain all 
over one’s body; being dulled with opioid medication; being unaware of your surroundings and 
loved ones; being confused and dissociative; being unable to care for one’s own hygiene; dying 
in a hospital or hospice away from the familiarity of one’s own home; dying, at any moment, in a 
dissociative state unaware of one’s loved ones being there to say goodbye.’227 
 
2.2.7 Humanity of euthanasia to cease unbearable suffering 
 
It has long been recognised and accepted that with regard to the treatment of animals, it is only 
humane to euthanize a ‘severely injured or diseased animal.’228 There is a statutory obligation 
incumbent on an owner of an animal to end the life of a seriously diseased or injured animal that 
is in such a serious condition that prolonging its life would be cruel and would cause unnecessary 
suffering for the animal. It is therefore more than just merciless and cruel, but a crime to permit 
an injured or sick animal to suffer through pain, yet such a dignified death cannot be afforded to 
human beings. Animals that are irremediably ill and are suffering through pain and illness are 
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2.2.8 The core concern regarding the legalisation of euthanasia 
 
One of the core concerns that is central to the debate surrounding the legalisation of voluntary 
active euthanasia in South Africa is the protection of the weak and vulnerable in society.229 This 
concern was also raised in the abovementioned case of Carter v Canada (Attorney General) as 
the object behind the prohibition on assisted dying. It was proposed by the SALC and submitted 
by the Applicant in the Stransham-Ford case that, ‘but for the risk posed to the weak and 
vulnerable, voluntary active euthanasia should be legalised in South Africa.’230 The most 
pragmatic solution that arises for this issue of protecting the weak and vulnerable in society, 
however, is to ensure there are sufficient safeguards in the legislation envisaged to regulate and 
control the practice of legal assisted dying. These safeguards would prevent a ‘ripple effect’231 
and would combat the slippery slope argument raised by many opponents of assisted dying.  
 
With regard to the best interests of the patient in the context of assisted dying, the Court is 
usually inclined to interpret the best interests of the patient in favour of the preservation of life, 
however, there have been instances where the courts find that the preservation of life does not 
extend as far as requiring that life should be maintained at all costs, regardless of the quality of 
life. In the aforementioned case of Clarke v Hurst NO232 an application for the cessation of life 
sustaining treatment was granted by the Court to end the life of a patient in accordance with his 
wishes contained in an advance healthcare directive, thus placing the best interests of the patient 
above the preservation of life. 
 
2.2.9 International developments of the law pertaining to euthanasia 
 
Counsel for the Applicant submitted proof of at least eleven foreign jurisdictions in which 
assisted dying in some form (assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia) is not considered 
unlawful.233 Fabricius J then referred to the decision of Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), 
highlighting the Supreme Court of Canada’s duty to balance competing values of great 
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importance, namely the autonomy and dignity of a competent adult with the sanctity of life and 
the need to protect the vulnerable. 
  
Fabricius J expressly noted the substantial similarities between the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and the South African Bill of Rights and as such, found the Supreme Court of 
Canada's reasoning in Carter not only enlightening, but also very persuasive. Moreover, 
Fabricius J noted that the findings with regard to the limitation of rights in Carter were 
consistent with the limitation clause found in s36 of the 1996 Constitution. Specific reference 
was made to the Supreme Court of Canada’s finding that the total prohibition on assisted dying 
was overbroad and Fabricius J drew parallels between this finding and s36(1)(e) of the 1996 
Constitution which  provides that when a Court is considering the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights, it must take into account, amongst others, ‘less restrictive means to achieve the stated 
purpose.’234  
 
Although the finer details of a limitation of rights enquiry were not explored, several parallels 
were drawn between Canadian and South African law and, as a result, Fabricius J endorsed and 
liberally applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada and the dictum of Carter v 
Canada (Attorney General). Moreover, Fabricius J noted how great emphasis was placed on the 
concepts of dignity and personal autonomy in the context of assisted dying and it was reasoned 
that if proper safeguards were to be instated, there would be no need for a total prohibition on 
assisted dying.235 It was asserted that the State should not have the power to dictate to a 
terminally ill patient that he has to make use of other options available to him, such as well 
managed palliative care. 
  
Although there is no South African legislation that directly mirrors the Canadian laws that 
impinge on life, liberty or security of the person, Fabricius J agreed that any relevant legislation 
on the matter should not be arbitrary, overbroad or have grossly disproportionate consequences. 
Fabricius J further agreed with the findings of the Supreme Court of Canada in respect of the 
effect of the total prohibition on assisted suicide. The severity of the impact on terminally ill 
patients, the imposition of unnecessary suffering and denying terminally ill patients the right to 
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determine what to do with their own bodies could cause affected persons to take their own lives 
sooner than they would have it they were allowed lawful access to a doctor’s assistance in 
dying.236 
  
2.2.10 The South African Law Commission’s Report on Euthanasia and the Artificial 
Preservation of Life 
  
The South African Law Commission's Project 86 Report was referred to several times 
throughout the Stransham-Ford judgment and Fabricius J agreed with the Counsel for the 
Applicant's  submission that the Commission's approach and public opinion were of limited 
value. The ultimate question to be determined was not based on public opinion, but rather what 
was provided for in the Constitution. The safeguards proposed in the Project 86 Report were not 
dealt with expressly in the Stransham-Ford judgment, but Fabricius J stated that he had 
considered the proposed safeguards and agreed that they were valuable and appropriate in most 
cases, but definitely not all.237 
  
The argument raised by the Respondents, that the Court's ‘facts-based development of the 
common law would leave a void which would ultimately lead to abuse,’238 was dispelled by 
Fabricius J.239 Any other court will also have to scrutinise the facts before it and determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether there are sufficient safeguards against abuse in the absence of 
legislation. Fabricius J was firm in his disagreement with the Respondents when stating that his 
case-by-case approach would not leave a void in the common law which could lead to abuse.240 
  
The Applicant was able to show that sufficient safety measures had been employed to ensure that 
there could be no possibility of abuse.241 These measures included: adequate knowledge of his 
illness, the prognosis of his condition and the treatment options available to him; full command 
of his mental faculties and thorough consideration of his request for an assisted death, as well as 
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persistence in his decision to end his life with dignity and his request as contained in the Notice 
of Motion.242 
  
2.2.11 Respondent's Argument 
 
It was argued by the Respondents that the conduct of a medical practitioner who assists in the 
death of another person would amount to a criminal offence and the Respondents further denied 
that the Applicant’s right to dignity was involved in the matter.243 It was argued that the 
application should be dismissed because, if the order were to be granted, it would equate to the 
promotion of ‘inequalities and discrimination of the poor by way of limiting access to the Courts 
to the rich only.’244 This, it was argued, would be a violation of the Constitutional guarantee for 
the poor to have access to the Courts.245  
 
The abovementioned argument was dismissed by the Court as being irrelevant, but it was said 
that it may become relevant at a later stage in future cases if no objective safeguards are put in 
place by a Court or by way of legislation.  
 
The Respondents further argued that the manner of the Applicant’s death was not undignified. 
Moreover, it was argued that the suffering endured by the Applicant was natural and therefore 
did not infringe on his constitutional right to dignity. Fabricius J deemed these comments, 
however, to be unjustified and lacking a factual basis.246  
 
Fabricius J briefly returned to the Applicant’s argument that there is no logical or justifiable 
distinction between the active and passive euthanasia. The Applicant asserted that in both 
instances, the primary intention of the doctor is ensuring the patient’s quality of life and dignity 
and that the secondary result, the death or hastening of the death of the patient, remains the same 
in both instances.  
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With regard to conscientious objection, the Applicant submitted that his rights are ‘sacrosanct to 
him’247 and ‘should not be sacrificed on the altar of religious self-righteousness.’248 Moreover, 
‘conscientious objections’ to other issues such as homosexuality, same-sex marriages, mixed 
race marriages and abortion did not detract from the rights enshrined in the 1996 Constitution 
and, similarly, should not do so in the context of assisted dying.  
 
2.2.12 Relief sought by the Applicant 
 
It was submitted by the Applicant that the Court could grant the relief sought by the Applicants 
with the safeguards contained in the application, until the legislature could formulate statutory 
safeguards. Examples were made of foreign jurisdictions that have ruled on matters pertaining to 
assisted dying before legislation is promulgated, with particular reference to the Canadian 
decision of Carter.249  
 
Fabricius J made further mention of s39(2) of the 1996 Constitution whereby careful 
consideration of the common law is required to determine whether the common law requires 
development in any particular case. It was noted that the legislature bears the primary 
responsibility for law reform, rather than the courts and that should a Court develop the common 
law, it should only be done incrementally.250 Section 39 does not merely provide a Court with 
discretionary powers, but rather imposes an obligation on the Court.251 
 
2.2.13 Findings of the Court 
 
Fabricius J ultimately found that the absolute prohibition on assisted suicide, as prescribed by the 
common law, is not in line with the rights relied upon by the Applicant.252 Life is sacrosanct, the 
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right to life is of paramount importance which is supported by s11 of the 1996 Constitution, but 
the right to life does not mean that an individual is obliged to live regardless of his quality of life. 
The order granted by the Court was as follows: 
 
It is declared that: 
1.1 The Applicant is a mentally competent adult; 
1.2 The Applicant has freely and voluntarily, and without undue influence requested the Court to 
authorise that he be assisted in the act of suicide; 
1.3 The Applicant is terminally ill and suffering intractably and has a severely curtailed life 
expectancy of some weeks only; 
1.4 The Applicant is entitled to be assisted by a qualified medical doctor, who is willing to do so, 
to end his life, either by administration of a lethal agent or by providing the Applicant with the 
necessary lethal agent to administer himself; 
1.5 No medical doctor is obliged to accede to the request of the Applicant; 
1.6 The medical doctor who accedes to the request of the Applicant shall not be acting 
unlawfully, and hence, shall not be subject to prosecution by the Fourth Respondent or subject to 
disciplinary proceedings by the Third Respondent for assisting the Applicant. 
2. This order shall be read as endorsing the proposals of the Draft Bill on End of Life Decisions as 
contained in the Law Commission Report of November 1998 (Project 86) as laying down the 
necessary or only conditions for the entitlement to the assistance of a qualified medical doctor to 
commit suicide. 
3. The common law crimes of murder or culpable homicide in the context of assisted suicide by 
medical practitioners, insofar as they provide for an absolute prohibition, unjustifiably limit the 
Applicant’s constitutional rights to human dignity, (s10) and freedom to bodily and psychological 
integrity (s12(2)(b) read with s1 and s7), and to that extent are declared to be overbroad and in 
conflict with the said provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
4. Except as stipulated above, the common law crimes of murder and culpable homicide in the 
context of assisted suicide by medical practitioners are not affected. 
 
The Stransham-Ford judgment has marked a turning point in the South African jurisprudence 
pertaining to assisted dying, however, the judgment was somewhat lacking in its contribution to 
the analysis of the limitation of rights. Although the Carter judgment included an in-depth 
analysis of the rights infringed by the prohibition on assisted dying, and these rights are protected 




by an instrument that is substantially similar to the South African Bill of Rights, there are certain 
nuances in the limitation of rights enquiry in a South African context that cannot be adequately 
captured through a direct application of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 
Despite its brief analysis of the prohibition on assisted dying and the implications thereof, the 
Stransham-Ford judgment has contributed greatly to the international discourse on assisted 
dying as it indicates a potential shift toward a permissive regime being implemented in South 
Africa and was referred to by the High Court of New Zealand in the subsequent case of Seales v 
Attorney-General.253 
 




The case of Seales v Attorney-General,254 bearing remarkable similarities to the Stransham-Ford 
case, was brought before Justice Collins of the High Court of New Zealand at Wellington in June 
2015. The Plaintiff, Lecretia Seales, was a high powered lawyer, passionate about law reform, 
who worked at the Law Commission in New Zealand, writing laws to improve the lives of 
people living in New Zealand. Seales was described by Former Prime Minster of New Zealand 
Sir Geoffery Palmer (with whom she had worked for six years in private practice as well as at the 
Law Commission) as a ‘law reformer par extraordinaire’ with a ‘developed social conscience 
and a feeling for how things should be made better.’ 
 
Lecretia Seales, however, was diagnosed with a brain tumour in 2011 which had gone through 
almost a quarter of her brain and required immediate surgery. Intense brain surgery and radiation 
treatment reduced the size of the tumour which enabled her to travel extensively and continue 
working. Although Ms Seales was able to return to work at the Law Commission on reduced 
hours, she began experiencing a loss of vision and weakness on the left side of her body which 
became partial paralysis, leaving her unable to use her left hand. The decline in Ms Seales' 
physical health continued, despite taking powerful drugs to reduce these effects. Ms Seales was 
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terminally ill and had exhausted all available remedies. Doctors informed Ms Seales that she had, 
at most, eighteen months to live and, should the tumour spread to vital parts of her brain, she 
would have less than three months to live. 
 
As a result of her circumstances, Ms Seales was determined to challenge the Attorney General 
and sought a clarification of the law to declare that it would not be an offense for a doctor to 
assist her to die in her circumstances.255 The law in New Zealand, as it relates to assisted dying, 
was somewhat unclear. Assisting suicide is illegal under the Crimes Act 1961,256 but Ms Seales 
felt that it should not be so in her case because she was competent, consenting and terminally 
ill.257 Moreover, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) provides that Ms Seales 
had the right not to be deprived of life in terms of s8258, and the right not to be subjected to cruel 
and degrading treatment in terms of s9.259 Lecretia Seales’ first affidavit in the proceedings is 
attached as Annexure A. 
 
Ms Seales' legal team argued that denying her lawful access to a physician-assisted death 
amounted to a breach of her rights and fundamental freedoms under the NZBORA. The 
argument raised by Ms Seales' opponents claimed that the issue was unethical and impermissible 
within the law,260 stating that the purpose of the current law is to protect the sanctity of life as 
well as vulnerable members of society. Moreover, it was argued that if Ms Seales were to 
succeed, it would have far-reaching implications beyond just her own case and would apply to all 
persons with terminal illnesses, therefore the usual understanding of the Crimes Act (which 
prohibits physician-assisted suicide) should continue to apply unless it is altered by Parliament. 
 
Lecretia Seales had become increasingly paralysed and was unable to speak by the time the 
matter came before the Court. Justice Collins ultimately decided against Ms Seales and denied 
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her bid to be allowed assistance in dying.261 The judgment confirmed that the Crimes Act is not 
incompatible with the NZBORA and that only Parliament can change the law pertaining to 
physician-assisted suicide.262 Ms Seales died of natural causes shortly after her lawyers and 
family received the judgment and had relayed Justice Collins’ decision to her, informing her that 
she would not be allowed to lawfully seek assistance in dying and would have to wait to die a 
natural death.  
 
The Seales judgment is worthy of thorough analysis to determine why Justice Collins denied Ms 
Seales the right to a doctor-assisted death when, less than six months prior to the matter, judges 
in South Africa and Canada had found in favour of assisted dying. 
 
2.3.2 Analysis of application and ruling 
 
The application that was brought before Justice Collins sought to give Ms Seales the option of 
determining when she died by allowing her doctor to either administer a fatal drug to her or to 
provide her with a fatal drug which would enable her to end her life by herself without facing 
criminal charges.263 
 
The application was twofold: first, Ms Seales sought a declaration that her doctor would not be 
committing murder or manslaughter under s160(2)(a) and (3) of the Crimes Act by 
'administering aid in dying'264 to Ms Seales. In addition, a second declaration was sought that her 
doctor would not be assisting her to commit suicide which is prohibited by s179(b) of the Crimes 
Act if her doctor 'facilitated aid' in Ms Seales' death.265 In the alternative, it was asked that 
Justice Collins declare the abovementioned provisions of the Crimes Act inconsistent with the 
rights guaranteed by s8 and s9 of the NZBORA (the right not to be deprived of life and the right 
not to be subjected to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment respectively).  
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Thus, the declarations sought by Ms Seales were: first, that s160 of the Crimes Act be declared 
inconsistent with sections 8 and 9 of the NZBORA 'to the extent that administered aid in dying is 
unlawful under s160 for a competent adult who clearly consented to the administered aid in 
dying and has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to 
the individual in the circumstances of his or her illness'266 and second, that s179 of the Crimes 
Act is declared inconsistent with s8 and s9 of the NZBORA 'to the extent that it prohibits 
facilitated aid in dying for a competent adult who clearly consented to the facilitated aid in dying 
and has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the 
individual in the circumstances of his or her illness.'267 
 
Justice Collins, however, found that Ms Seales' right not to be deprived of life in terms of s8 of 
the NZBORA was engaged, but not breached and that her right not be subjected to cruel, 
degrading or disproportionately severe treatment in terms of s9 of the NZBORA was not 
engaged by her tragic circumstances.268 It was, therefore, held that the aforementioned provisions 
of the Crimes Act are not inconsistent with s8 and s9 of the NZBORA. It was further noted that 
the declarations sought by Ms Seales would have required Justice Collins to change the effect of 
the offence provisions of the Crimes Act and that issuing the criminal law declarations sought by 
Ms Seales would be a departure from the constitutional role of Judges in New Zealand.269 Justice 
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2.3.3 Key principles 
 
Justice Collins highlighted four key principles which he felt the case engaged: (i) the sanctity of 
life; (ii) respect for human dignity; (iii) respect for individual autonomy; and (iv) protection of 
the vulnerable.271 These four principles resonate with the global debate pertaining to assisted 
dying and are not case-specific or unique to the Seales case. 
 
2.3.3.1 Sanctity of life 
 
The first principle highlighted by Justice Collins, the sanctity of life, underpins the criminal law 
relating to murder and culpable homicide but is not an absolute principle.272 Reference was made 
to both British and New Zealand cases273 pertaining to the limitation of the sanctity of life 
principle where acceptable standards of medical practice prevailed over the sanctity of life.274 
These principles are mirrored in a South African context in the Soobramoney275 case where 
rational decisions, taken in good faith, concerning the distribution of medical resources deprived 
a patient of access to dialysis, which caused the patient to die. 
 
2.3.3.2 Respect for human dignity 
 
The principle of respect for human dignity was then discussed by Justice Collins, making 
reference276 to the Stransham-Ford case and quoting Justice Fabricius’ reliance on Justice 
O’Reagan’s words in S v Makwanyane:  
 
The right to life… incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to dignity and to life are 
intertwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being 
                                               
271 Seales (note 12 above) 62. 
272 Seales (note 12 above) 64. 
273 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] All ER 821 HL and Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 
1 NZLR 235. 
274 Ibid para 65. 
275 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
276 Seales (note 12 above) 66. 




with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be 
dignity.277  
 
The reference to South African decisions by a New Zealand High Court judge highlights the 
transcendence of the principle of respect for human dignity, one of the most important founding 
principles of the South African Constitution. 
 
Justice Collins further emphasised the importance of the principle of respect for human dignity 
by placing it in an international context, referring to the major international human rights 
instruments that respect and protect the right to human dignity, such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter,278 as well as other New Zealand human rights 
cases279 which emphasised the importance and significance of the principle of respect for human 
dignity.  
 
In further analysis of the principle of respect for human dignity, Justice Collins referred to the 
Carter280 case by highlighting the Supreme Court of Canada’s assertion that underlying the 
rights to liberty and security of the person is 'a concern for the protection of individual autonomy 
and dignity.'281 Justice Collins held that an individual’s sense of his or her own bodily integrity 
and dignity in response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition is 'critical to their 
dignity and autonomy.'282 
 
2.3.3.3 Respect for individual autonomy 
 
The third key principle discussed by Justice Collins was that of respect for individual 
autonomy.283 Although this is a multi-faceted concept, it was stated that individual autonomy 
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encompasses 'self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and limitations 
that prevent [the individual from making] meaningful choice[s] [about his or her body].'284 
 
Justice Collins then referred to s11 of the NZBORA which provides that: 'Everyone has the right 
to refuse to undergo any medical treatment.'285 Despite ethical and philosophical challenges to 
the notion of assisted suicide being viewed as an expression of individual autonomy, from a legal 
standpoint, the principles of freedom, liberty and security of the person are underpinned by the 
principle of respect for individual autonomy.286  
 
It is interesting to note that in a South African context, the National Health Act 61 of 2003 
mirrors the sentiments of s11 of the NZBORA by respecting the individual autonomy of a health 
care user. Section 7 of the National Health Act provides that 'a health service may not be 
provided to a user without the user’s informed consent' and expressly provides that a healthcare 
user must be informed of their 'right to refuse health services.' Thus, the National Health Act 
allows for the user to retain a degree of control and their individual autonomy is respected by 
allowing a patient to partake in the decision-making process and by ensuring they are fully 
informed and aware of their right to refuse health services. 
 
In addition, Justice Collins quoted further from the Carter case, in which s7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which encompasses the right to liberty and security of the 
person) was described as such: 
 
Liberty protects the right to make fundamental personal choices, free from state interference… 
Security of the person encompasses a notion of personal autonomy involving control over one’s 
bodily integrity free from state interference and it is engaged by state interference with an 
individual’s physical or psychological integrity, including any state action that causes physical or 
serious psychological suffering.287 
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2.3.3.4  Protection of the vulnerable 
 
The final of the four key principles identified by Justice Collins was the protection of the 
vulnerable. Vulnerability, however, is a multi-faceted concept which proves difficult to define as, 
it amalgamates numerous elements. Some of these elements, as delineated by Justice Collins, 
include: communication vulnerability (those with a diminished capacity to communicate as a 
result of distressing symptoms), institutional vulnerability (those existing under the authority of 
others), differential vulnerability (those who are subject to the informal authority or independent 
interests of others), medical vulnerability (those with distressing medical conditions) and social 
vulnerability (those who are members of an undervalued social group).288  
 
Justice Collins then referred to the research of Oregon psychiatrist, Professor Ganzini, which 
aimed to determine whether the laws permitting physician-assisted dying in Oregon placed 
vulnerable members of society at risk. Professor Ganzini’s research concluded that terminal 
illness in itself is not a factor that would make a person vulnerable.289 
 
Vulnerability is of a highly personal nature and is context-specific which can be influenced by 
numerous factors. In cases dealing with requests for assisted deaths, one would have to analyse 
the vulnerability of the particular person making the request in order to determine whether or not 
to grant their request. Ms Seales consistently maintained that she was not vulnerable in any sense 
and that her wishes were carefully considered and reasoned, a self-assessment that was endorsed 
by her doctor.290 Justice Collins respected Ms Seales' statement of her belief that she was not 
vulnerable and declared it a 'rational and intellectually rigorous response to her circumstances.'291 
 
Justice Collins emphasised that all branches of government in New Zealand should be vigilant to 
protect the vulnerable in society as he noted the importance of ensuring that medical judgments 
are not based upon assumptions of vulnerability, as this would devalue the respect for the 
principle of individual autonomy.292  
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2.3.4 Analysis of the criminal law provisions 
 
Having looked at the four key principles engaged by the case, Justice Collins proceeded with an 
analysis of the criminal law provisions relevant to the matter. In New Zealand, as in South 
Africa, no person may consent to death. Section 63 of the New Zealand Crimes Act provides 
that: 
 
No one has a right to consent to the infliction of death upon himself; and, if any person has killed, 
the fact that gave any such consent shall not affect the criminal responsibility of any person who 
is party to the killing. 
 
Further provisions of the Crimes Act relevant to the matter were: 
 
s160 Culpable Homicide which provides: 
 
‘(2) Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person (a) by an unlawful act… (3) 
culpable homicide is either murder or manslaughter.’ 
 
s164 Acceleration of Death, which provides: 
 
‘Every one who by any act or omission causes the death of another person kills that person, although the 
effect of the bodily injury caused to that person was merely to hasten his death while labouring under 
some disorder or disease arising from some other cause.’ 
 
s179(b) Aiding and abetting suicide, which provides: 
 
'Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who aids or abets any person in the 
commission of suicide.' 
 
These provisions of the Crimes Act were analysed extensively by Justice Collins to determine 
the content and scope of the prohibition on assisted dying in New Zealand. Justice Collins 
undertook his legislative analysis with a focus on the text and purpose of the relevant provisions 




of the Crimes Act and noted that he would interpret the Crimes Act in the context of 
'contemporary circumstances.'293  
 
Drawing on jurisprudence from the United Kingdom and New Zealand, Justice Collins 
concluded that Ms Seales' consent to her death would not provide a lawful excuse for her doctor 
if aid in dying was administered to her.294 It was further held, however, that should a lethal dose 
of morphine be administered to Ms Seales, the doctor’s actions may not be unlawful within the 
meaning of s160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act if the doctor’s intention was to provide palliative relief, 
even if Ms Seales' life would be shortened as an indirect, but foreseeable, consequence.295 
Furthermore, it was confirmed that the withdrawal or removal of life-sustaining measures (where 
continued support would be medically futile) does not constitute an unlawful act for the purposes 
of s160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act. 
 
Justice Collins also looked extensively at the definition of suicide and noted the suggestion that 
the term ‘suicide’ in s179 of the Crimes Act could be interpreted to exclude ‘rational decisions to 
die’ from its ambit.296 It was in his assessment, however, that there is an important distinction to 
be made between those who end their lives by taking a lethal drug and those who refuse medical 
treatment and their death occurs as a result of natural causes. This distinction lead Justice Collins 
to conclude that Ms Seales would be committing suicide if she died as a result of taking a fatal 
drug that was supplied to her by her doctor.297 Justice Collins concluded that if Ms Seales' doctor 
had supplied her with a fatal drug, with the intention that Ms Seales would use the drug to take 
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2.3.5 Analysis of the rights-based arguments: the right to life (s8) 
 
Having analysed the offence provisions, it was necessary for Justice Collins to thoroughly 
examine s8 and s9 of the NZBORA in order to make the Bill of Rights declarations sought by 
Ms Seales.299  
 
As stated above, section 8 of the NZBORA provides that 'No one shall be deprived of life except 
on such grounds as are established by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice.'300 Despite the wording of this provision couching the right to life in negative terms, the 
fundamental principle of the right to life remains the same. Justice Collins explained the three 
essential components to the right enshrined in section 8: (i) the right to life (ii) the exceptions to 
that right established by law and (iii) consistency with the principles of fundamental justice.301 
 
Each of the three components of the section 8 right will be discussed in turn: 
 
2.3.5.1 The right to life 
 
Justice Collins made reference to how the right to life is embodied in various other jurisdictions 
with particular reference to the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act (and how the Act 
incorporates Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom law), 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. It was made clear in the judgment that there is a need for caution when relying on 
Canadian and American jurisprudence in the context of an inquiry into s8 of the NZBORA, 
however, assistance was nevertheless derived from the decision of Carter v Canada (Attorney-
General).302 
 
As established above, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately found that the provisions of the 
Canadian Criminal Code which prohibit assisted dying would be of no force and effect in the 
circumstances of a clearly consenting adult who has a grievous and irremediable medical 
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condition that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the patient in those circumstances 
and thus a declaration of invalidity was issued, but suspended for a period of 12 months in order 
to allow Parliament to devise an appropriate remedy. Despite this judgment being fundamentally 
different to the ultimate decision reached in the Seales case, Justice Collins referred to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis of the right to life and its consideration of the principles of 
fundamental justice in s7 of the Canadian Charter.  
 
The case put forward by Ms Seales with regard to her right to life bore substantial similarities to 
the approach taken in Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) and is comprised of three stages:  
 
First, that the sanctity of life is one of the most fundamental values of society, underpinning the 
right to life in s8 of the NZBORA  (as well as s7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and s11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). Justice Collins, however, 
held that s8 of the NZBORA did not require human life to be preserved in all circumstances,303 
citing New Zealand jurisprudence as authority for his finding.304 
 
Second, that the right to life may be engaged where the law or the actions of the state impose an 
increased risk of death.305   
 
Third, that the person suffering from a terminal illness (the applicant in the matter) would 
consider taking their own life earlier than they otherwise would if a general practitioner could 
lawfully assist them to die.306 It was in this regard where the most substantial similarities arose 
between the circumstances in Seales and Carter. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
right to life was engaged when ‘...the prohibition on physician-assisted dying had the effect of 
forcing some individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear that they would be 
incapable of doing so when they reached a point where suffering was intolerable.’307 
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The abovementioned reasoning of the Court in Carter was said to apply with equal force in the 
case of Seales.308 Such reasoning lead Justice Collins to conclude that the impugned provisions 
of the Crimes Act may have had the effect of forcing Ms Seales to take her own life prematurely 
out of fear that she would no longer have been able to do so when her condition deteriorated 
further. It was therefore concluded that the right to life was engaged in the circumstances of the 
case.309 
 
2.3.5.2 Exemptions established by law 
 
The right enshrined in s8 of the NZBORA does not guarantee an absolute right.310 Should the 
state have to deprive a person of their right to life, s8 provides a guarantee that the state will only 
do so if it can rely upon grounds established by law. 
 
In the context of the case of Seales v Attorney-General, the state’s interference with the 
applicant’s right to life was based upon the aforementioned provisions of the Crimes Act which 
were passed by Parliament and are, therefore, grounds firmly established by law.311  
 
2.3.5.3 Consistency with the principles of fundamental justice 
 
Section 8 of the NZBORA further requires that there must be consistency with the principles of 
fundamental justice, thus, it would be considered insufficient for the interference with a person’s 
right to life to rely solely on grounds established by law. Should s8 of the NZBORA be engaged, 
as it was in the case of Seales, the court would need to analyse the scope of the phrase 'consistent 
with the principles of fundamental justice', however, owing to a lack of New Zealand 
jurisprudence with regard to the interpretation of this phrase, Canadian case law was again relied 
upon for assistance in this regard.312  
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Justice Collins noted that in accordance with Canadian jurisprudence, there are three components 
for consideration when analysing whether there has been a breach of the principles of 
fundamental justice, namely: (i) arbitrariness; (ii) over-breadth; and (iii) gross disproportionality. 
 
In the Seales judgment, Justice Collins laid out the components of the principles of fundamental 
justice as follows:  
 
The first component considered was that of ‘arbitrariness’, as arbitrariness is prohibited by the 
principle of fundamental justice. Thus, situations that have no rational connection between the 
objective and the law must be targeted for arbitrariness.313 Further, a law is considered arbitrary 
where it ‘bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that lies behind it.'314 
Moreover, in order to be considered arbitrary, the limitations on life, liberty and security require 
a real connection on the facts and not merely a theoretical connection between the limitation and 
the legislative goal.315 
 
The second component for consideration, over-breadth, can be understood as laws that go further 
than necessary when denying the rights of individuals in a manner that has no bearing on the 
objective of the law.316 Justice Collins noted his preference for the phrase 'overly broad' when 
addressing this component of the principles of fundamental justice.317 
 
The third component to consider in a possible breach of the principle of fundamental justice is 
whether there is gross disproportionality between the impact of the restriction on an individual’s 
life and the purpose of the law in question.318 
 
Upon analysing the abovementioned three components that need to be considered when 
determining whether there has been a breach of the principles of fundamental justice, it was held 
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that there was no arbitrariness in the case of Seales.319 This was because the purpose of 
s160(2)(a) the Crimes Act, to protect all human life, is the objective of the law and is therefore 
not arbitrary. Moreover, s179(b) of the Crimes Act is aimed at protecting the lives of both the 
vulnerable in society as well as those who are not vulnerable which means the objective of s179 
is also not arbitrary.  Thus, it was concluded that Ms Seales’ rights under s8 of the NZBORA 
were not limited arbitrarily by s160(2)(a), s179 or s179(b) of the Crimes Act. 
 
Similarly, the ‘over-breadth’ component of the enquiry was not fulfilled, as the purpose of the 
relevant sections of the Crimes Act is directed at the protection of human life320 and does not 
overreach its objective. Thus, it was held that the abovementioned sections of the Crimes Act are 
not overly broad and do not satisfy the ‘over-breadth’ component. This finding differed from the 
conclusion reached in Carter, as the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Canadian Criminal 
Code’s prohibition against assisting suicide transgressed the ‘over-breadth’ component due to a 
narrower interpretation of the objectives of the law prohibiting assisted suicide.  
 
Lastly, Justice Collins considered the ‘gross disproportionality’ component. Although gross 
disproportionality was not considered in the Carter judgment, Canadian jurisprudence dictates 
that the standard for ‘gross disproportionality’ is high, as it asks a different question from the 
first two components, arbitrariness and over-breadth.321 Gross disproportionality analyses the 
law’s effects on life, liberty or security of the person and asks whether these effects can 
rationally be supported or whether they are grossly disproportionate to the purpose of the law.322 
In the case of Seales, it was held that the objectives of s160(2)(a) and s179(b) are not grossly 
disproportionate because they achieve a fair objective of protecting all human life.323 
 
Although Justice Collins reached the conclusion that there had not been a breach in the principles 
of fundamental justice, as there was no arbitrariness, the law was not overbroad and there was no 
evidence of gross disproportionality, it was emphasised that this conclusion was reached on the 
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basis of a purely legal analysis that somewhat clinical in its application and detached from Ms 
Seales' plight. Justice Collins acknowledged that the consequences of the current law were 
'extremely distressing for Ms Seales'324 and that 'she [was] suffering because that law does not 
accommodate her right to dignity and personal autonomy.'325 
 
Despite Ms Seales' right to life under s8 of the NZBORA being engaged, it was found that there 
was no inconsistency with the fundamental principles of justice and that there were legitimate 
exemptions therefrom established by law.  
 
2.3.6 Analysis of the rights-based arguments: the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel 
treatment (s9) 
 
Having decided on Ms Seales' right to life, it was necessary for Justice Collins to determine her 
rights under s9 of the NZBORA and decide whether the circumstances of her illness amounted to 
cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment.326 This right enshrined in s9 of the 
NZBORA is not specific to New Zealand, but is found in numerous international instruments327 
and the bills of rights of various countries.328  
 
The argument presented in the case of Seales was that suffering from a terminal illness 
constitutes a form of suffering if it can be prevented.329 By depriving a person of the opportunity 
to bring their suffering to an end, the state subjects that person to cruel, degrading or 
disproportionately severe treatment.  
 
It was similarly argued in Rodriguez330 that the Canadian Criminal Code’s prohibition of assisted 
suicide breached Rodriguez’s right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment in terms of s12 of the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms.331 The Supreme 
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Court of Canada, however, rejected this line of reasoning and ruled that there had to be some 
form of state control over an individual before there could be 'treatment.' Therefore, it was held 
that a person suffering from a terminal illness and the effects of a disease is not subjected to 
'treatment' for the purposes of s12 of the Canadian Charter, owing to a lack of state control over 
the individual’s circumstances. It should be noted that although many of the findings in 
Rodriguez have been subsequently overruled by Carter, the court’s approach to interpreting s12 
of the Canadian Charter was not put in issue in Carter.332 
 
Justice Collins made further reference to decisions made by the House of Lords and the 
European Court of Human Rights and in doing so, referred to Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.333 It was concluded, however, that there is no correlation between 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant provisions of the 
NZBORA, but that s12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms equates to s9 of the 
NZBORA. 
 
Justice Collins therefore concluded that Ms Seales' rights under s9 were not engaged in the 
circumstances of her case for the following reasons: her distressing circumstances were as a 
direct consequence of her tumour and not her treatment; the treatment she was receiving was 
designed to alleviate the worst effects of her tumour and the State’s duty under s9 is not to 
subject persons to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment which is a positive 
obligation that is not engaged by the criminal law prohibition on assisted dying that has the effect 
of continued suffering for persons in Ms Seales' position.334  
 
It was ultimately concluded that none of the declarations sought by Ms Seales could be issued by 
Justice Collins and it was emphasised that only Parliament can address the 'complex legal, 
philosophical, moral and clinical issues' that were raised in the court proceedings to pass 
legislation to remedy the effects of the Crimes Act.  
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2.4  Concluding remarks 
 
Despite the New Zealand High Court's decision to deny Ms Seales the right to an assisted death, 
the Canadian judgment of Carter remains in full force and effect and can have a significant 
influence on future judicial decisions in South Africa, should further cases concerning assisted 
dying appear before South African courts. The abovementioned cases collectively highlight the 
need for a legislative framework within which matters concerning assisted dying can be 
regulated, as it is impractical for the courts to deal with such matters on a case-by-case basis and 
for terminally ill patients to have to handle the strain of court proceedings in their final months or 
perhaps weeks of life. This legislative framework shall be discussed further in Chapter 4 on 
proposed legislation. 
 
These cases are thus central to this study as they contextualize a rights-based analysis of the 
issues pertaining to assisted dying and provide fresh insight into the current legal position in 
South Africa and pave the way for future legal challenges against the constitutionality of the 
prohibition on assisted dying.  
 
Having examined the most current foreign and domestic jurisprudence regarding the limitation of 
protected rights, it is necessary to analyse the limitation of rights that occurs as a result of the 
prohibition on assisted dying in a South African context in order to determine whether or not said 
limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the principles of freedom, 


















As an essential element of the legal discourse on assisted dying in South Africa, it is necessary to 
analyse the limitation of rights that emerges as a result of the prohibition on assisted dying in 
order to determine whether there is a limitation of rights and, if so, whether such a limitation is 
justifiable. The outcome of this analysis will be influential when formulating legislation to 
regulate the practice of assisted dying, as the nature and scope of the procedures and safeguards 
implemented through the legislation would have to adequately remedy the limitation and 
infringement of rights that has occurred.  
 
This chapter aims to analyse the limitation of rights in the context of the prohibition on assisted 
dying by first tracing the development of the limitation of rights enquiry in order to understand 
the relevance of Canadian and early South African jurisprudence in the limitation enquiry. The 
two-stage approach to the limitation of rights will then be followed in order to first determine 
whether there is an infringement or limitation of a constitutionally protected right and second to 
determine whether the limitation is justifiable.  
 
Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution will provide the basic structure for the limitation of rights 
enquiry, using South African jurisprudence, the Interpretation Clause and international human 
rights law to analyse the effects and implications of the limitation.  
 




In defending our fledgling democracy, the importance of protecting and promoting human rights 
for all South Africans cannot be overstated, however, it must also be conceded that rights are not 




absolute.335 The 1996 Constitution thus contains a limitation clause in s36 that enables the 
‘constitutionally valid limitation of rights’336 should such a limitation be necessary.   
 
Justifying the limitation of rights is not a simple process and bears significant consequences as a 
result of South Africa’s turbulent history, which saw the systematic violation of fundamental 
rights and freedoms which required a remedy of intense legal transformation and resulted in our 
present constitutional democracy. It can thus be very difficult to determine what constitutes a 
justifiable limitation of a person’s rights, considering how far the development of human rights 
has come in South Africa. The limitation of rights is therefore not an enquiry or a process that 
can be taken lightly and requires careful consideration and evaluation. The reasons for limiting a 
right need to be 'exceptionally strong'337 and the limitation must serve a 'compellingly 
important'338 purpose.  
 
It should be noted that the burden of proving that the limiting measure is justifiable falls on the 
party who seeks to rely on the limiting measure, and it is thus not up to the party challenging the 
limiting measure to show that it is not justified.339 Therefore, the burden should not be on a 
terminally ill patient to prove that the prohibition on assisted dying is not justified, but the 
burden lies on the State to establish the justification of the prohibition. In the context of the 
assisted dying debate in South Africa, the government has made a somewhat unsatisfactory 
attempt to justify the limiting measure and the finding of the High Court in the Stransham-Ford 
judgment will make it even more difficult for the State to justify the prohibition on assisted 




Before proceeding with an analysis of the South African approach to the limitation of rights, it is 
important to consider the development and evolution of the limitation analysis in South Africa. 
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The limitation clause found in s36 of the Bill of Rights developed from the s33 of the Interim 
Constitution, the drafting of which was influenced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.340 It thus stands to reason that, when interpreting s33 of the Interim Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court would rely on the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision of R v Oakes341 for 
guidance in its approach. It is important to take note of these developments in order to 
understand how they have shaped the current limitation enquiry based on s36 of the 1996 
Constitution.   
  
The case of R v Oakes established a test which is essentially an analysis of section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the limitations clause, which allows for the 
reasonable limitation of rights and freedoms, sanctioned through legislation if it can be 
‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’342 The Oakes test is twofold and 
determines whether a person’s rights can be justifiably infringed by first showing that the law 
has a ‘pressing and substantial object’343 and second, that the means chosen are ‘proportional’344 
to that object. The law will be deemed proportionate if it satisfies three criteria: first, there is a 
‘rational connection’345 between the means adopted and the objective, second, whether the law is 
‘minimally impairing’346 of the right in question and third, whether there is ‘proportionality 
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the right in question’347 
and the objective thereof which is held to be of ‘sufficient importance.’348  
 
Essentially, once a court has established that a law or a legislative provision infringes on one or 
more of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, the court must then determine whether or not 
the infringement is justifiable.349 This infringement of rights is also referred to as a ‘limitation’.350 
The test to determine whether a person can prove that their rights have been limited is a complex 
one, but through an analysis of relevant jurisprudence, it appears as though the test for the 
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350 Currie & de Waal (note 335 above) 164.  




limitation of rights is essentially twofold: first, it must be determined whether there has been an 
infringement or limitation of rights and, if so, the court must then determine whether or not the 
limitation is ‘justifiable in terms of the limitation clause.’351   
  
Early on, the South African Constitutional Court was somewhat inconsistent in its approach to 
the limitation of rights, as the enquiry that had to be followed was not applied identically in each 
case determined by the Court. The Constitutional Court elected not to follow the ‘structured and 
sequential approach’352 to determining the justifiability of a limitation of rights as established in 
Oakes. Instead, the Constitutional Court, in S v Makwanyane, adopted a 'singular global 
approach'353 and considered a list of factors together in a 'balancing test' which combined the 
requirements of reasonableness and necessity, introduced the notion of proportionality and 
omitted to address justifiability.   
 
 In the Makwanyane judgment, Chaskalson P asserted:  
  
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment 
based on proportionality. This is implicit in the provisions of s33(1).354  
  
It was further noted that although set of ‘principles could be established, the application of those 
principles to particular circumstances could only be done on a case-by-case basis’355  which is an 
inherent requirement of proportionality and calls for the ‘balancing of different interests.’356  
 
When the 1996 Constitution came into effect, the limitation clause was included in s36 of the 
Bill of Rights and provides:  
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The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of the law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including-  
1. the nature of the right;  
2. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
3. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
4. the relation between the limitation and its purpose;  
5. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
  
South African jurisprudence regarding the limitation of rights has changed considerably since 
s36 came into operation and the Canadian jurisprudence concerning the limitation of rights has 
also developed substantially in the years following the Oakes judgment.  
  
With particular reference to South African jurisprudence, the most significant change in the 
development of the limitation enquiry came about as a result of the structure of the s36 limitation 
clause. The ‘sequential, structured approach’357 (which addressed a series of specific question) 
that was found in s33 of the Interim Constitution was abandoned in s36 of the 1996 Constitution. 
The drafters of the 1996 Constitution followed the approach that was taken in the Makwanyane 
judgment, by taking a more global approach that required the consideration of certain factors and 
used the terms 'reasonable and justifiable'358 rather than the language of ‘balancing and 
proportionality'.359 Section 36 also included new factors such as ‘less restrictive means’360 as well 
as the factors relevant to balancing,361 as found in S v Makwanyane.362  
  
3.2.3 The structure of the limitation of rights 
 
Section 36 shall be used in conjunction with jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court as the 
basis for the analysis of the limitation of rights, following the two-stage approach that has been 
taken by the Court to deal with the limitation of rights. As explained in broad terms by the Court 
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in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence,363 the two-stage approach first 
asks ‘whether the provision in question infringes the rights protected by the substantive clauses 
of the Bill of Rights’364 and, if so, it must then be determined whether or not that ‘infringement is 
justifiable.’365  
  
A more detailed explanation of the two-stage approach was set out by the Constitutional Court in 
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and another. The Court 
stated:  
  
First, there is the threshold enquiry aimed at determining whether or not the enactment in 
question constitutes a limitation on one or another guaranteed right. This entails examining (a) the 
content and scope of the relevant protected right(s) and (b) the meaning and effect of the 
impugned enactment to see whether there is any limitation of (a) by (b). Subsections (1) and (2) 
of s39 of the Constitution give guidance as to the interpretation of both the rights and the 
enactment, essentially requiring them to be interpreted so as to promote the value system of an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. If upon such analysis 
no limitation is found, that is the end of the matter. The constitutional challenge is dismissed there 
and then. If there is a limitation, however, the second stage ensues. This is ordinarily called the 
limitations exercise. In essence, this requires a weighing up of the nature and importance of the 
right(s) that are limited together with the extent of the limitation as against the importance and 
purpose of the limiting enactment. Section 36(1) of the Constitution spells out these factors that 
have been put into the scales in making a proportional evaluation of all the counterpoised rights 
and interests involved.366  
  
In order to determine the ‘content and scope of the rights in question,’367 three essential elements 
need to be taken into consideration, namely: s39 of the 1996 Constitution (the Interpretation 
Clause), a contextual interpretation of the rights and international human rights law. The 
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contextual interpretation of rights was advocated for by the Constitutional Court in Bernstein and 
Others v Bester NO and Others.368 
 
It should be noted that if rights are interpreted in an excessively narrow way, this could hinder 
the limitation enquiry process. Similarly, an interpretation that is too broad or ‘insufficiently 
discerning’369 would undermine the value of the substantive approach to the enquiry. Therefore, 
it is necessary to ensure that the first stage of the enquiry clearly and accurately defines the 
content and scope of the rights that will form the basis of the enquiry, as this will be important at 
a later stage when determining whether the limitation or infringement strikes at the core of the 
right or whether it merely infringes upon the periphery of the right.  
 
Therefore, in following the same structure of the limitation enquiry that is followed by the 
Constitutional Court, it is necessary to begin by first looking at the substantive rights in question 
and determining whether there was an infringement or limitation of the relevant rights. 
 




In light of the Stransham-Ford decision and the apparent trend in foreign legislation toward 
approaching the issue of legalising assisted dying from a rights-based perspective, the limitation 
of rights analysis is relevant in the context of assisted dying as it serves to highlight the most 
pertinent issues and emphasises the impact of the limitation on terminally ill patients who wish 
to die with dignity. The enquiry allows us to see the shortfalls of the prohibition on assisted 
dying which simplifies the process of finding a remedy to the infringement of rights.  
 
In the context of assisted dying, the prohibition on assisted dying is a limiting measure that has 
an impact on several rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights as well as certain ‘analogous rights’ 
that exist by virtue of the operation of the substantive rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Such 
an analogous right would be the right to autonomy which, although not expressly protected or 
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provided for in the Bill of Rights, exists by virtue of respecting one’s right to dignity, privacy 
and bodily and psychological integrity.370 While analogous rights remain controversial, courts 
have relied on autonomy on more than one occasion in order to assist in reaching decisions.371 
For the purposes of analysis, autonomy will thus be considered an analogous right. This shall be 
discussed below in further detail.  
  
The first step that needs to be taken in order to determine whether or not the prohibition on 
assisted dying constitutes a limitation on one or another of the guaranteed rights is to ‘examine 
(a) the content and scope of the relevant protected right(s) and (b) the meaning and effect of the 
impugned enactment372 to see whether there is any limitation of (a) by (b).’373 The protected 
rights that will be examined for the purposes of this limitation enquiry are the right to life and the 
right to dignity, with reference to the analogous right to autonomy.   
 
3.3.2 Does the prohibition on assisted dying limit a constitutionally protected right? 
 
This enquiry will commence by considering the content and scope of three affected rights, 
namely life, dignity and autonomy. Although there are other rights affected by the prohibition on 
assisted dying, such as bodily and psychological integrity, the rights to life, dignity and 
autonomy are the most fundamental and all-encompassing rights affected by the prohibition on 
assisted dying. The enquiry will then consider the impugned provision, namely the common law 
prohibition on assisted dying in order to determine whether the prohibition has infringed the 
aforementioned rights which will complete the first half of the two-stage approach to the 
limitation of rights enquiry. 
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 3.3.2.1  The Right to Life 
 
The right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights and can be seen as the ‘first of the 
absolute human rights.’374 The right to life is protected by s11 of the Bill of Rights which states 
that ‘everyone has the right to life.’375 When examining the content and scope of the right to life, 
however, it becomes evident that the right to life is a complex and multifaceted right. In order to 
determine the meaning of the right to life, it is prudent to analyse the value of life and determine 
what implications the value of life has on the meaning and definition of the right to life.  
  
The value of life can be conceptualised in numerous different ways, but for the purposes of this 
analysis, these conceptualisations have been grouped into three main categories: intrinsic, 
instrumental and self-determined.  
  
The first possible conceptualisation of the value of life supports the notion that life has intrinsic 
value. This means that the value of life lies in simply being alive. This resonates with religious 
undertones and deontological thinking as it conveys the sanctity of life, the idea that life in itself 
is sacred, should ‘not be intentionally brought to a premature end’376 and that life/being alive is 
an end in itself. If the right to life is conceptualised as having intrinsic value, ‘quantity’ of life 
would have more importance than ‘quality’ of life. This means that those who believe in the 
intrinsic value of life would choose to prolong one’s existence, regardless of circumstances or 
quality of life. Even if a person is terminally ill and suffering through immense pain and 
diminished physical capabilities, the value of that person’s life lies in how long they live rather 
than how well they live.  
  
Another conceptualisation of the value of life is that life has instrumental value. This means that 
life is viewed as a means to an end, the end being the ability to enjoy whatever it is that really 
makes life worth living.377 Thus, the notion of quality of life becomes a central concept in 
determining the value and meaning of the right to life. If a person loses their quality of life, their 
ability to enjoy the amenities of life and/or their ability to live with dignity (through disability, 
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illness or old age), it may be argued that one’s right to life has been eroded to such an extent that 
one would prefer to bring one’s life to a premature end as life has no value if one is unable to 
enjoy one’s life. In such instances, respect should be given to a person’s decision to end their life 
if they are unable to enjoy or realise their right to life when they have no quality of life and thus 
feel life has no value.  
  
A third conceptualisation of the value of life is that life has a self-determined value. In 
accordance with this proposition, decisions pertaining to the way in which a person’s life ends 
should be left to the individual in question to decide independently. This conceptualisation 
resonates with the notion that the right to life actually means the right to life with dignity, as 
shall be discussed further below.  
  
The landmark judgment of S v Makwanyane may be interpreted in a manner that finds favour 
with the notion of life having instrumental or even self-determined value rather than intrinsic 
value. In Makwanyane, life and dignity were highlighted as the two ‘most important’378 human 
rights that should be valued ‘above all others.’379 This raises the prospect that the right to life 
should be interpreted to mean a life with dignity.  
  
The Constitutional Court further endorsed this notion of an ‘inherent fusion’380 between the 
rights to life and dignity and affording everyone the right to a life with dignity by stating:  
  
It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the 
right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the experience of 
humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our constitutional values. The 
Constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual value of each member of the 
community is recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such a society. The right to 
life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the right to human dignity and life are 
entwined. The right to life is more than existence; it is a right to be treated as a human being with 
dignity.381 
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 Moreover, the Interpretation Clause provides that: ‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum— (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.’382 This bolsters the notion that the right 
to life should be interpreted through the lens of human dignity and that the right to life exists as a 
right to a dignified life.  
  
If ‘life’ is to be understood as ‘life with dignity’, this interpretation finds favour with the notion 
that life has an instrumental or self-determined value. If one merely exists, with no dignity or 
quality of life, it cannot be said that one is truly living and, as such, one is unable to realise one's 
right to life.  
  
The notion that the right to life should be understood as life with dignity is thrown into stark 
relief in cases where a person is so severely injured they are left unconscious or in a permanent 
vegetative state yet remain, biologically speaking, alive.383 An illustration of this concept can be 
found in the case of Clarke v Hurst NO384 where the court held that:    
  
As it was put in 58 US Law Week 4936 “medical advances have altered the physiological 
conditions of death in ways that may be alarming: highly invasive treatment may perpetuate 
human existence through a merger of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an 
insult to life rather than its continuation.” Patients may be resuscitated and maintained alive when 
there is not the remotest possibility that they would ever be able to consciously experience life.385  
  
In instances where a person has experienced damage to the cortex of the brain386 rather than the 
brain stem,387 the person will be left in a permanent vegetative state and is thus not legally 
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dead.388 In the case of Clarke v Hurst NO, the patient sustained damage to the cortex of the brain 
and was maintained in a permanent vegetative state through naso-gastric feeding, a process 
whereby feeding tubes are introduced to the stomach through the nose. The patient’s wife 
approached the court seeking an order authorising her to withhold this nourishment and, as a 
result, the patient would starve and die.389  
  
The patient’s life expectancy was uncertain and undeterminable, but the court found that there 
was no reasonable expectation of the patient emerging from the permanent vegetative state as his 
brain had ‘permanently lost the capacity to induce a physical and mental existence at a level 
which qualifies as human life.’390 
  
It becomes evident from this dictum that there is a strong nexus between life and dignity, as the 
court refers to a level of existence which can qualify as human life, alluding to the importance of 
quality of life for human existence. Clarke v Hurst NO established the judicial precedent that 
‘human life amounts to more than mere biological functions but must also be accompanied by 
both cortical and cerebral functioning.’391 This calls into question the importance of quality of 
life and highlights the inextricable link between life and dignity.   
 
It should also be noted that international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights392 and the European Convention on Human Rights393 ensure the right to life 
is respected and protected on an international level. Moreover, numerous states have enshrined 
the right to life in their bills of rights such as the United States of America’s Constitution (14th 
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Amendment), the Irish Constitution (Art 40.3.1), the South African Constitution (s11), Germanic 
basic law (Art 2.2), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s7) and the UK Human 
Rights Act (s1 and schedule 1, incorporating article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights).  
 
These international and foreign instruments have a significant influence on the interpretation of 
the right to life in South Africa as s39(1)(b) and s39(1)(c) of the Constitution place a ‘court, 
tribunal or forum under an obligation to consider international and foreign law when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.’394 Moreover, s233 of the Constitution provides that: ‘When interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.’  
  
3.3.2.2 The Right to Dignity 
 
For the purposes of the limitation enquiry, it should be noted that although the right to dignity 
can be viewed simply as a ‘value that informs the interpretation of other rights,’395 such as the 
right to life, the right to dignity should also be examined as an independent substantive right 
which can form the basis of the limitation enquiry in the context of assisted dying in order to 
determine whether or not said prohibition constitutes a justifiable limitation of the right to 
dignity. In order to do so, it is first necessary to analyse the content and scope of the right to 
dignity.  
  
The right to dignity, as provided for in s10 of the Bill of Rights, states: ‘[e]veryone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’396 Therefore, as alluded to 
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above, dignity is both a constitutional value397 and a right398 and has been identified as central in 
both the founding provisions of the Constitution and by the Constitutional Court.399  
  
In S v Makwanyane,400 the Constitutional Court acknowledged the importance of dignity which is 
highlighted in the statement made by O’Regan J:  
  
The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. 
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings; 
human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is 
the foundation of many other rights that are specifically entrenched in chapter 3.401  
  
This view is bolstered by many prominent academics, such as Devenish who asserted that 
dignity is even more of a pre-eminent value than the right to life in the 1996 Constitution.402 
Moreover, Devenish noted that dignity ‘constitutes the moral premise for the existence and 
operation of other cognate rights.’403 Joubert affirms that human dignity is probably the most 
important right in the Constitution404 and Grove concurs that human dignity is a pre-eminent and 
core constitutional right.405 
  
Despite the right to dignity being protected by the Constitution and numerous international 
instruments, as evidenced above, as well as having judicial and academic authorities pronounce 
on the importance and supremacy of the right to dignity, it remains difficult to formulate a 
workable definition for the right to dignity. One of the possible reasons why the right to dignity 
proves difficult to define is that, as stated by O’Reagan J in the Makwanyane judgment, the right 
to dignity is the ‘foundation of many other rights’406 and, as such, is intricately linked to these 
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rights. It is therefore challenging to isolate the right to dignity and identify the scope and content 
thereof independently from all other rights.  
  
Considering the difficulty of separating the right to dignity from other fundamental rights, 
dignity can be conceptualised as a lens through which other rights must be viewed. As evidenced 
above, there are inextricable links between the right to dignity and the right to life as well as 
other rights such as freedom and security of the person, privacy and equality. Even if a particular 
right is not expressly protected in the Constitution, there is evidence to support the fact that the 
Constitutional Court will protect that right if it is related to dignity.407 
  
In the case of Dawood,408 no right existed in the Bill of Rights that specifically protected the right 
to marry and the right to family life for individuals. The right to dignity was thus relied upon as 
there was not a more specific right available to protect persons who wished to ‘enter into and 
sustain permanent intimate relationships.’409 It is therefore evident that the right to dignity can be 
used by the courts to deal with infringements of human rights that are not specifically addressed 
by other rights explicitly included in the Bill of Rights.410 
  
Although dignity can be seen as merely a value that informs the interpretation of other rights in 
the Bill of Rights, the justiciability and enforceability of dignity as a self-standing independent 
right should not be forgotten. The right to dignity, as formulated in s10 of the Constitution as an 
independent substantive right, can be viewed in two ways: narrowly, as a personal right 
associated with one’s own identity, autonomy and moral agency or broadly, as a means to create 
an opportunity for all persons to reach their full potential and experience complete freedom, 
securing space for the fulfilment of self-actualisation.411 Thus, the scope of the constitutional 
right to dignity is determined by the constitutional value of dignity.412 
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The right to dignity has been further informed by international jurisprudence as Chaskalson P 
used the Canadian Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Law v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration)413 to inform his interpretation of the right to dignity. In the case of 
Law v Canada it was held:   
  
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned 
with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair 
treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, 
capacities or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities or merits 
of different individuals, taking into account the context of their differences. Human dignity is 
harmed when individuals and groups are marginalised, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced 
when laws recognise the full place of all individuals and groups within society.414  
  
The right to dignity has also been enshrined in numerous international instruments such as the 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which, in its preamble, 
recognises ‘inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’415 The UDHR further provides that 
all human beings are ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights.’416 In addition, the Organisation 
of African Unity’s Charter on Human and People’s Rights, in its preamble, considers the Charter 
of the Organisation of African Unity which stipulates that ‘freedom, equality, justice and dignity 
are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African 
peoples’417 and further provides that: 
  
[E]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and 
to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
shall be prohibited.  
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South African courts would thus be obliged to consider these international instruments when 





It should also be noted that, although a right to autonomy is not explicitly provided for in the Bill 
of Rights, the constitutional rights to dignity,418 privacy419 and bodily and psychological 
integrity420 cumulatively indicate that there is an argument to be made for the existence of an 
analogous right to autonomy. 
 
It has previously been held that autonomy is not recognised as an independent right, but rather as 
an underlying constitutional value.421 The constitutional value of autonomy is understood to 
mean the 'ability to independently form opinions and act on them'422 which is 'the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity.'423 When attempts have been made to elevate the value of 
autonomy to a right, it has been argued that although there is considerable ‘overlap’424 between 
the rights to dignity, freedom and privacy, it is not useful for the purposes of constitutional 
analysis to 'posit an independent right to autonomy'425 and further, that it is ‘not appropriate to 
base constitutional analysis on a right not expressly included within the Constitution.’426 
 
It has been argued, however, that it is a matter of 'extreme significance'427 for all persons to be 
able to determine how they live their lives. Moreover, it is the right and the ability to make 
decisions that matters more than the content of the decision itself and the State 'should not be 
empowered to make judgments concerning good or bad life, provided that the conduct in 
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question does not harm others.'428 Patient autonomy is thus more than a mere ethical concept, an 
abstract philosophical notion or an underlying value but should be considered a right afforded to 
all persons, especially in the context of health care. Despite the role and significance of 
autonomy in the assisted dying debate, the right to autonomy is not a substantive right provided 
for in the Bill of Rights, and thus jurisprudence dictates it should not be used as a right for the 
purposes of this limitation enquiry analysis.429 Should the courts decide otherwise, it can be 
assumed that for the purposes of analysis, the right to autonomy would be limited in a similar 
fashion to the other rights expressly provided for in the Bill of Rights.  
  
Having touched on the content and scope of the right to life and the right to dignity, it is 
necessary to analyse the ‘meaning and the effect of the impugned enactment’430 in order to 
determine whether there has been an infringement or limitation of the rights to life and dignity.   
  
3.3.3 The meaning and effect of the prohibition on assisted dying 
 
In the context of assisted dying in South Africa, there exists no legislative enactment that 
expressly prohibits the practice of assisted dying. As indicated above, other countries such as 
Canada and New Zealand have express legislative provisions that prohibit the practice of assisted 
dying. 
  
The prohibition on assisted dying in South Africa is therefore not a statutory prohibition, but a 
common law prohibition that is found embedded in the case law and jurisprudence of criminal 
law. Although there are no specific legislative provisions that can be analysed, the development 
of the prohibition on assisted dying, as found in criminal case law, shall be analysed to determine 
the meaning and effect of the limiting measure.  
  
Accordingly, it is necessary, at this stage of the limitation enquiry, to determine the meaning and 
effect of the prohibition on assisted dying and to see whether this limiting measure infringes the 
right to a dignified life and the independent right to dignity. This analysis shall be fact specific 
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and shall focus on the nature and breadth of the prohibition on assisted dying in order to 
determine whether the limiting measure strikes at the heart of the rights or merely on the 
periphery.  
  
In order to understand the current legal position pertaining to assisted dying in South Africa, it is 
necessary to note important legal developments that took place and that have influenced the law 
as it stands today.   
 
3.3.3.1 Development of the Prohibition on Assisted Dying in Criminal Law 
  
In the 1955 case of R v Davidow,431 the accused’s mother was suffering from unbearable pain as 
a result of an incurable illness. Davidow requested the assistance of a friend to inject his mother 
with a lethal dose of medication to relieve her from her suffering, but the friend refused to do so. 
Evidence was led that indicated Davidow’s mother had said, on numerous occasions in his 
presence, that she wished she could be dead as she could no longer bear the pain and suffering. 
Davidow eventually visited his mother in hospital and shot her in the head with a revolver, 
killing her instantly. A letter, written by Davidow to his brother the night before, indicated that 
he intended to relieve their mother of her suffering ‘without causing her pain.’ Despite his 
merciful intentions, Davidow was charged with murder. Psychiatric evidence was led which 
indicated Davidow had developed an obsession to ‘help’ his mother which led him to act 
automatically and involuntarily and he was subsequently acquitted by the jury that tried him.432 
  
Suicide was decriminalised in South Africa in 1962 in the case of S v Gordon433 which was 
subsequently upheld by the then Appellate Division in the case of S v Grotjohn.434 Despite the 
decriminalisation of suicide, the then Appellate Division, in the Grotjohn case, held that it is 
unlawful to assist a person to commit suicide if the assistance provided to that person is 
considered the effective cause of death.435 The principles of the Grotjohn case clearly established 
that a person will be held liable for murder if they provide assistance to another person who 
                                               
431 Unreported, June 1955 WLD. 
432 A Carmi Euthanasia 1 ed (2012). 
433 S v Gordon 1962 (4) SA 727 (N) 729. 
434 Ex Parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Grotjohn 1970 (2) SA 355 (A) 363D, 366. 
435 JM Burchell & J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed (2014) 567. 




commits suicide.436 It is somewhat anomalous that, as a result of the decriminalisation of suicide, 
every person has the right to commit suicide, but the assistance thereof remains unlawful.   
  
In 1968 the case of S v De Bellocq437 highlighted legal issues pertaining to active euthanasia and 
the role played by an accused person in facilitating the death of another. De Bellocq gave birth to 
a premature child who, within three weeks of birth, was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with 
toxoplasmosis. De Bellocq, having studied medicine in Paris, was aware of the disease and its 
prognosis and thus understood that the child would not be able to drink and would have to be fed 
with a tube through the nose and into the stomach. There was no reasonable chance that the child 
would live for any length of time, and evidence was led by a professional pediatrician who 
testified that he would not have treated the child medically if it were his own child. When it was 
ascertained that nothing more could be done for the child, De Bellocq took her child home and, 
while bathing the child, drowned it. De Bellocq was charged with murder, as she confessed her 
intention was to kill her child and the court held that the law does not permit the killing of any 
person, irrespective of whether the person is very ill or an imbecile. Although De Bellocq was 
charged with murder and the court found that killing her child was an unlawful act that amounted 
to murder in the law, De Bellocq was never called upon to come up for sentence and thus no 
sentence was ever imposed.   
 
 The next major criminal case that dealt with assisted dying and mercy killing in South Africa 
was the case of S v Hartmann.438 Hartmann was a medical practitioner whose elderly father had 
been suffering from prostate cancer for several years, which had spread throughout his body and, 
after treatment in Pretoria, was admitted as a private patient of his son, Dr Hartmann, in Ceres. 
By the time Hartmann’s father was admitted into his care, there was no hope for a cure as he was 
completely bedridden, incontinent, emaciated and was suffering tremendous pain for which he 
was administered analgesic drugs. The patient’s condition continued to deteriorate and he was 
reliant on intravenous food as he was unable to swallow without choking and was in a critical 
state, near to death. Dr Hartman injected additional morphine and a rapid onset barbiturate 
general anaesthetic into his father’s drip which caused his father’s death within seconds. 
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Evidence led at the trial indicated that his father would have probably died a few hours later as a 
result of his critical condition, but the court found Dr Hartmann guilty of murder because the law 
is clear that even if an accused person merely hastens the death of a person who was about to die 
anyway, the actions of the accused nevertheless constitute the crime of murder. Although Dr 
Hartmann’s sentence consisted of a period of imprisonment for one year, he was only detained 
until the rising of the court. Dr Hartmann was granted a suspension of his sentence for the 
remaining period.439 
  
Subsequent to the aforementioned mercy killing cases was the case of S v Marengo440 in which 
the accused intentionally killed her father by shooting him twice in the head with a firearm he 
kept next to his bed for self-defence. Marengo pleaded guilty to murder, but claimed that her 
actions were motivated by her desire to put an end to her father’s suffering, as he was 81 years 
old and had been suffering from cancer. She was convicted and sentenced to three years 
imprisonment which was suspended for a period of five years.  
  
A somewhat more recent criminal case dealing with assisted dying was the case of S v 
Nkwanyana441 in which the deceased, suffering from a severe psychiatric disorder, wanted to kill 
herself and had attempted to do so on numerous occasions. The deceased requested assistance 
from Nkwanyana and, after initially refusing, the accused finally agreed to her persistent 
requests. Nkwanyana obtained a firearm illegally and shot the deceased for which he pleaded 
guilty as a first time offender. It was evident that the accused was not a threat or danger to 
society and the court held that the deceased wanted to be killed and had planned her own death. 
These amounted to exceptional and compelling circumstances which justified a lesser sentence 
than what was provided for in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
Nkwanyana was convicted of murder and sentenced to five years imprisonment, suspended 
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3.3.3.2 Effect of the Prohibition on Assisted Dying 
  
Although the courts have been firm in their application of the law in cases that deal with 
assisted-dying and mercy killing, as we see in all these cases, there has been a noticeable trend 
toward lenient sentencing. Lenient sentencing, however, does little to detract from the severity of 
criminal charges against a person who has attempted to relieve another person of their suffering, 
either at their request or out of compassion. By charging a person with murder for assisting 
another person to end their life, the courts have upheld the prohibition on assisted dying which 
has serious implications for both the person suffering from a terminal illness as well as the doctor 
or loved one who attempts to relieve the terminally ill patient from their suffering.   
  
The prohibition on assisted dying has a serious impact on the lives of those who are enduring 
unbearable suffering as a result of a terminal illness and wish to end their lives. If terminally ill 
patients require assistance to fulfil their wishes, the prohibition on assisted dying denies them the 
right to commit suicide. Moreover, the prohibition on assisted suicide places great emotional 
strain on the families of terminally ill patients who are put in a quandary when they are asked to 
assist a loved one to end their life, but are unable to do so and are forced to watch their loved 
ones suffer through pain and a loss of dignity and autonomy if palliative care is inaccessible or 
ineffective.   
  
It is difficult to make a general statement with regard to the symptoms and effect that a terminal 
illness will have on a patient. Various factors such as the nature of the illness, the chosen course 
of treatment, the patient’s medical history and the patient’s personal traits will influence the 
nature and outcome of the case, therefore, it is difficult to make broad assertions as to the 
physical and psychological effect a degenerative terminal illness will have on a person. It is, 
however, common among all terminal illnesses that the patient will suffer from a diminishing 
state of health and will lose strength and physical control over one’s own body. The very nature 
of a terminal illness erodes one’s quality of life and impacts severely on one’s dignity as one 
loses control and independence as a result of decreased physical capabilities. Moreover, intense 
treatment options, such as chemotherapy and palliative sedation, can also erode one’s dignity and 
quality of life as shall be discussed below.  





Evidence led in the Stransham-Ford case illustrates some of the effects that a terminal illness 
and related treatment options can have on a person. The applicant in the Stransham-Ford case 
suffered from stage four cancer which began as adenocarcinoma and spread to his ‘lower spine, 
kidneys and lymph nodes.’442 It was reiterated in the judgment that the ‘applicant’s quality of life 
[had] deteriorated markedly’443 as a result of his terminal illness, and the court acknowledged 
that the Applicant’s imminent future included a 'worsening condition', 'increased frailty' and 
'progression of the disease.'444 
  
There are countless cases where patients who suffering from terminal illnesses endure the 
degeneration of their physical strength and gradually lose their dignity as their quality of life 
diminishes when they are no longer able to perform basic daily tasks and bodily functions 
independently. Although treatment options exist which aim to relieve these symptoms and ease 
the discomfort of a patient suffering from a terminal illness, not all patients are willing or able to 
access such palliative care and treatment.   
  
In extreme cases, some patients continue to experience intolerable and unrelieved pain and 
suffering, despite extensive palliative care, and thus turn to palliative sedation.445 Palliative 
sedation treats pain, dyspnoea (shortness of breath and/or laboured breathing), nausea and 
vomiting, delirium and myoclonus (involuntary jerking or twitching of muscles) to enable a 
person to die comfortably.446 Palliative sedation is achieved by decreasing the level of the 
patient’s consciousness by ‘inducing varying degrees of unconsciousness, but not death, in order 
to relieve their physical distress and unendurable symptoms’447 when that patient is expected to 
die within hours or days. Should a person reach the stage where palliative sedation is required, 
they will no longer be able to communicate with their loved ones or those around them who are 
managing their care and treatment in the final moments before they die.  
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Although palliative sedation is not ultimately required by all persons suffering from terminal 
illnesses, it is an unfortunate reality that many people are faced with this loss of autonomy and 
control at the end of their lives. By refusing to allow terminally ill patients the option of assisted 
dying, one is ultimately limiting the options available to a person suffering through sickness and 
pain and condemning them to choose between: (i) palliative care (ii) a loss of dignity and 
autonomy through palliative sedation, (iii) suffering through intolerable pain and unbearable 
symptoms, (iv) committing suicide, while still physically able to do so, which often results in a 
traumatic and premature death.   
  
It must, however, be acknowledged that advancements and developments in the field of 
palliative care have allowed for the majority of terminally ill patients receiving palliative care to 
die peaceful and dignified deaths,448 but not all emotional and psychological suffering can be 
remedied by these medical advancements. The loss of control over one’s body and physical 
capabilities and the loss of dignity experienced by many patients receiving palliative care can 
often only be remedied by enabling a patient to choose the manner and timing of his/her own 
death.  
 
It is clearly evident, therefore, that the prohibition on assisted dying results in unnecessary 
physical and emotional suffering for terminally ill patients who are denied assistance in ending 
their lives in a dignified manner. By forcing terminally ill patients to remain alive against their 
will and to fight through weeks, months or even years of pain and suffering strips these patients 
of their dignity and autonomy. This prohibition on assisted dying therefore strikes at the heart of 
the right to a dignified life and the right to dignity.   
  
As expounded above, the right to life is not merely the right to exist, but to live with dignity. It 
has been said that death should not be viewed as the opposite of life, but rather the completion 
thereof.449 Similarly, the opposite of assisted dying is not life, but rather pain, isolation, 
dependence and indignity. By refusing to allow terminally ill patients the right to end their lives 
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when they feel they have endured enough pain and suffering, the state strips these patients of 
their autonomy and dignity and strikes at the core of the right to life by forcing the terminally ill 
to endure a physical existence with little to no quality of life even after they feel they have had 
enough and expressed a desire to end their own lives. Naturally, the manner in which the value 
of life is conceptualised will have significant bearing on the outcome of this analysis. However, 
regardless of whether the value of life is conceptualised as being intrinsic, instrumental or self-
determined, the effect of pain and suffering on a person’s life remains the same. How one 
chooses to conceptualise the value of their life thereafter remains a personal view. Taking into 
account all of the aforementioned conceptualisations of the value of life, the fact remains that 
one should retain the right and the power to control all decision-making with regard to end of life 
care and practices, particularly in circumstances wherein your dignity and autonomy is severely 
impaired as a result of terminal illness. 
 
The prohibition on assisted dying, therefore, does not merely infringe on the periphery of the 
right to life, the right to dignity and patient autonomy, but strikes at the heart of these rights 
causing a significant infringement and limitation at the core of these rights.  
 




Having established that the prohibition on assisted dying significantly limits the right to life and 
the right to dignity, it must be determined whether or not this limitation can be constitutionally 
justified. Should it be found that the limitation is legitimately justifiable, the limitation will pass 
the test of constitutionality.450 If, however, the limitation is found to be unjustifiable, the 
prohibition on assisted dying will be unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid.   
  
In order for the limitation to be constitutionally justifiable, the following criteria entrenched in 
s36 should be fulfilled: the limitation must be in terms of the law of general application and must 
be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on equality, freedom and 
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human dignity.’451 The factors listed in s36 of the Constitution shall provide guidance as to what 
should be considered in the justification stage of the enquiry.   
 
3.3.4.2  Law of General Application 
  
The first criterion that needs to be fulfilled in the justification stage of the enquiry is that the 
limiting measure, the prohibition on assisted dying, should be sourced in a law of general 
application.452 The requirement that a measure must be in terms of the law of general application 
is an effective tool to prevent the legislature from singling out a particular group of persons for 
punishment without trial and also respects the principle of the rule of law more generally.453  
  
Although the Constitutional Court has not clarified exactly what is required at this stage of the 
enquiry and has not enunciated a list of requirements to be met, it is evident that the limiting 
measure must be in terms of the law of general application in both its form and content.454 
  
The ‘form’ of the limiting measure is a requirement that said limiting measure must be in the 
form of something recognised by the Court as law. Specific administrative decisions that are not 
sourced in the law of general application will not be recognised by the Court, but legislation, 
common law, customary law, municipal by-laws,455 domesticated international conventions456 
and rules of court457 can be considered law for the purposes of this stage of the enquiry. The 
prohibition on assisted dying, entrenched in the common law, will therefore be recognised by the 
Court as law for the purposes of this stage of the enquiry and thus satisfies the requirement of 
‘form’.  
  
With regard to the content of the limiting measure, the prohibition on assisted dying applies 
generally to all persons who seek an assisted death, regardless of their circumstances. The 
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prohibition does not seek to target specific individuals, but applies to all persons, and thus the 
content of the limiting measure is also sourced in the law of general application.  
 
3.3.4.3 Is the limiting measure reasonable and justifiable? 
 
In addition to the law of general application, s36 of the Constitution requires that a limiting 
measure be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.’458 Although no mention is made of proportionality in the text of 
the s36 limitation clause, the jurisprudence that has emerged from the Constitutional Court 
indicates that the limitation of rights enquiry turns on the notion of proportionality and 
balancing.459 There is no clear definition of the concept of proportionality in the context of the 
limitation enquiry, however, it is generally understood to mean ‘reasonable and justifiable’.460  
  
Although the limitation clause underwent much transformation from the Interim Constitution to 
the 1996 Constitution and drew inspiration from foreign jurisprudence, there are two questions 
from the Oakes formulation of the limitation enquiry that have remained an essential part of the 
limitation enquiry today, namely: ‘does the limiting measure serve a legitimate purpose?’461 and 
‘is there a rational connection between the limiting measure and its stated purpose?’462 These 
questions are comparable to s36(1)(b) and s36(1)(d) and function as a kind of threshold test that 
should be satisfied before proceeding with the balancing of competing rights.   
  
Essentially, these two ‘threshold questions’463 are distinct from the notion of proportionality and 
balancing and can be answered independently from the other factors listed in the limitation 
clause. The remaining factors found in the limitation clause of the Constitution are the factors 
that make up the proportionality aspect of the enquiry. Even though the abovementioned 
threshold questions are generally considered first in a limitation enquiry, the factors listed in s36 
of the Constitution are not always considered sequentially by the Court. Although there are 
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certain drawbacks to dealing with the justification stage of the limitation enquiry with an ‘all-at-
once’ approach, there is nothing in the text of s36 that mandates a strict sequential or ordered 
approach to the enquiry.  
  
For the purposes of analysing whether the prohibition on assisted dying can be justified in the 
limitation enquiry, the following structure, based loosely on s36, shall be adhered to: first, the 
threshold requirements shall be dealt with by asking what the purpose of the prohibition on 
assisted dying is, and whether it is legitimate in an ‘open and democratic society based on 
equality, freedom and human dignity.’464 Second, the relationship between the prohibition on 
assisted dying and the purpose thereof shall be analysed, to determine whether they are rationally 
connected. Thereafter, it shall be asked whether there are clear, alternative means available that 
would be less restrictive on the full enjoyment of the right. Finally, it shall be determined 
whether the legitimate, rationally based limiting measure, the prohibition on assisted dying, is a 
proportionate limitation on the right to life and the right to dignity, taking into account the degree 
of the infringement, the nature of the right, the breadth of the measure and the social good it 
achieves.465   
 
a.   What is the purpose of the limiting measure? 
  
First, in dealing with the purpose of the limiting measure, the prohibition on assisted dying, it is 
important to note that there are two components to this factor, namely the purpose of the measure 
and the importance of the measure in an ‘open and democratic society.’466 The purpose of the 
limiting measure must constitute a legitimate constitutional purpose,467 however, there are no set 
guidelines or rules for determining the constitutional legitimacy of a limiting measure. Rather, 
the underlying constitutional values, such as freedom, democracy, equality and dignity inform 
the notion of what constitutes a legitimate constitutional purpose. 
  
                                               
464 S36(1) of the Constitution. 
465 Ibid 366. 
466 s36(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
467 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) 15. 




The purpose of the prohibition on assisted dying has been defended around the world for 
centuries by those who oppose the practice of assisted dying.468 Subsequent to the Stransham-
Ford judgment in South Africa, the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, expressed his 
support for the prohibition on assisted dying and gave reasons relevant in a South African 
context to illustrate the purpose of the prohibition.  
  
One of the reasons that is often voiced as the main purpose of the prohibition on assisted dying is 
for the protection of the vulnerable in society. Although protecting the vulnerable in society is 
generally understood to mean protecting those who are more prone to becoming victims of undue 
influence or pressure, such as the elderly, the disabled or the very young, in the Seales judgment, 
the concept of vulnerability was broken down into numerous subcomponents such as 
communication vulnerability, institutional vulnerability, differential vulnerability, medical 
vulnerability, and social vulnerability (Refer to 2.3.3.4 above). 
  
Assessing the vulnerability of a person, however, is a difficult task. As argued in the Seales 
judgment, an individual’s vulnerability to influence is highly personal and context-specific. Ms 
Seales consistently maintained that despite her illness, she did not feel vulnerable in any sense 
and that her wish for an assisted death was carefully considered and reasoned.469 This self-
assessment of non-vulnerability was endorsed by Ms Seales’ doctor who confirmed that she was 
pursuing her request in a positive, rational manner, and showed ‘no signs of depression or a lack 
of understanding of her condition.’470 
  
In a South African context, the protection of the vulnerable in society would certainly be 
considered a legitimate constitutional purpose. Unfortunately, however, the State’s current 
failure to protect the vulnerable in society outside the realm of assisted dying was highlighted in 
the Stransham-Ford judgment when it was stated:  
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They seem to even tolerate a horrendous murder rate in a number of countries, including ours. 
They seem to tolerate the yearly slaughter on our roads because, despite the statistics, thousands 
of people drive like lunatics on our roads every single day. People die of AIDS, from malaria by 
the hundreds of thousands, from hunger, from malnutrition and impure water and insufficient 
medical facilities. The State says it cannot afford to fulfil all socio-economic demands, but it 
assumes the power to tell an educated individual of sound mind who is gravely ill and about to 
die, that he must suffer the indignity of the severe pain and is not allowed to die in a dignified, 
quiet manner with the assistance of a medical practitioner.471 
  
It could be argued, therefore, that the idea of protecting the vulnerable has become somewhat 
skewed. Instead of focusing on what groups of persons should be classified as vulnerable and 
worthy of protection, greater consideration should be given to what it is that vulnerable persons 
require protection against. Rather than deciding who, in the opinion of the State, is considered a 
vulnerable person, the State should focus on protecting all persons against undue pain, suffering 
and indignity instead of prolonging life without dignity against the will of those who do not wish 
to suffer through such an existence. As stated by Terry Pratchett in his lecture entitled Shaking 
Hands with Death, ‘Most men don’t fear death. They fear those things - the knife, the shipwreck, 
the illness, the bomb - which precede, by microseconds if you’re lucky, and many years if you 
are not, the moment of death.’472    
  
Not all terminally ill patients seek an assisted death out of depression or as a result of undue 
pressure or duress. As evidenced in the Carter, Stransham-Ford and Seales cases, the respective 
patients who had requested assisted deaths were deemed by expert witnesses, to be of sound 
mind and having clear and settled intentions, with no evidence of being vulnerable or in need of 
protection against a third party. As observed by Pratchett:  
  
I have reached the conclusion that a person may make a decision to die because the balance of 
their mind is level, realistic, pragmatic, stoic and sharp. And that is why I dislike the term 
‘assisted suicide’ being applied to the carefully thought out and weighed up process of having 
one’s life ended by gentle medical means. The people who thus far have made the harrowing trip 
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to Dignitas in Switzerland to die seemed to me to be very firm and methodical of purpose, with a 
clear prima facie case for wanting their death to be on their own terms. In short, their mind may 
well be in better balance than the world around them. 
  
The State’s position on prohibiting doctor-assisted dying for the terminally ill is thus based on 
the paternalistic assumption that all terminally ill patients who request assisted deaths do so from 
a vulnerable position, an assumption based merely on anecdotal evidence that does not provide a 
sound basis for the limitation of a constitutionally protected right. 
 
 Those who are opposed to assisted dying, and assert the view that the vulnerable must be 
protected, say that ‘as if it would not have occurred to anyone else.’473 Although evidence has 
been sought, there is little to no evidence to prove that ‘the sick or elderly have ever been cajoled 
into assisted death by relatives anywhere in the world where assisted dying is [lawfully] 
practised.’474 Moreover, it is oftentimes the case that the family members of a terminally ill 
patient would prefer to keep their loved one alive and ‘beg to keep Granny alive even when 
Granny is indeed, by all medical standards, at the end of her natural life,’475 an assertion made by 
Pratchett, based on the experiences of doctors.476  
  
Therefore, although it seems as though protecting the vulnerable in society is a constitutionally 
valid purpose for maintaining the prohibition on assisted dying in South Africa, there are 
inherent flaws to the reasoning behind this given purpose, as the mere assumption that the 
prohibition achieves its purpose is problematic. Carefully drafted legislation with sufficient 
safeguards can function to protect persons who may be vulnerable (or may be at risk of coercion) 
while simultaneously protecting the rights to life and dignity of those who request an assisted 
death.  
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Another reason given as the purpose for the prohibition on assisted dying was articulated by the 
Minister of Health in an interview with John Perlman in 2015477 when the Minister argued 
against the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia by stating that it is still too soon to legalise the 
practice of assisted dying for the terminally ill in South Africa because the health care system in 
South Africa is insufficiently developed to deal with such complexities. The Minister cited the 
United Kingdom as an example of a country with a health care system that is more developed 
that than the health care system in South Africa, but despite being more advanced and well-
established, was still unequipped to deal with the complexities of lifting a prohibition on assisted 
dying which was why the debate, at that stage, remained unsolved in the United Kingdom and 
many other developed European countries.   
  
This view is supported by academics who assert that legalising euthanasia can only be justified 
in countries with the ‘best [healthcare] for all, a well-organised and universally accessible 
palliative care and support system’478 and a ‘strong culture of respect for human life.’479 It is 
suggested that if doctor-assisted dying is legalised in South Africa, there is a risk of it becoming 
a substitute for real and proper health care for patients in ‘dire medical straits’480 as South Africa 
faces ‘severe constraints on health care facilities’481 and an ‘inadequate allocation of resources 
for highly effective medical treatments.’482 
  
Although there may be merit to the Minister’s argument that one cannot put a roof on a house if 
the house has no foundation, one needs to do a pragmatic analysis and a comparison of the 
options available to a person diagnosed with a terminal illness who is facing an imminent death 
in order to dispel the myth that assisted dying is too complex for the South African health care 
system to cope with.483 In addition, one can draw parallels with the legalisation of abortion in 
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South Africa. Subsequent to the introduction of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 484 
the South African health care system had to facilitate the practice of legal abortions in order to 
fulfil their statutory obligations in terms of the legislation. Similarly, once a secure legislative 
framework has been implemented to regulate and control the practice of assisted dying, the 
legislation will ensure that the health care system is not overburdened with obligations that it is 
not equipped to deal with.    
 
b. Is the purpose of the limiting measure legitimate in an open and democratic society? 
 
In looking at the importance of the limiting measure in an open and democratic society, it was 
argued by the Minister of Health that it is important to maintain the prohibition on assisted dying 
in order to ensure that doctors are not seen as people who kill, but rather to maintain the 
perception of doctors and health workers as healers.485 Although there is merit to preserving the 
image of doctors in society by viewing doctors as professionals who help with healing and 
prolonging life rather than wilfully ending life, allowing assisted dying in South Africa will not 
necessarily taint the perception of doctors as healers. The Minister further argued that medical 
students should never be taught that there is a time when, if they feel they have exhausted all 
options, they are allowed to consider killing their patient. This, however, would never be 
possible under a system of legalised assisted dying that is regulated by a statutory framework 
with strict safeguards and thus, this particular argument fails to prove the importance of the 
prohibition on assisted dying.   
  
Doctors often have to perform procedures that initially harm patients in order to facilitate healing 
and prevent long-term suffering. If a patient is suffering from bone cancer and a surgeon has to 
amputate his/her leg as a life-saving measure in prevention of long-term suffering, this form of 
dismemberment does not taint the reputation of the surgeon and society does not view doctors 
and surgeons as barbaric for performing amputations, mastectomies or other painful procedures 
aimed at the long-term prevention of suffering. Similarly, the purpose of assisted dying is aimed 
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at relieving patients from their suffering and, although it does entail a loss of life, the doctors 
who facilitate the practice of assisted dying should not be viewed as murderers or people who 
kill, but rather as people who assist in relieving intolerable pain and suffering at the voluntary, 
informed request of a patient.  
  
Another reason given by the Minister of Health to highlight the importance of the prohibition on 
assisted dying is that the Department of Health maintains that dying should be a natural process 
and that no person should interfere with the natural process of death by assisting another person 
to end his/her life. However, any medical intervention and any medical procedure performed by 
a doctor for the purpose of prolonging a patient’s life interferes with the natural process of death. 
When a patient is suffering through intolerable pain and wishes to end his or her own life without 
causing any harm to any other person, that patient, with the assistance of a wilfully consenting 
doctor, should be allowed to do so without the undue imposition of other people’s moral views. 
The death of a terminally ill patient should be a private matter and, any moral repercussions 
stemming from the assisted death should be dealt with by the patient him/herself and the doctor 
who consented to providing assistance. Therefore, if a patient wishes to interfere with the natural 
process of death by requesting assistance in dying, they should be entitled to do so, as it is a 
private matter based on one’s own moral views and beliefs.  
  
The Minister further argued that cultural differences in South Africa would make regulating the 
practice of assisted dying exceptionally difficult. It was argued that some cultures believe the 
most honourable way for a man to die is to die by the spear. It was asked whether an obligation 
could be placed on a doctor to respect the cultural beliefs of a patient who wishes to die by the 
spear and consequently whether you can expect a doctor to stab a man with a spear if that is how 
he wishes to end his life. These issues, however, would have to be dealt with by the legislature 
when drafting the necessary legislation to regulate the procedures involved in a doctor-assisted 
death. 
  
The reasons advanced by the Minister of Health as to why the prohibition on assisted suicide 
should remain in place have thus far failed to prove the importance of the limiting measure in an 
open and democratic society, as carefully drafted legislation that institutes sufficient safeguards 




can ensure that the practice of assisted dying takes place within controlled limits and can remedy 
each of the issues raised by the Minister of Health. 
  
Another reason often used to illustrate the importance of prohibiting assisted dying is the 
‘slippery slope’ argument. It is a widely-held belief by many who oppose assisted dying that 
once assisted dying in any form is permitted, there will be a slippery slope that leads to 
unauthorised non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia and the indiscriminate killing of the 
weaker or more vulnerable members of society under a guise of assisted dying. Further argument 
is made that if legislation is enacted to permit assisted dying for only terminally ill patients who 
request it, the law will become steadily more permissive and result in euthanasia and assisted 
dying being permitted in a wider range of cases, even if they are morally wrong.486 
 
Regions where assisted dying is permitted, however, have shown no evidence of such a slippery 
slope effect.487 Reports issued in the American states of Oregon and Washington have shown that 
there is no evidence of any abuse or misuse of legalised assisted dying and studies conducted by 
Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, University Medical Center Utrecht and Statistics Netherlands 
have shown that the number of people who died as a result of assisted dying decreased slightly 
subsequent to the introduction of legislation regulating assisted dying in 2002.488  
  
An example of a purpose of a limiting measure that failed at this stage of the limitation enquiry is 
the enforcement of ‘private moral views.’489 In the case of National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others490 it was stated:  
  
The enforcement of the private moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a 
large extent on nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate purpose. There is 
accordingly nothing, in the proportionality enquiry, to weigh against the extent of the limitation 
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and its harmful impact on gays. It would therefore seem that there is no justification for the 
limitation.491 
  
It can therefore be argued that the reasons advanced by the Minister of Health as to why the 
prohibition on assisted dying should not be lifted are merely private moral views. The Minister 
of Health asserted that his department was of the belief that people should die in a ‘natural way’ 
and, despite intense pain and suffering, should not be allowed to end their lives with the 
assistance of a doctor when they wish to do so. This is merely the expression of a private moral 
view which does not represent the interests of South Africa as a whole. If a terminally ill patient 
is enduring intolerable pain and suffering and wishes to take control over the ending of his/her 
own life rather than dying through a ‘natural process’, that person will be stripped of their 
autonomy and will have no control over their own life because of the private moral views of 
other members of society who believe that death should occur naturally.   
  
Provided a patient has the cooperation of a wilfully consenting doctor, the patient’s decision to 
end his or her own life in order to relieve intolerable pain and suffering should not be hampered 
by the moral beliefs of any other person who stipulates that death should be a ‘natural process’ 
and thereby ignores the patient’s pain and suffering which causes a severe impairment of their 
dignity and quality of life.  
  
It is therefore difficult to conclude that the limiting measure, the prohibition on assisted dying, 
pursues a legitimate constitutional purpose. Although arguments raised by the Minister of Health 
and parties opposed to the legalisation of assisted dying may be valid and relevant in our South 
African society, they are not strong enough to constitute a constitutionally legitimate purpose for 
limiting the rights of those who seek an assisted death, as legislation can be enacted to 
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c. Is there a rational connection between the limiting measure and the purpose thereof?  
  
Having considered the purpose and the importance of the limiting measure, one needs to analyse 
the ‘rational connection requirement’492 as part of the justification process within the limitation 
enquiry. This stage of the enquiry asks whether the means chosen as part of the limiting measure 
achieve their accepted purpose. This is somewhat narrow in focus when looking at whether there 
is a rational connection between the limiting measure and the purpose it seeks to fulfil. If the 
court is satisfied at this threshold stage, the limiting measure will be considered in more detail 
along with other, less restrictive, means to achieve those ends. It should be noted that, at this 
stage of the enquiry, the aim is not to determine whether the means chosen are the optimum 
means of achieving the measure not whether there are more appropriate means of doing so; as a 
result, there are very few instances where a measure has failed at this stage of the test.493 
  
The case of South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence494 illustrates an 
example where the means, a blanket ban on soldiers forming and joining trade unions, was not 
rationally connected to the constitutionally legitimate objective of maintaining a disciplined 
military.495 O’Regan J was not persuaded that allowing members of the Permanent Force to join a 
trade union would undermine the ‘discipline and efficiency’496 of the Defence Force. It was held 
that permitting members to join trade unions would ‘enhance rather than diminish discipline,’497 
as members would have ‘proper channels for grievances and complaints,’498 but this, as noted by 
O’Regan J, would depend on the ‘nature of the grievance procedures established,’499 the 
activities permitted and the ‘attitude and conduct of those involved.’500  
  
Similarly, a blanket ban on assisted dying is not rationally connected to the constitutionally 
legitimate purpose of protecting the vulnerable in society. The prohibition of assisted dying, 
rather than the closely regulated practise thereof, is not likely to provide any more protection to 
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the vulnerable than a closely regulated system that permits assisted dying only for those who 
request it and meet strict criteria before it becomes applicable to them.  
 
d. Alternative, less-restrictive means 
  
For the sake of completeness, it is prudent to discuss any less-restrictive, alternative means for 
achieving the end. It is unlikely that a court would continue with the rest of the enquiry, as there 
is little sense in undertaking a complex consideration of the balance that should exist between a 
right and a limiting measure if the limiting measure is not rationally connected to its aim.501  
  
Should a court find that the reason for the limiting measure serves a legitimate constitutional 
purpose, and the limiting measure rationally achieves that end, the court would then consider the 
availability of ‘less restrictive means’502 to achieve the same end. The question of whether there 
are less restrictive means of achieving the end is essentially twofold. First, it looks at whether 
there are less restrictive, alternative means of achieving the end, and second, looks at the chosen 
measure to determine whether or not it is ‘well-tailored’503 in light of all relevant circumstances.  
  
Although it is not the Court’s duty to find the least restrictive means, the Constitutional Court 
has been less deferential when considering the proportionality of the means chosen by the 
legislature and determining whether the means are well-tailored to their purpose in light of all the 
relevant factors found in the limitation clause. The Court must, however, refrain from stepping 
into the realm of policy-making. This stage of the enquiry can be seen as ‘gentle enticement’504 
to the courts as well as the legislature and the executive to look for alternative means, rather than 
resorting to the difficult balancing act required to remedy the infringement of rights.   
  
At this stage of the enquiry, the Court could look to recent Canadian jurisprudence for guidance 
in applying the limitation of rights enquiry to the prohibition on assisted dying. In the final 
Carter judgment, reference was made to the trial judge’s finding that ‘the prohibition [of assisted 
dying] was broader than necessary, as the evidence showed that a system with properly designed 
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and administered safeguards offered a less restrictive means of reaching the government’s 
objective.’505  
 Although the notion of ‘over-breadth’ is often conceptually and practically combined with the 
question of the availability of less restrictive means, there is merit to maintaining a distinction 
between the two concepts. With reference to the ‘over-breadth inquiry,’ however, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held:  
A law that is drawn broadly to target conduct that bears no relation to its purpose “in order to 
make enforcement more practical” may therefore be overbroad. The question is not whether 
Parliament has chosen the least restrictive means, but whether the chosen means infringe life, 
liberty or security of the person in a way that has no connection with the mischief contemplated 
by the legislature. The focus is not on broad social impacts, but on the impact of the measure on 
the individuals whose life, liberty or security of the person is trammelled. Applying this approach, 
we conclude that the prohibition on assisted dying is overbroad. The object of the law, as 
discussed, is to protect vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a moment of 
weakness. Canada conceded at trial that the law catches people outside this class: “It is 
recognized that not every person who wishes to commit suicide is vulnerable, and that there may 
be people with disabilities who have a considered, rational and persistent wish to end their own 
lives”. The trial judge accepted that Ms. Taylor was such a person — competent, fully-informed, 
and free from coercion or duress. It follows that the limitation on their rights is in at least some 
cases not connected to the objective of protecting vulnerable persons. The blanket prohibition 
sweeps conduct into its ambit that is unrelated to the law’s objective.506  
  
In further analysis, the Supreme Court of Canada found that  
  
The question in this case comes down to whether the absolute prohibition on physician-assisted 
dying, with its heavy impact on the claimants’ s7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person, 
is the least drastic means of achieving the legislative objective. It was the task of the trial judge to 
determine whether a regime less restrictive of life, liberty and security of the person could address 
the risks associated with physician-assisted dying, or whether Canada was right to say that the 
risks could not adequately be addressed through the use of safeguards.507  
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After reviewing the evidence, it was concluded by the trial judge that ‘a permissive regime with 
properly designed and administered safeguards was capable of protecting vulnerable people from 
abuse and error. While there are risks, to be sure, a carefully designed and managed system is 
capable of adequately addressing them.’508  
  
By applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in a South African context, it is therefore 
possible to conclude that there are less restrictive, alternative means available to achieve the end 
of protecting the vulnerable in society. The Court, however, would not be able to take on the role 
of policy-maker, and the responsibility would thus fall on the legislature to ensure there is a 
secure legislative framework in place to allow for a permissive regime that protects the 
vulnerable in society.   
 
3.3.4.4 Balancing and Proportionality 
  
Once it has been determined that the purpose of the limiting measure is legitimate and that there 
is a rational connection between the limiting measure and the purpose that it seeks to achieve, 
and that there are no alternative, less-restrictive means, the enquiry leaves something worth 
balancing.509 What needs to be balanced at this point are the competing goods, namely the right 
and the limiting measure which has been deemed to serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose.   
   
When balancing the right against the limiting measure, the right should be considered in terms of 
its relative importance under the scheme of rights and interests protected by the Constitution, and 
further consideration should be given to the whether the limiting measure strikes at the core or on 
the periphery of the right. 
  
In looking at the rights to life and dignity in terms of their relative importance under the scheme 
of rights and interests protected by the Constitution, there is no doubt that the rights to life and 
dignity are of pre-eminent importance, despite the lack of a formal hierarchy of rights. The 
Constitutional Court highlighted this fact in the Makwanyane judgment when it was stated that 
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‘the rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights.’510 Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the prohibition on assisted dying erodes the dignity and quality of life of 
terminally ill patients to such an extent that it cannot be denied that the limiting measure strikes 
at the core of these rights.  
  
Therefore, because the rights to life and dignity are of supreme importance and the limiting 
measure, the prohibition on assisted dying, strikes at the heart of the rights, the bar is set fairly 
high for the justification, as the greater the impact on the right, the greater the justification that is 
required.511 Because the limiting measure in this instance was not found to be rationally 
connected to a legitimate constitutional purpose and there were alternative, less restrictive means 
available to achieve said purpose, the final balancing process is rendered futile as the limiting 
measure did not meet the abovementioned internal thresholds.  
  
There are two possible outcomes or conclusions that could be reached by the Court: first, it could 
be found that the limitation is justifiable because the limitation has a proportionate effect on the 
right. Alternatively, the Court could conclude that the limitation is not justifiable and that the 
right should prevail over the limitation. The reason for this conclusion may be that the ‘effect on 
the right is disproportionate to the good achieved by the measure’512 or that the means chosen 
were not well-tailored to the purpose of the limitation.513  
  
Should the first conclusion be reached by the Court (and it is found that the limitation on the 
right is justifiable and proportionate to the impact on the right and its importance) then balancing 
in its purest form has been achieved in the sense that one interest/value simply outweighs another 
right/interest/value. Should the second conclusion be reached, and the limiting measure is found 
to be unjustifiable, then the right shall prevail as the right was either too important and the effect 
thereon was too great or because the good achieved by the limiting measure did not hold enough 
merit.   
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As in the case of the prohibition on assisted dying, many cases see the limiting measure fail as a 
result of not being well-tailored to its purpose rather than as a result of failing the balancing test. 
There are more cases in which the limiting measure went ‘further than is necessary to ensure its 
end’514 and in which it was found that the means were not reasonable because they were 
‘overbroad’515 than cases where the limiting measure failed the balancing test.   
  
3.4 Conclusion of the Limitation Enquiry 
 
Through an analysis of the limitation enquiry, it is therefore evident that the prohibition on 
assisted dying strikes at the core of the rights to life and dignity, two of the most important and 
fundamental rights guaranteed to all persons in South Africa. This limitation proves difficult to 
justify in terms of the requirements of the limitation clause, and should therefore not be 
considered a legitimate or justifiable limitation of the rights to life and dignity. This limitation of 
rights can be remedied through carefully drafted legislation which will perform a dual function to 
permit the practice of assisted dying for those who qualify in terms of the legislation, and have 
requested it, while simultaneously protecting those who may be vulnerable and require 
protection against unsolicited, involuntary or non-voluntary euthanasia.   
   
It is therefore evident, through an analysis of case law and the limitation of rights pertaining to 
assisted dying, that should a permissive regime be implemented, a stringent legislative 
framework is required in order to regulate and control the practice of assisted dying in limited 
circumstances.  
 
A proposed legislative framework shall be discussed below in order to evidence the proposition 
that the South African health care system will be able to adapt to the demands of a permissive 
regime that allows for assisted dying in limited circumstances while protecting the rights of all 
parties involved. The potential for abuse is naturally higher when assisted dying is legalised in a 
health care system in which people do not have equal access to resources, however, a stronger 
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degree of prescriptive control will be possible through a legislative framework as opposed to 
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Having found that the prohibition against assisted dying unjustifiably limits constitutionally 
protected rights, this chapter will consider the legislative framework that should be put in place 
to enable the practice of doctor-assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. In 
doing so, it will critically examine the Draft Bill on the End of Life Decisions Act, in light of 
international best-practices from the American states of Oregon, Washington and California, 
taking into account contributions made by the United Kingdom. Although legislation has been 
operating effectively in other countries such as Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, much 
research has already been compiled drawing comparisons between these legal systems and their 
similarities to South Africa.517 The comprehensive nature of the American legislation and the 
courts’ reliance thereon (evidenced in the most recent judicial decisions pertaining to assisted 
dying) indicates that South Africa can look to the American legislation for guidance when 
formulating legislation to be implemented for the purposes of regulating the practice of assisted 
dying thus, for the sake of simplicity, this study has been limited to an analysis of comparative 
American legislation. 
 
After setting out the history of the Draft Bill, this chapter will consider the most important 
aspects of the bill in light of comparative legislation, namely: Definitions, Procedures, 
Safeguards and the constitution of a committee for deciding on requests for assisted deaths. 
These aspects of the legislation will be integral in ensuring the effective operation of the 
legislation and the efficient regulation of the practice of assisted dying for the terminally ill.  
 
4.2 The Draft Bill: Background  
 
The Draft Bill of the End of Life Decisions Act was proposed by the South African Law 
Commission in Project 86,518 and has been subject to much debate since it was first put forward 
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in 1998. Some academics believe it provides a good starting point from which the legislature can 
formulate and promulgate relevant legislation,519 however, others have disagreed and argued that, 
‘from a constitutional perspective, the Draft Bill does not strike a proper balance between the 
state’s duty to protect life, and a person’s right (derived from the rights to physical and 
psychological integrity and to dignity) to end his or her life.’520 
 
This Draft Bill will form the basis for discussion, using the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the 
Washington Death with Dignity Act, the California End of Life Option Act, the English Assisted 
Dying Bill and the Canadian decision of Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) to make 
recommendations for amendments to the Draft Bill, in order to formulate legislation that can 
implement and regulate a permissive regime of assisted dying in South Africa. 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act521 came into effect in 1997 and has, to date, seen 1327 
prescriptions written for lethal medication in terms of the Act with only 859 deaths occurring as 
a result of the legislation.522 The Washington Death with Dignity Act was passed in November 
2008 and came into effect in March 2009 and, as of 16 March 2015, there have been 725 patients 
who participated under the Act.523 The California End of Life Option Act, based on the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act,524 was approved by the California Assembly on a vote of 42 to 33 and 
by the California Senate on a 23 to 14 vote.525 The Bill was thus passed in both legislative 
chambers and the End of Life Option Act was signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown on 5 
October 2015. 
 
The Assisted Dying Bill, a Private Member’s Bill tabled by MP Rob Marris in the House of 
Commons in June 2015 was debated in September 2015 but was ultimately rejected by MPs in a 
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vote of 330 to 118.526 Despite its rejection, the Assisted Dying Bill, hereafter referred to as the 
‘English Assisted Dying Bill’,527 was well formulated and is worthy of analysis alongside the 
aforementioned American legislation.  
 
To date, Canada has not yet enacted any legislation pertaining to assisted dying, but in the Carter 
judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada suspended its ruling for a period of twelve months in 
order to give the government time to amend its laws. Reference was made to enacting legislation 
in the Carter judgment and shall thus be referred to wherever applicable.  
 
In essence, legislation that permits and regulates the practice of assisted dying affords peace of 
mind to terminally ill, mentally competent adults by offering them the right to choose an assisted 
death, should their suffering become unbearable in their final months or weeks of life. This 
eliminates the burden of having to end one's life oneself in a less dignified manner or seeking the 
illegal assistance of a doctor, friend or family member or incurring hefty travel expenses by 
travelling to regions where assisted dying is permitted, such as at Dignitas in Switzerland. 
 
It is important for the proposed legislation to be clear and precise so that it can never be argued 
that the legislation will act as a slippery slope for an abuse of active euthanasia, or that the 
legislation will lead to vulnerable persons being euthanized without consent and the perpetrators 
evading liability in terms of the Act. Moreover, legislation should afford protection to vulnerable 
persons in society by limiting the scope of the legislation to be applicable only to terminally ill 
adults of sound mind and to ensure that the laws that make it a criminal offence to assist persons 
who do not qualify in terms of the legislation528 in ending their lives will remain unaltered. 
 
The legislation should be drafted in such a manner that its provisions respect, protect, promote 
and uphold the rights and values of life, dignity, patient autonomy and bodily and psychological 
integrity. Moreover, the legislation should protect more than just the patient’s interests, but 
should also protect the rights and interests medical practitioners who wish to assist terminally ill 
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patients in fulfilling their wishes for a dignified death. The legislation needs to strike a balance 
between competing constitutional rights and values, and this should be done through stringent 




In order for a piece of legislation on assisted dying to operate effectively, a clear definitions 
section is required. In the Draft Bill on End of Life Decisions, the definitions section made a 
clear distinction between ‘intractable and unbearable illness’529 and ‘terminal illness.’530 
 
An ‘intractable and unbearable illness’ was defined as ‘an illness, injury or other physical or 
mental condition, excluding a terminal illness, that offers no reasonable prospect of being cured 
and causes severe physical or mental suffering of a nature and degree not reasonable to be 
endured.’531 A ‘terminal illness’ was defined as ‘an illness, injury or other physical or mental 
condition that, in reasonable medical judgment, will inevitably cause the untimely death of the 
patient concerned and which is causing the patient extreme suffering or causes a persistent and 
irreversible vegetative condition with the result that no meaningful existence is possible for the 
patient.’532 Some academics have argued that the definition of intractable and unbearable illness 
is too broad, and that the term ‘intractable and unbearable condition’ would have matched the 
above definition more accurately.533 Maintaining the distinction between an intractable and 
unbearable condition and a terminal illness will provide clarity when limiting the ambit of the 
legislation's applicability to ‘terminally ill’ patients.  
 
In the Carter judgment, the phrase ‘grievous and irremediable medical condition’534 was used 
instead of ‘terminal illness.’ It was proposed that a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
includes ‘an illness, disease or disability that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the 
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individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.’535 Although legislation is yet to be 
enacted in Canada, this definition provided by the Supreme Court of Canada places emphasis on 
the importance of the individual patient in question by looking at how much suffering can be 
tolerated by that person in the circumstances of his or her condition, thereby respecting that 
individual’s patient autonomy and dignity. This patient-centered approach differs greatly from 
the definitions found in foreign legislation that regulates assisted dying, as shall be discussed 
below. 
 
The English Assisted Dying Bill defined a person as having a 'terminal illness' if they have been 
diagnosed by a registered medical practitioner as having an ‘inevitably progressive condition 
which cannot be reversed by treatment’536 and, as a consequence of that terminal illness, that 
person is ‘reasonably expected to die within six months.’537 The legislation stipulated that 
treatment which ‘temporarily relieves the symptoms of an inevitably progressive condition 
cannot be regarded as treatment which reverses that condition.’538 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides that a 'terminal disease' is an ‘incurable and 
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical 
judgment, produce death within six months.’539 Similarly, the Washington Death with Dignity 
Act540 and California End of Life Option Act541 also incorporate the same wording into the 
definition of a terminal disease, stipulating that the disease will produce death within a period of 
six months.  
 
It should be noted that the definition of a terminal illness/disease, as found in the English 
Assisted Dying Bill, Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Washington Death with Dignity Act and 
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California End of Life Option Act differs from the definition provided in the South African Draft 
Bill and the Carter judgment in that specific reference is made to a six month life expectancy. 
This six month limitation functions as a safeguard to ensure that all patients who are diagnosed 
with terminal illnesses have to pursue other treatment options if their prognosis includes a life 
expectancy of more than six months, and thus cannot be pressured into seeking an assisted death 
prematurely and, in addition, doctors cannot resort to assisted dying as an alternative to palliation 
if the patient has more than six months to live. 
 
By imposing this safeguard, however, it can be argued that the legislation would detract from the 
patient’s autonomy, independence and bodily and psychological integrity by limiting the 
timeframe in which the person may seek an assisted death with no regard for the circumstances 
of his or her condition. If the purpose of the legislation is to promote and respect patient 
autonomy, dignity and bodily and psychological integrity by enabling a terminally ill person to 
take control of their own death, it is somewhat contradictory for the State to retain control over 
the timing of the patient’s death by imposing such a specific time frame. 
 
The definition of a grievous and irremediable medical condition, as formulated in the Carter 
judgment, respects the dignity and autonomy of a patient by determining the extent of suffering 
that can be tolerated by that person in the circumstances of his or her condition. This definition is 
preferable, as it does not impose a rigid timeframe within which a patient may request an assisted 
death with no regard for the circumstances of his or her condition. Therefore, for the purposes of 
legislation to regulate end of life decisions and assisted dying in South Africa, the definitions of 
‘terminal illness’ and 'intractable and unbearable condition' should take into account the 
experience of the suffering patient, and should thus resemble the formulation of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s definition of a grievous and irremediable medical condition. 
 
With regard to the definitions of euthanasia and assisted dying, no formal definitions are 
provided in the definition sections of any of the abovementioned Acts or Bills. It is, however, 
still possible to gain an understanding of what constitutes an assisted death through a careful 
reading of the relevant provisions in the legislation. It is therefore unnecessary to include formal, 
static definitions for the various forms of assisted dying in the legislation if there are provisions 




to regulate procedural aspects of assisted dying that clearly stipulate forms of permissible and 
impermissible conduct. Thus, our understanding of the definition of assisted dying shall be 
gleaned from the procedures and safeguards established in the legislation and the forms of 
conduct that will be permitted in terms of the legislation, rather than from a rigid definition in the 
definitions section. 
  
The Draft Bill includes a definition of death for the purposes of the legislation, yet there are no 
corresponding provisions in any of the other comparable pieces of foreign legislation. The Draft 
Bill provides in section 2(1) ‘(Conduct of a medical practitioner in the event of clinical death)’542 
that, for the purposes of the legislation, a person is considered dead when ‘two medical 
practitioners agree and confirm in writing that the person is clinically dead according to the 
following criteria for death: (a) the irreversible absence of spontaneous respiratory and 
circulatory functions; or (b) the persistent clinical absence of brain-stem function.’543 Should a 
person be considered dead according to the provisions of sub-section (1), the legislation 
stipulates that ‘the medical practitioner responsible for the treatment of such person may 
withdraw or order the withdrawal of all forms of treatment.’544 
 
It is necessary to include a provision in the legislation that clarifies when the precise moment of 
death occurs, as this bears significant legal implications.545 When the Draft Bill was first 
proposed, the National Health Act 61 of 2003 had not yet been enacted. Prior to the enactment of 
the National Health Act, the traditional moment of death was accepted as the irreversible absence 
of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions, ie when the heart and lungs stopped 
functioning on their own.546 Advances in medical technology, however, have enabled restoration 
of a heartbeat when it has ceased and resuscitation of respiration where it has failed.547 As such, 
section 1 of the National Health Act now defines death as brain death.548  
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Brain death/brainstem death can be defined as the ‘irreversible and irreparable cessation of all 
the brainstem functions, inclusive of complete cessation of the heartbeat, respiration, blood 
circulation and digestive functions.’549 Neocortical death, however, occurs when the patient is 
not brain dead and is biologically alive, but has suffered damage to the cortex of the brain and is 
thus left in a permanent vegetative state with no cognition or conation.550  
 
The issue that arises in this context, however, is when a patient is not brain dead or in a 
permanent vegetative state, but is terminally ill and requests assistance in dying. An important 
question to be considered is whether the patient’s continued existence can be considered ‘life’ or 
‘life worth living’. In Good Life, Good Death: A Doctor’s case for Euthanasia and Suicide, Dr 
Christiaan Barnard asserted that ‘the primary goal of medicine was to alleviate suffering and not 
merely to prolong life.’551 Barnard further argued that advances in modern medical technology 
demand that we ‘evaluate our view of death and the handling of terminal illness’552, as he felt that 
it was not the diagnosis of death that was a concern as much as a possible means of determining 
when the state of being alive ceases. Moreover, it was asserted that dying, in this context, could 
be defined as the irreversible deterioration in the quality of life which precedes the death of that 
particular individual.553  
 
Although a definition of death that focus on quality of life is unsuitable for the purposes of 
promulgating legislation, a clinical definition of death, incorporating the precise moment of 
death, should be included in the legislation. In order for the death of a person to be established it 
is therefore prudent to ensure the person concerned is declared dead by at least two medical 
practitioners, one of whom must have been practicing as a medical practitioner for at least five 
years after the day on which she or he was registered as a medical practitioner.  
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The Draft Bill also fails to define other important key terms such as ‘palliative care’, ‘treatment’ 
and ‘care’. It has been argued that it is highly unlikely that the Commission intended for 
euthanasia to be included in the definition of ‘treatment’ or ‘care’ in the Draft Bill.554 However, a 
strong counterargument can be made for the inclusion of euthanasia under a definition of 
‘treatment’ or ‘palliative care.’555 It is thus necessary to ensure that the definitions are well 
drafted to minimise the risk of ambiguity or legislative loopholes and, as such, important terms 
such as ‘palliative care’, ‘treatment’ and ‘care’ should be defined appropriately.556  
  
For the sake of completeness and clarity, additional terms such as self-administer, aid-in-dying 
drug and lethal agent should be included in the definition section of the proposed legislation. The 
California End of Life Option Act defines self-administer as ‘a qualified individual’s affirmative, 
conscious and physical act of administering and ingesting the aid-in-dying drug to bring about 
his or her own death.’557 The Washington Death with Dignity Act defines self-administer as ‘a 
qualified patient’s act of ingesting medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified 
manner.’558 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the English Assisted Dying Bill and the Draft 
Bill, however, all omit definitions for the terms self-administer and self-administration.  
 
It is important to include a formal definition of ‘self-administration’ in the legislation, as the 
degree of involvement on the part of the medical professional will be essential in determining 
whether the patient died as a result of an act of active euthanasia or doctor-assisted suicide and, 
consequently, whether or not there was compliance with the legislation. 
 
A hybrid formulation of the two definitions stated above should be considered as part of the 
proposed legislation in South Africa. Self-administration should thus be defined as a patient’s 
affirmative, conscious and physical act of administering and ingesting the lethal agent provided 
by the medical professional to end his or her own life in a humane and dignified manner thereby 
incorporating the most important elements of each definition. 
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The proposed legislation also requires a clear definition for an ‘aid-in-dying drug’559 or lethal 
agent that is to be provided to the patient who has requested assistance in dying. There are 
several methods by which a person can bring about their own death in a humane and dignified 
manner, with the assistance of a medical professional, which include injecting, swallowing or 
inhaling measured amounts of the lethal substance. The legislature would have to consider the 
submissions and recommendations of medical professionals when formulating a definition for a 
lethal agent, as medical evidence is required in order to determine the most appropriate lethal 




When analysing legislation that regulates assisted dying, it becomes evident that many of the 
safeguards aimed at protecting the vulnerable are found in the procedures outlined in the 
legislation. It is important for these procedures to be clearly delineated in order to ensure that 
patients and medical professionals alike understand what is expected of them and what conduct 
is permissible in terms of the legislation. 
 
There are substantial similarities between the abovementioned pieces of foreign legislation with 
regard to the procedures that are to be followed by patients and medical practitioners in instances 
where a patient has requested an assisted death. 
 
The procedure with regard to the cessation of life in the Draft Bill is explained as follows: ‘if a 
medical practitioner is requested by a patient to put an end to that patient’s suffering, or to enable 
the patient to put an end to his or her own suffering by way of administering or providing some 
or other lethal agent, the medical practitioner shall give effect to the request if he or she is 
satisfied that the patient is suffering from a terminal or intractable and unbearable illness and that 
the patient is over the age of 18 years and mentally competent.’560 Furthermore, the patient must 
be ‘adequately informed of the illness from which he or she is suffering as well as the prognosis 
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of his or her condition and of any treatment or care which is available.’561 The patient’s request 
must be based on a ‘free and considered decision.’562 The request for an assisted death by the 
patient must be repeated by the patient ‘without self-contradiction on two separate occasions at 
least seven days apart, the last of which must be no more than 72 hours before the medical 
practitioner gives effect to the request.’563 
 
In addition, the patient must sign a ‘completed certificate of request, asking the medical 
practitioner to assist the patient to end his or her life, the signing of which must be witnessed by 
the medical practitioner.’564 The Draft Bill does not include a template of the required form that 
the certificate of request should take, however, the English Assisted Dying Bill, the Washington 
Death with Dignity Act, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the California End of Life Option 
Act all include a template for a declaration of intent that must be completed before the request for 
an assisted death will be granted. These templates shall be discussed and analysed below as 
safeguards in the legislation.  
 
The Draft Bill also provides that a patient may rescind their request for an assisted death ‘at any 
time and in any manner without regard to his or her mental state.’565 Should the request be 
rescinded by a patient, the medical practitioner bears the responsibility of destroying the 
certificate of request as soon as practicable and this fact should be noted on the patient’s medical 
record.  
 
It is clearly stipulated in the Draft Bill that the medical practitioner shall only give effect to the 
patient’s request if s/he is ‘satisfied that ending a patient’s life or assisting a patient to end his/her 
own life is the only way for the patient to be released from his or her suffering.’566 The Draft 
Bill, however, does not stipulate what constitutes ‘suffering’. Suffering is subjective and to some, 
suffering could mean enduring physical pain, but to others, suffering could mean a loss of 
dignity and struggling to perform basic daily functions independently. If such a provision were to 
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remain in the legislation, it would mean that the ultimate decision to end the patient’s life could 
lie with the doctor rather than the patient, as a doctor may not be satisfied that all the legislative 
requirements have been met and may thus deny the patient's request for an assisted death if the 
patient has not explored alternative available remedies, such as hospice care, palliative care and 
palliative sedation. This provision should be deleted from the legislation as retaining such a 
provision would contradict the purpose of the legislation, as it disregards patient autonomy and 
detracts from the patient's power of choice and control over medical decisions. The legislation 
should make assisted dying available to terminally ill patients as an alternative option to other 
courses of treatment such as palliative care and hospice care. Should the legislation prevent a 
medical practitioner from giving effect to the patient’s request for an assisted death on the basis 
that there are other ways for the patient to be relieved from his or her suffering, this would hinder 
the operation of the legislation and should thus be omitted. 
 
It should be emphasised that the proposed legislation would make assisted dying available to 
terminally ill patients as an alternative course of treatment to relieve them from their suffering 
when treatment has become futile and death is imminent. There are currently four main options 
available to a patient: (i) palliation, (ii) withdrawal of treatment that has already been 
administered yet has subsequently become futile, (iii) withholding/refusal of treatment and (iv) 
assisted dying, however, a patient may only elect from the first three options as assisted dying 
remains unlawful. 
 
For many patients, however, palliation and sedation are not treatment options they wish to 
pursue. Palliative care cannot necessarily provide relief from suffering in all cases,567 and the 
effects of opioid medication are not always guaranteed.568 Although it is usually possible to 
secure relief from pain and nausea and to suppress seizure activity,569 not all patients achieve the 
same level of pain relief and some require higher doses of medication in order to control their 
symptoms. Higher doses of medication can have severe effects on a person and loss of physical 
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and mental capacity, behavioral changes and psychological impacts can only be relieved to a 
minimal extent.570 
 
Australian palliative care expert, Professor Michael Ashby, and Dr Rajesh Munglani, 
professional consultant in pain medicine, both described the limitations of palliative relief in 
affidavits that were considered by the court in the case of Seales v Attorney-General.571 
Numerous negative side effects such as a massive weight gain, impairment of sleep, behavioral 
and mood changes as well as a predisposition to stomach ulcers and bleeding are linked to the 
administration of steroids used in palliative treatment.572 Should one stop or reduce the usage of 
steroids, one is likely to suffer from severe headaches which are difficult to control by morphine 
or other pain killers.573  
 
In brief summation, should a patient, who has been fully informed of his or her treatment 
options, elect not to pursue palliation, but requests an assisted death instead, a medical 
practitioner would not be able to give effect to the patient’s wishes if there is a provision in the 
legislation that requires the medical practitioner to be satisfied that assisted dying is the only way 
for the patient to be released from his or her suffering. Section 5(1)(i) should thus be removed 
from the Draft Bill and no similar provision should be enacted in future legislation to regulate 
assisted dying in South Africa, as there are other, more effective, safeguards that can be 
implemented.  
 
The Draft Bill further provides that, once satisfied of the abovementioned legislative 
requirements, the medical practitioner who has received a request for an assisted death will have 
to ‘consult and confer with an independent medical practitioner who is knowledgeable in respect 
of the terminal illness from which the patient is suffering.’574 This independent medical 
practitioner must have ‘personally examined the patient and checked the patient’s medical 
history, and must further confirm that the patient is a mentally competent adult, is suffering from 
a terminal or intractable and unbearable illness, and that an assisted death is the only way for the 
                                               
570 Affidavit of Lecretia Seales' principal oncologist in Seales v Attorney-General) (note 12 above) 39. 
571 Seales v Attorney-General (note 12 above). 
572 Seales v Attorney-General (note 12 above) 40-41. 
573 Ibid 41. 
574 Section 5(2) of the Draft Bill. 




patient to be released from his or her suffering.’575 This final requirement, however, should be 
omitted from the legislation as discussed above. The Draft Bill stipulates that both the primary 
medical practitioner and the independent consulting medical practitioner will be required to 
record in writing the findings with regard to the abovementioned facts pertaining to the patient 
and the circumstances of his or her illness.  
 
The notion of consulting with an independent medical practitioner is reflected in the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act, the Washington Death with Dignity Act, the California End of Life 
Option Act and the English Draft Bill on Assisted Dying which all make reference to an 
attending doctor/physician and a consulting physician or independent doctor. The duties and 
obligations of both the primary and the consulting medical practitioner are clearly stipulated in 
the relevant pieces of legislation, but the role of the consulting physician shall be discussed under 
safeguards below.  
 
The procedures outlined in the Draft Bill further require that the patient’s medical record be 
supplemented with the following documentation:  
 
A note of the oral request made by the patient for an assisted death; the certificate of request; a 
record of the doctor’s opinion that the patient has made the decision to end his or her own life 
freely, voluntarily and after due consideration; the report from the independent medical 
practitioner referred to above and a note by the medical practitioner indicating that all of the 
legislative requirements have been met, indicating the steps taken to carry out the request and a 
notation of the substance prescribed to the patient.’576  
 
A similar list of documents that are required to supplement the medical record of the patient can 
be found in the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the Washington Death with Dignity Act and the 
California End of Life Option Act. These documents provide information that is necessary for the 
reporting requirement that will be discussed below under safeguards.  
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4.5 Decision making by panel or committee 
 
The Draft Bill includes another model to facilitate assisted dying which differs greatly from the 
procedures found in the American and English legislation discussed above. The Draft Bill 
proposes that a panel or committee be established for the purpose of deciding on cases of assisted 
dying. Similar multi-disciplinary committees were instituted in the Netherlands, but the Draft 
Bill proposes that the committee should be approached before the request for an assisted death is 
granted, rather than forming part of a subsequent review process as in the Netherlands.577  
 
The Draft Bill proposes that euthanasia578 may only be performed by a medical practitioner when 
the request for euthanasia has been approved by an ethics committee ‘constituted for that 
purpose, consisting of five persons including: two medical practitioners (other than the 
practitioner attending to the patient), one lawyer, one person who shares the same home language 
as the patient, one member from the multi-disciplinary team and one family member.’579 
 
This committee, once constituted, would have to verify in writing, that in its opinion, the request 
made by the patient for euthanasia was a ‘free, considered and sustained request; the patient is 
suffering from a terminal or intractable and unbearable illness and that euthanasia is the only 
way for the patient to be released from his or her suffering.’580 
 
The Draft Bill further stipulates that the ‘request for euthanasia must be heard within three weeks 
of being received by the committee.581 This, however, poses pragmatic issues because a 
terminally ill patient could experience a rapid deterioration of health within a period of three 
weeks which could change the circumstances of their request, and three weeks may be 
insufficient notice to constitute a committee of five members. 
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Once a committee has granted authority for euthanasia to be performed in terms of the 
legislation, the committee must ‘report confidentially to the Director-General of the Department 
of Health, by registered post, the granting of such authority.’582 The report to the Director-
General must set out ‘the personal particulars of the patient concerned, the place and date where 
the euthanasia was performed and the reasons therefor.’583 It must also include ‘the names and 
qualifications of members of the committee who issued the certificates in terms of the legislation 
and the name of the medical practitioner who performed the euthanasia.’584 The Director-General 
may call upon members of the committee or the medical practitioner who performed the 
euthanasia to make a report furnishing any additional information that may be required. Should 
an assisted death be granted by a committee in terms of the Draft Bill, the medical record of the 
patient should be supplemented by ‘the full particulars regarding the request made by the patient, 
a copy of the certificate issued by the committee authorising the euthanasia and a copy of the 
report’585 that is sent to the Director-General of Health, as referred to above.  
 
Although the constitution of a multi-disciplinary committee for the purposes of determining 
whether or not to grant a terminally ill person the right to die has its merits,586 there are 
numerous pragmatic issues and shortfalls to this model. It would prove difficult to identify and 
define the legal criteria upon which the ethics panel/committee should make its decisions, and 
this allows for the potential influence of private moral views, which could unfairly discriminate 
against the patient who approached the committee to request an assisted death. A person who is 
suffering from a terminal illness in their final months of life may not have the strength and/or the 
ability to appear before a committee. Moreover, a person who is suffering intolerable pain should 
not have to wait three weeks after submitting a request for an assisted death for a panel to hear 
the request, after which it would take even more time for the panel to present its decision and 
either grant or deny a patient the right to an assisted death. 
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Through an analysis of the definitions and the procedures detailed above that should be 
incorporated into the proposed legislation for South Africa, it is evident that the term ‘assisted 
dying' is more appropriate than 'euthanasia' as used in the Draft Bill. The term ‘euthanasia’ in the 
context of human death holds negative implications for many people as a result of historical 
widespread abuses of euthanasia, such as under the Nazi regime.587 Therefore, the proposed 
legislation for South Africa will not legalise the practice of human euthanasia that could be open 
to abuse, but will only permit assisted dying for those who qualify to participate under the 
legislation if they have requested an assisted death and are physically able to self-administer the 
lethal agent that is provided to them by a medical practitioner.  
 
Although it is intended as a safeguard, the required ability to self-administer the lethal agent that 
is found in most of the abovementioned foreign legislation could constitute a form of indirect 
discrimination against those who are physically unable to do so. As a result of terminal illnesses, 
many patients are left paralysed or unable to perform basic bodily functions, such as swallowing, 
and rely on feeding tubes or the assistance of others in order to ingest food or medication. 
Patients in this condition, who are unable to independently self-administer a lethal agent, would 
be excluded from the operation of the legislation and any medical practitioner, friend or family 
member who actively participates in administering the lethal agent to the patient would not be 
afforded protection against criminal liability.  
 
The strict requirement of self-administration that excludes certain patients from the operation of 
the legislation could be challenged as a form of indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
physical disability. Influential activists in the right to die movement, such as Dr Jack Kevorkian, 
argued that legislation such as the Oregon Death with Dignity Act is insufficient as it does not 
help those who cannot help themselves. In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper in April 
2010, Dr Kevorkian argued that the legalised assisted dying in Oregon, Washington and 
Vermont is ‘not done right’ and does not constitute a medical service, because a doctor cannot be 
directly involved, as a doctor would be punished and have his or her license revoked by the 
American Medical Association.588 
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It will prove exceptionally difficult for doctors and medical practitioners to provide assistance to 
terminally ill patients who have experienced such a severe decline in their physical well-being 
that they are paralysed or unable to ingest medication on their own. Although difficult, it would 
not be impossible. Doctors Jack Kevorkian and Philip Nitschke invented machines which could 
be set up by a doctor but subsequently operated by patients to bring their own lives to an end in a 
peaceful and dignified manner. By utilising such machines, the patients were able to control the 
timing of their own deaths by triggering the release of the lethal agent with a simple push of a 
button.589 These machines could be adapted to suit the needs of a patient who suffers from 
paralysis or an inability to swallow independently, and could provide assistance to those who 
would otherwise be excluded from the operation of the proposed legislation on the grounds of 
their disability.  
 
In order to accommodate procedures for various forms of self-administration and to make 
provision for those who require additional assistance in self-administering a lethal agent, a 
provision similar to the following should be enacted with regard to the preparation of the 
medicine prescribed for a patient. The English Assisted Dying Bill stipulates that:  
 
An assisting health professional may (a) prepare the medicine for self-administration by that 
person; (b) prepare a medical device which will enable that person to self-administer the 
medicine; and (c) assist that person to ingest or otherwise self-administer the medicine; but the 
decision to self-administer the medicine and the final act of doing so must be undertaken by the 
person for whom the medicine has been prescribed.590 
 
The Bill further stipulates that this provision ‘does not authorise an assisting health professional 
to administer a medicine to another person with the intention of causing that person’s death.’591 
Such a provision will provide protection to the patient as well as the medical practitioner who 
must still refrain from performing the final act of ending the patient’s life. This will assist in 
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striking a balance between the protection of patient’s rights as well as protection of the rights of 




The Project 86 Report incorporates specific proposals with regard to safeguards that were 
suggested by various interested parties in submissions received by the South African Law 
Commission.592 Parties both for and against assisted dying all emphasised the importance of 
preventing or containing any abuse of statutory law as effectively as possible by implementing 
procedural safeguards and tightening the safeguards already proposed by the Commission. These 
proposed safeguards, as well as the safeguards included in the relevant foreign legislation, shall 
be examined below for the purpose of recommending changes to the Draft Bill. 
 
4.6.1 Attending and consulting physicians 
 
As mentioned above, the recommended procedure for the proposed legislation in South Africa 
requires the participation of both a primary attending physician as well as an independent 
consulting physician who examines the patient, confirms the diagnosis and prognosis and signs 
the declaration of intent. It is important for a second, consulting medical practitioner to play an 
active role in the process of facilitating end-of-life decisions for terminally ill patients. Not only 
will a second medical practitioner ensure that the correct diagnosis and prognosis has been given, 
but the involvement of a second medical practitioner ensures there are certain checks and 
balances in place to guard against an abuse of the legislation, and to assist in preventing any 
undue influence, coercion or duress, essentially providing another layer of protection for 
potentially vulnerable patients.  
 
4.6.2 Timeframes/Waiting periods 
 
One of the proposals received by the Commission, in respect of legislative safeguards, concerned 
the lack of specificity in the Draft Bill with regard to the number of requests that need to be 
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made by the patient requesting an assisted death in addition to the interval of time that is required 
between each request.593 It was suggested that a prolonged period of time between the initial 
request for an assisted death and all subsequent requests will give the patient more time to reflect 
on his or her decision, but ‘without becoming overbearing.’594 Proposals received by the 
Commission suggested that after an initial oral request for an assisted death has been made by 
the patient, a waiting period of seven days should follow before a written request is made by the 
patient. After the written request has been made by the patient, it was suggested that a second 
waiting period of 48 hours should follow before the patient is offered repeated, formalised 
opportunities to rescind the decision.595  
 
The English Assisted Dying Bill also stipulates certain waiting periods and time frames within 
which no action may be taken. In accordance with the Bill, the lethal medication prescribed for 
the patient can only be delivered to the patient ‘after a period of no less than 14 days has elapsed 
since the day on which the patient’s written declaration of intent took effect.’596 If, however, both 
the attending and the independent doctor agree that the patient is ‘reasonably expected to die as a 
result of their terminal illness within one month from the day on which the written declaration 
took effect, the waiting period is reduced to six days.’597 The English Bill does not specify any 
other waiting periods between requests. 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Washington Death with Dignity Act and the California End 
of Life Option Act all specify a mandatory waiting period of 15 days to elapse after making an 
initial oral request to the medical practitioner, before the patient can make a second oral 
reiteration of the request.598 At the time the ‘second oral request [is made], the attending 
physician [must] offer the patient an opportunity to rescind the request.’599 In addition to the oral 
requests made by the patient, a written request600 must also be made, the requirements for which 
shall be discussed below. The legislation further stipulates that no less than 15 days shall elapse 
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between the patient’s initial oral request and the writing of the prescription for the lethal 
medication, and no less than 48 hours shall elapse between the written request and the writing of 
the prescription. 
 
In looking at the Draft Bill and the abovementioned pieces of foreign legislation, it is therefore 
preferable for the legislation to stipulate specific time frames and intervals that should elapse 
between the requests made by a patient seeking an assisted death. The proposed legislation 
should thus incorporate a waiting period longer than seven days to bring the legislation in line 
with its international counterparts.  
 
The proposed legislation for South Africa should stipulate that ‘two oral requests need to made 
to the attending physician on two separate occasions’601 no less than 15 days apart. The second 
oral request should be made ‘no more than 72 hours before the medical practitioner gives effect 
to the request.’602 No less than 48 hours should elapse between the written request made by the 
patient and the writing of the prescription for the lethal medication. The option and ability to 
rescind the request should be made available to the patient at all times, but the medical 
practitioner should offer the patient an opportunity to rescind his or her request at the time the 
written declaration is signed, and again before the attending physician makes the lethal 
medication available to the patient for self-administration. These timeframes will act as a 
safeguard by providing a mandatory 'cooling off' period for a patient who has requested an 
assisted death without becoming cumbersome.  
 
4.6.3 Written request: Declaration of Intent/Certificate of Request 
 
As mentioned above under the legislative procedures, it is necessary for a ‘patient, or a person 
acting on behalf of the patient, to sign a certificate of request,’603 ‘witnessed by the medical 
practitioner,’604 asking the medical practitioner to ‘assist the patient in ending his or her life’605 
and this certificate forms part of the patient's medical record.  
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The certificate of request, along with the other documents listed above that form part of the 
patient's medical record, provide a safeguard against abuse of the legislation. The extensive list 
of documentation that needs to be completed by the patient, the primary medical practitioner as 
well as an independent consulting doctor protects vulnerable members of society against 
coercion and duress from any third party who may try pressure a vulnerable person into 
requesting an assisted death against their will.   
 
Although the Draft Bill stipulates that a certificate of request must be completed,606 no template 
or suggested structure for such a certificate is provided in the Draft Bill to offer guidance as to 
the form of the request. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the Washington Death with Dignity 
Act, the California End of Life Option Act and the English Assisted Dying Bill all include a 
template for a declaration of intent that needs to be signed before a person may receive assistance 
in dying.  
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act stipulates that a patient’s ‘request for medication to end their 
life should be made in substantially the following form:’607 
 
 
‘REQUEST FOR MEDICATION 
TO END MY LIFE IN A HUMANE 
AND DIGNIFIED MANNER 
 
I, _____, am an adult of sound mind. 
I am suffering from ________, which my attending physician has determined is a terminal disease and 
which has been medically confirmed by a consulting physician.  
I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prognosis, the nature of medication to be prescribed and 
potential associated risks, the expected result, and the feasible alternatives, including comfort care, 
hospice care and pain control. 
I request that my attending physician prescribe medication that will end my life in a humane and dignified 
manner. 
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___ I have informed my family of my decision and taken their opinions into consideration 
___ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision 
___ I have no family to inform of my decision 
 
I understand that I have the right to rescind this request at any time. 
I understand the full import of this request and I expect to die when I take the medication to be prescribed. 
I further understand that although most deaths occur within three hours, my death may take longer and my 
physician has counseled me about this possibility.  
 





DECLARATION OF WITNESS 
 
We declare that the person signing this request: 
a. Is personally known to us or has provided proof of identity; 
b. Signed this request in our presence; 
c. Appears to be of sound mind and not under duress, fraud or undue influence; 




NOTE: One witness shall not be a relative (by blood, marriage or adoption) of the person signing this 
request, shall not be entitled to any portion of the person’s estate upon death and shall not own, operate or 
be employed at a healthcare facility where the person is a patient or resident. If the patient is an inpatient 
at a healthcare facility, one of the witnesses shall be an individual designated by the facility.’608 
 
The Washington Death with Dignity Act includes a similar provision with a suggested certificate 
of request in substantially the same form. Where the Oregon Act states: 'I request that my 
attending physician prescribe medication that will end my life in a humane and dignified 
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manner'609 the Washington Act states: 'I request that my attending physician prescribe medication 
that I may self-administer to end my life in a humane and dignified manner and to contact any 
pharmacist to fill the prescription.'610 Although this difference in wording is slight, the inclusion 
of the phrase 'that I may self-administer' has important consequences, as discussed above, with 
regard to the degree of participation by the medical practitioner and the ultimate act of self-
administration by the patient which would render the death an assisted suicide rather than an act 
of voluntary active euthanasia.   
 
The California End of Life Option Act also includes a similar formulation of the written request 
for an aid-in-dying drug to end one’s life in a 'humane and dignified manner.'611 The only 
difference in the request form is that the California Act states: 'I request that my attending 
physician prescribe an aid-in-dying drug that will end my life in a humane and dignified manner 
if I choose to take it, and I authorise my attending physician to contact any pharmacist about my 
request.'612 This formulation of the request highlights the patient’s right to remain in control and 
to retain the power of choice at all times. Up until the final moment of the patient’s life, even 
after signing the written certificate of request, the patient still retains the ability to choose 
whether or not he or she wishes to take the aid-in-dying medication. This is an important 
safeguard to include in the legislation, as it is of the utmost importance to ensure that the 
terminally ill patient who has requested an assisted death has their autonomy respected and is 
allowed to retain the ability to choose and control aspects of their death. 
 
A second difference between the California End of Life Option Act and the Oregon and 
Washington Acts is that the Californian legislation provides: 'My attending physician has 
counselled me about the possibility that my death may not be immediately upon the consumption 
of the drug. I make this request voluntarily, without reservation and without being coerced.'613 
This formulation of the request omits the phrase 'I further understand that although most deaths 
occur within three hours, my death may take longer and my physician has counseled me about 
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this possibility'614 as well as the phrase 'I accept full moral responsibility for my actions.'615 It is 
prudent for the legislators to have broadened the scope of the provision and to couch the 
provision in general terms, rather than making specific reference to a timeframe of three hours. 
Moreover, it is wise to exclude the concluding phrase 'I accept full moral responsibility for my 
actions' because although there is a strong link between morality and the law, it is unnecessary to 
include a provision about moral responsibility in a legal declaration of intention for an assisted 
death. The moral responsibility of the patient has no legal consequences for the sake of an 
assisted death and should thus not be included in the legislation. The California legislature 
replaced this phrase with: 'and without being coerced' which is more appropriate for the sake of 
the legislation.  
 
Despite its rejection by Parliament in 2015, the English Assisted Dying Bill also includes a 
schedule with a proposed form for the declaration to be made by a patient who requests an 
assisted death. Although less detailed than the abovementioned American formulations of a 
certificate of request, the proposed form for the Declaration is still worthy of analysis.  
 
 
‘Declaration: Assisted Dying Act 2016 
 
Name of declarant:                                           Date of Birth: 
Address: 
 
I have [condition], a terminal condition from which I am expected to die within six months of the date of 
this declaration.  
 
The Attending Doctor and Independent Doctor identified below have each fully informed me about the 
diagnosis and prognosis and the treatments available to me, including pain control and palliative care.  
 
Having considered all this information, I have a clear and settled intention to end my own life and, in 
order to assist me to do so, I have asked my attending doctor to prescribe medicines for me for that 
purpose.  
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I make this declaration voluntarily and in the full knowledge of its significance. 
 
I understand that I may revoke this declaration at any time. 
 




Name of Witness: 
Address: 
 
This declaration was signed by [name of declarant] in my presence and signed by me in [his/her] 
presence. 
 
Signature:                       Date: 
 
Countersignature: Attending Doctor 
 
I confirm that [name], who at the date of the declaration is [age] years of age and has been ordinarily 
resident in England and Wales for [time]: 
(1) is terminally ill and that the diagnosis and prognosis set above is correct; 
(2) has the capacity to make the decision to end their own life; and 
(3) has a clear and settled intention to do so, which has been reached on an informed basis, without 
coercion or duress, and having been informed of the palliative, hospice and other care which is 
available to [him/her]. 
 
Signature:                      Date: 
Name and Address of Attending Doctor: 
 
Countersignature: Independent Doctor 
 
I confirm that [name], who at the date of this declaration is [age] years of age and has been ordinarily 
resident in England and Wales for [time]: 
(1) is terminally ill and that the diagnosis and prognosis set above is correct; 




(2) has the capacity to make the decision to end their own life; and 
(3) has a clear and settled intention to do so, which has been reached on an informed basis, without 
coercion or duress, and having been informed of the palliative, hospice and other care which is 
available to [him/her]. 
 
Signature:                       Date: 
Name and Address of Independent Doctor’616 
 
One of the features that sets this suggested declaration of intent apart from the American 
certificates of request as discussed above, is the requirement that both the attending and the 
independent doctor sign the declaration. The American certificates of request require the 
signature of two witnesses, whereas the English declaration of intent requires the signature of 
one witness in addition to the signatures of both the attending doctor and the independent doctor.  
 
This is an important safeguard to include in legislation pertaining to assisted dying, as it ensures 
the participation of both doctors who must confirm that the patient has the capacity to make the 
decision and that the decision was reached on an informed basis, without coercion and duress. 
This respects the notion of patient autonomy and ensures protection for the vulnerable members 
of society who could potentially fall victim to abuse of the legislation by third parties and be 
coerced into requesting an assisted death against their will. 
 
Although this safeguard is important in ensuring that patient autonomy is respected and guarding 
against abuse of the legislation, the fact that the American formulation of a proposed certificate 
of request did not include the countersignature of both doctors does not necessarily threaten the 
integrity of the certificate of request. In accordance with the American legislation, the 
counselling physician/independent doctor will have to confirm, in writing, that ‘the attending 
physician’s diagnosis and prognosis is correct and verify that the patient is capable, is acting 
voluntarily and has made an informed decision.’617  
 
                                               
616 Schedule to the English Assisted Dying Bill. 
617 Oregon Death with Dignity Act 127.820 s.3.02 Consulting physician confirmation. 




Despite their different formulations, the abovementioned pieces of legislation have each included 
adequate safeguards to ensure that there is considered participation by both the attending and the 
independent/consulting doctor and that no person may receive assistance in dying until both 
doctors are satisfied that the conditions have been fulfilled.  
 
4.6.4 Counselling  
 
Each of the Acts or Bills discussed thus far include a provision stipulating that the attending 
and/or the independent doctor must refer the patient to counselling with an appropriate specialist 
if they have doubts as to the patient’s mental capacity and competence, or if they feel the patient 
is suffering from a psychological disorder or depression that has impaired their judgment. In the 
suggestions put forward in the Project 86 Report, it was proposed that ‘an assessment of the 
patient’s mental competence’618 (to determine whether they qualify as a patient in terms of the 
legislation) should include an ‘assessment of whether the patient is suffering from depression 
which may impair decision making.’619 
 
With regard to the patient's mental capacity, the English Assisted Dying Bill provides: 
 
If the attending doctor or independent doctor has doubt as to a person’s capacity to make 
a decision under subsection 3(b) or (c), before deciding whether to countersign a 
declaration made by that person the doctor must (a) refer the person for assessment by an 
appropriate specialist; and (b) take account of any opinion provided by the appropriate 
specialist in respect of that person.620 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the Washington Death with Dignity Act both provide:  
 
If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a patient may be suffering 
from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment, either 
physician shall refer the patient for counselling. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane 
and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counselling determines 
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that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing 
impaired judgment.621 
  
The California End of Life Option Act, however, deals with the mental health assessment of the 
patient differently. The legislation stipulates: 
 
Before a qualified individual obtains an aid-in-dying drug from the attending physician, the 
consulting physician shall perform all of the following: 
a. Examine the individual and his or her relevant medical records. 
b. Confirm in writing the attending physician’s diagnosis and prognosis. 
c. Determine that the individual has the capacity to make medical decisions, is acting 
voluntarily, and has made informed decisions. 
d. If there are indications of a mental disorder, the consulting physician shall refer the 
individual for a mental health specialist assessment.  
e. Fulfill the record documentation required under this part.  
 
Upon referral from the attending or consulting physician pursuant to this part, the mental health 
specialist shall:  
a. Examine the qualified individual and his or her relevant medical records. 
b. Determine that the individual has the mental capacity to make medical decisions, act voluntarily, 
and make an informed decision.  
c. Determine that the individual is not suffering from impaired judgment due to a mental disorder. 
d. Fulfill the record documentation requirements of this part.622 
 
The legislation further requires a ‘report of the outcome and determinations made during a 
mental health specialist’s assessment,’623 if performed, to be documented in the patient’s medical 
records.  
 
Ensuring patients have the requisite mental capacity to make a request for assistance in dying 
(and undergoing psychological evaluation should there be any doubt as to the patients' mental 
health) is an important safeguard to include in the legislation. The Draft Bill, however, makes no 
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reference to any form of counselling or psychological evaluation should there be doubt as to the 
mental health of the patient. It is vital for this safeguard to be included in the proposed 
legislation, as many patients who are terminally ill suffer from depression and should have their 
mental health evaluated before their request for an assisted death is considered. 
 
It is submitted that a psychological evaluation should not be left to the discretion of the attending 
and consulting doctors. Although the attending medical practitioner should be suitably qualified 
to assess the mental competence of a patient in order to make a determination as to whether their 
decision was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or duress, all patients who request 
assistance in dying should be referred to mandatory or optional counselling before having their 
request fulfilled. By including this safeguard in the legislation, it offers another level of 
protection to patients who may be facing pressure from a third party or are suffering from 
depression and wish to end their lives prematurely as a result of these factors.  
 
The attending and consulting medical practitioners play a vital role in explaining the diagnosis 
and prognosis to a patient and ensuring that the patient has been adequately informed of his or 
her treatment options. A psychologist or counsellor to whom the patient would be referred for a 
mental health evaluation or counselling would play a different role to that of the medical 
practitioner. The medical practitioner will be vital in ensuring the patient can understand and 
come to terms with their diagnosis and prognosis but a psychologist or counsellor would assist 
the patient in coming to terms with the consequences of their decision and dealing with the moral 
and emotional burden of deciding to end one’s life to relieve suffering.  
 
Although there are merits to referring a patient for mandatory counselling once they have 
requested an assisted death, there are numerous pragmatic issues involved with mandatory 
counselling referrals. The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act624 includes a provision that 
deals with counselling and stipulates that the state shall promote the provision of non-mandatory 
and non-directive counselling, before and after the termination of a pregnancy.625 Such a 
provision, that encourages the provision of counselling, but does not make it compulsory unless 
it is at the discretion of the attending and/or consulting medical practitioner, should be included 
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in the legislation regulating assisted dying. For pragmatic reasons, however, it is unwise for the 
legislation to impose mandatory counselling for every patient who requests assistance in dying in 
terms of the legislation. 
 
4.6.5 Rescission of Request 
 
The next major safeguard that is enshrined in the legislation is the patient’s ability to rescind 
their request for an assisted death at any time and in any manner. The Draft Bill stipulates: 
'Notwithstanding anything in this Act, a patient may rescind a request for assistance under this 
Act at any time and in any manner without regard to his or her mental state.'626 Moreover, if a 
patient rescinds their request, the attending medical practitioner shall, ‘as soon as practicable, 
destroy the certificate of request and note that fact on the patient’s medical record.’627 Similar 
provisions are included in each of the abovementioned pieces of legislation. The English Assisted 
Dying Bill stipulates: 'A person who has made a declaration under this section may revoke it at 
any time and revocation need not be in writing.'628 Moreover, in the proposed form of the 
declaration of intent found in the English Assisted Dying Bill, it is suggested that the patient 
include a clause which states that they understand they may revoke their request for an assisted 
death at any time. 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act also stipulates that the attending medical practitioner must 
‘inform the patient that he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at any time and in any 
manner,’629 and that the patient must be offered an opportunity to rescind the request at the end of 
a mandatory 15 day waiting period between the initial oral request and the writing of the 
prescription.630 Moreover, a separate section of the legislation stipulates: 'A patient may rescind 
his or her request at any time and in any manner without regard to his or her mental state. No 
prescription for medication under ORS 127.800 to 127.897 may be written without the attending 
physician offering the qualified patient an opportunity to rescind the request.'631 
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The Washington Death with Dignity Act also provides, under a section entitled 'Written and Oral 
Requests,'632 that the attending physician must offer the patient an opportunity to rescind their 
request at the time of making a second oral request no less than 15 days after their initial oral 
request. The Act further provides, under a section entitled 'Right to Rescind Request'633 that a 
patient may ‘rescind their request at any time and in any manner without regard to his or her 
mental state.’634 ‘No prescription for medication to end the patient’s life may be written without 
the attending physician offering the patient an opportunity to rescind their request.’635  
 
The California End of Life Option Act includes a similar rescission clause which states: 'An 
individual may at any time withdraw or rescind his or her request for an aid-in-dying drug, or 
decide not to ingest an aid-in-dying drug, without regard to the individual’s mental state.'636 The 
Act goes further to stipulate that the attending physician’s ‘offer to the patient to withdraw or 
rescind his or her request at the time of the patient’s second oral request’637 must be recorded and 
included in the patient’s medical record. 
 
It is therefore evident that affording a patient an opportunity to rescind their request at any time 
and in any manner is an important provision to include in the legislation to operate as a safeguard 
to protect patients against making decisions without a clear and settled intention. Moreover, it is 
important to ensure the legitimacy of the attending physician’s offer to the patient to rescind his 
or her request by including the offer as a mandatory component of the patient’s medical record.  
 
4.6.6 Conscientious Objection 
 
Another important safeguard to include in the legislation is a provision for conscientious 
objection that protects the moral interests and religious beliefs of the medical practitioner. The 
Draft Bill states: 'The provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted so as to oblige a medical 
                                               
632 70.245.090 of the Washington Death With Dignity Act. 
633 70.245.110 of the Washington Death with Dignity Act. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid. 
636 443.4 (a). 
637 California End of Life Option Act 443.9 (f). 




practitioner to do anything that would be in conflict with his or her conscience or any ethical 
code to which he or she feels himself or herself bound.'638 
 
The English Draft Bill on Assisted Dying also includes a conscientious objection clause which 
states: 'A person shall not be under any duty (whether by contract or arising from any statutory or 
other legal requirement) to participate in anything authorised by this Act to which that person has 
a conscientious objection.'639 
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act similarly provides: 'No health care provider shall be under 
any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the 
provision to a qualified patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified 
manner.'640 Moreover, the Washington Death with Dignity Act also provides for conscientious 
objection by stipulating that only ‘willing health care providers shall participate in the provision 
to a qualified patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.’641  
 
The California End of Life Option Act provides that 'participation in activities authorised 
pursuant to this part shall be voluntary. Notwithstanding s442 to 442.7, inclusive, a person or 
entity that elects, for reasons of conscience, morality or ethics, not to engage in activities 
authorised pursuant to this part is not required to take any action in support of an individual’s 
decision under this part.'642 Moreover, the legislation provides that a medical practitioner who 
refuses to participate under the Act will not be subject to any criminal or disciplinary liability.643 
 
The conscientious objection clause is particularly relevant and important in a South African 
context, as equal respect must be given to the protection of the cultural, religious and moral 
beliefs of medical professionals. Without the conscientious objection clause, the legislation could 
be deemed unconstitutional as it would violate the constitutional rights of medical professionals 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.644 In accordance with the Health 
                                               
638 Draft Bill s10. 
639 Assisted Dying Bill s5 Conscientious Objection 
640 Oregon Death with Dignity Act s4(4). 
641 Washington Death with Dignity Act s19(1)(d). 
642 California End of Life Option Act s443.14 (e)(1). 
643 Ibid (e)(2). 
644 s15 of the Constitution. 




Professions Council of South Africa Human Rights, Ethics and Professional Practice 
Committee’s statement645 pertaining to ethical conflicts and dilemmas, that arose as a result of 
the Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill, a conscientious objection can be upheld if the 
objecting practitioner has made a proper referral to an appropriate doctor. Thus, should a medical 
professional object to fulfilling a terminally ill person’s request for assistance in dying and refuse 
to countersign the person’s declaration of intent or refuse to prescribe lethal medicine to that 
terminally ill person, that medical professional will be entitled to do so, provided he or she has 
made a proper referral to an appropriate doctor. There will be no obligation incumbent on a 
medical professional to fulfil a person’s request if it goes against their cultural, religious or moral 
beliefs.  
 
No doctors or medical professionals in South Africa should ever be placed under any obligation 
to assist a terminally ill person in fulfilling their wish to die. Following the Stransham-Ford 
judgment, Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, argued that the legalisation of assisted dying 
would place an undue burden on doctors in South Africa. A conscientious objection clause in the 
legislation, however, would provide protection to all medical professionals who object to the 
practice of assisted dying on religious, cultural or moral grounds. 
 
4.6.7 Role of a doctor/medical practitioner  
 
The Draft Bill stipulates that the ‘termination of a patient’s life on his or her request to release 
him or her from suffering may not be effected by any person other than a medical 
practitioner.’646  
 
In the closing argument made by Dr Jack Kevorkian in his 1999 trial,647 the doctor made a strong 
argument for the legalisation of assisted dying. Dr Kevorkian submitted that doctors are afforded 
a certain degree of protection against prosecution for acts which, when performed in the context 
of a medical procedure, are considered medically necessary and are surgical procedures but, if 
similar acts were performed by anyone other than a doctor, they would be held criminally liable. 
                                               
645 Accessible at: http://www.hpcsa.co.za/Uploads/editor/UserFiles/downloads/publications/annual_reports/hpcsa-
annual-report-2009-2010.pdf 
646 Draft Bill s5(4). 
647 F Charatan 'Dr Kevorkian Found Guilty of Second Degree Murder' (1999) 318 British Medical Journal 962 




For example, as delineated above in the limitation of rights enquiry, if a patient is suffering from 
bone cancer and a doctor considers it medically necessary to amputate the patient’s leg to relieve 
him or her from suffering, the doctor may perform such a procedure. If any other person who is 
not a doctor were to cut off another person’s leg, they would face criminal charges. Similarly, 
should a doctor end a patient’s life, at the patient’s request, with the intention of relieving that 
patient of his or her suffering, it should be deemed a medically necessary procedure and not 
murder. As a result of this protection afforded to doctors, it is vital that assisted dying, as 
provided for in the proposed legislation, should only be facilitated by a qualified medical 
practitioner. 
 
Although the Minister of Health Dr Aaron Motsoaledi argued against the involvement of a 
medical practitioner in assisted deaths, it is safer for a patient to have the assistance of a qualified 
medical practitioner with the experience and expertise to guarantee the patient a controlled and 
dignified death. It would be unwise for family members or friends to assist in bringing about the 
death of a loved one, as matters could go unregulated and many of the safeguards delineated in 
the legislation would become futile. 
 
Many who oppose the participation of doctors in assisted dying argue that such involvement 
violates the doctor's oath to 'do no harm'648 however, extending the life of a terminally ill 
suffering individual against their will to live can be considered tantamount to a violation of the 
oath to do no harm. 
 
The Draft Bill should therefore retain the requirement that only a qualified medical practitioner 
may assist a terminally ill patient in ending his or her own life. This would act as a safeguard for 
both the patient and the medical practitioner if assisted dying were legalised in South Africa and 
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Each of the abovementioned pieces of legislation, barring the Draft Bill, require annual reports to 
be compiled for the purpose of facilitating a statistical analysis of deaths which occurred as a 
result of assistance provided in accordance with the legislation.  
 
The statistical reports compiled from data collected as a result of the Oregon and Washington 
Death with Dignity Acts have been essential in measuring the efficacy of the legislation and 
ensuring compliance with the law. In accordance with the Washington Death with Dignity Act, 
the attending physician of a patient who has died in terms of the Act must, within 30 days of the 
patient’s death, file the Attending Physician Compliance Form, the Consulting Physician 
Compliance Form and the Written Request for Medication to End Life Form with the 
Department of Health.649 Such requirements, although procedural, are an integral component of 
the reporting process that is a legislative safeguard.  
 
Statistical reports from 1998 to 2014 are publically available from the Oregon Department of 
Human Services and, similarly, the Washington Department of Health has made statistical 
reports from 2009 to 2014 publically available. The Washington Department of Health and the 
Oregon Public Health Division collect information submitted by healthcare providers (in the 
form of paperwork and death certificates), review the information to check for compliance with 
reporting requirements and, should the information be inadequate or incomplete, the health care 
providers are contacted.650 The information collected from the healthcare providers is not 
available as public record, but summarised data is released in the annual statistical report.651 
 
However, the reported statistics can be easily misrepresented. In order to gain a proper 
understanding of the impact of the legislation on the number of legal assisted deaths, it is 
necessary to perform a thorough analysis of the statistics.  
 
                                               
649 Additionally, if a psychiatrist or psychologist performed a patient evaluation, the Psychiatric/Psychological 
Consultant Compliance Form must be submitted to the Department of Health within 30 days of writing the 
prescription. 
650 Washington State Department of Health, Death with Dignity Act, accessed at: 
 www.doh.wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/IllnessandDisease/DeathwithDignityAct 
651 Ibid. 




Since its inception in 1997, a total of 1327 prescriptions have been written for lethal medication 
in accordance with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, but only 859 patients have died from 
ingesting this medication. The Oregon Public Health Division released a public report of the key 
findings from 2014, based on paperwork and death certificates as of 2 February 2015.652 The 
number of prescriptions written annually for patients in accordance with the legislation has 
increased from 24 prescriptions in 1998 to 155653 prescriptions in 2014. The total number of 
prescriptions, however, is not an accurate reflection of the number of patients who have died as a 
result of the legislation. Of the 24 patients who received prescriptions in terms of the Death with 
Dignity Act in 1998, only 16 died from ingesting the lethal medication. In 2014, only 105 of 155 
patients died from ingesting the lethal medication prescribed to them. Of these 105 patients who 
died in 2014, 94 had their prescriptions written in 2014, but 11 patients had their prescriptions 
written during 2012 and 2013 and only elected to ingest the medication in 2014. The other 
patients who had prescriptions written in 2014 either rescinded their requests for an assisted 
death or they died of natural causes before they were able to ingest the medication. In 2014, the 
105 terminally ill patients who died as a result of the medication prescribed to them in terms of 
the Death with Dignity Act corresponds to 31 assisted deaths per 10 000 total deaths in 
Oregon.654 Only three of the 105 patients who died in 2014 were referred for formal psychiatric 
or psychological evaluation.  
 
Of the 105 Death with Dignity Act deaths in 2014, 67.6 per cent were aged 65 or older and the 
median age of patients was 72 years. Of these deaths, 47.7 per cent of patients were well 
educated individuals, holding at least a baccalaureate/bachelor’s degree. The majority of 
terminally ill patients who requested assistance in terms of the Act were reported to have cancer, 
but the 68.6 per cent in 2014 was lower than the average of 79.4 per cent for all previous years. 
The number of patients with ALS, however, increased from 7.2 per cent in previous years to 16.2 
per cent in 2014. 93 per cent of patients were enrolled in hospice care either at the time the lethal 
medication was prescribed to them or at the time of their death. 




653 The 155 prescriptions written in 2014 were written by 83 different physicians, with each physician writing 
between 1-12 prescriptions.  
654 The rate per 10 000 deaths of Oregon residents was calculated using the 2013 statistics which was the most recent 
year for which final death data was available.  




Loss of autonomy was the main concern raised by 91.4 per cent of patients who requested 
assisted deaths in 2014. 86.7 per cent of patients stated that a decreasing ability to participate in 
activities that made life enjoyable was a reason for seeking an assisted death and 71.4 per cent of 
patients cited a loss of dignity.   
 
In accordance with the Washington Death with Dignity Act, the Washington State Department of 
Health released a public report summarising the data and statistics pertaining to deaths that took 
place in 2014.655 The report includes data from documentation received by the Department of 
Health as of March 2015.  
 
In accordance with the Washington Death with Dignity Act, 176 patients received prescriptions 
for lethal medication in 2014.656 These prescriptions were written by 109 different medical 
practitioners and the medication was dispensed by 57 different pharmacists.657 Of the 176 
patients who received prescriptions in 2014, only 170 are known to have died.658 No 
documentation was received by the State Health Department to indicate that death had occurred 
for the remaining 6 patients who received prescriptions in terms of the Act.659 Of the 170 patients 
who died in 2014, 126 died after ingesting the medication, 17 died without having ingested the 
medication and for the remaining 27 patients, ingestion status was unknown.660  
 
The average age of participants under the Act ranged from 21 to 101 years of age.661 Of the 170 
participants who died in 2014, 73 per cent of the patients had cancer and 13 per cent of the 
patients had a neurodegenerative disease such as ALS, statistics which bear a striking similarity 
to the numbers recorded in terms of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in 2014. Moreover, 76 
per cent of the participants under the Act were well educated with at least some college 
education. 
                                               
655 Washington State Department of Health 2014 Death with Dignity Act Report Executive Summary 
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656 When the Washington Death with Dignity Act was first enacted, only 65 patients had prescriptions written for 
them in 2009 in terms of the Act. Of these patients, however, only 36 were known to have ingested the medication 
and died as a result thereof. 
657 Washington State Department of Health 2014 Death With Dignity Act Report Executive Summary 1. 
658 Ibid 2. 
659 Ibid 2. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid 1. 





The three main reasons cited by patients for requesting an assisted death in terms of the Act 
included a loss of autonomy (89 per cent), a loss of the ability to participate in activities that 
make life enjoyable (94 per cent) and a loss of dignity (74 per cent). This reflects a similar result 
to the statistics gleaned from the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.  
 
A higher percentage of patients in Washington were at home at the time of their death, with 92 
per cent of patients dying at home, whereas in Oregon 89.5 per cent of patients were at home at 
the time of their death. These statistics are still remarkably high and reflect the large number of 
patients who elect to die in the comfort of their own homes rather than in a hospice, hospital or 
other care facility. 
 
It is therefore evident that the reporting requirement enables the collection of important 
information which assists with the monitoring and regulation of the practice of assisted dying. It 
is essential to include a mandatory reporting requirement in the proposed legislation for South 
Africa, as this serves a dual function by guarding against procedural abuse of the legislation and 
also providing an indicator to monitor the efficacy of the legislation.  
 
In conclusion, the legislation envisaged for South Africa to implement a permissive regime for 
assisted dying requires greater clarity than what is provided in the Draft Bill. The definitions 
section of the Draft Bill should be revised in accordance with the suggestions outlined above, 
moreover, clear procedures, outlining the responsibilities of the patient and the doctors involved, 
are required as an integral part of the legislation. Procedures should be as succinct and 
unambiguous as possible, delineating exactly what is required in order for an assisted death to be 
compliant with the legislation. Stringent safeguards, as proposed above, should be incorporated 
into the proposed legislation to adequately combat the concerns raised by parties opposed to the 
implementation of legalised assisted dying in South Africa. 
 
Once such a legislative framework is implemented in South Africa, those who qualify in terms of 
the legislation and require the assistance of a doctor in order to protect their autonomy, dignity 
and the right to a life with dignity, will be afforded the right to choose an assisted death if they so 




wish. Just as the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act allows pregnant women the option of 
a safe, lawful abortion while protecting the medical practitioner's right to conscientious 
objection, legislation regulating assisted dying will afford a safe, dignified death to those 
terminally ill adults who seek relief from unbearable and intolerable pain and suffering while 
protecting the rights and interests of the medical practitioners involved. 
 
It is acknowledged that the limitation on the scope of the proposed legislation will have the effect 
of excluding certain groups of persons from the operation of the legislation and omits to address 
advance healthcare directives. These issues, however, are significantly more complex and require 
a greater level of judicial analysis and legislative focus. The proposed legislation outlined above 
deals with the core issues surrounding assisted dying and end-of-life care and provides an 
adequate foundation upon which the rights of those who seek a dignified death can be respected 















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The right to live a dignified life is a right that no person should be deprived of. In the context of 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy, doctor-assisted dying for the terminally ill is an issue 
that needs to be addressed in a meaningful and substantial way.  
 
Recent judicial decisions in South Africa, Canada and New Zealand confirmed that the 
prohibition on assisted dying results in a substantial infringement of certain fundamental rights. 
The cases of Carter, Stransham-Ford and Seales have highlighted the need for legal reform in 
jurisdictions where assisted dying is prohibited, such as South Africa, and gave context to the 
rights-based arguments in favour of abolishing the prohibition on assisted dying. These cases, 
however, also confirmed that the issue of regulating the practice of assisted dying needs to be 
dealt with by the legislature and cannot be handled on a case-by-case basis by the courts.  
 
The abovementioned cases each dealt with the voluntary request for a doctor-assisted death by a 
terminally ill, mentally competent adult. A person in this position should not be denied the right 
to die a dignified death as a result of the private moral views of other individuals in power. The 
State should respect an individual’s choice to end his or her own life in a dignified manner, with 
the assistance of a willing doctor, when he or she chooses not to pursue alternative treatment 
options such as palliative care or palliative sedation when the pain and suffering caused by a 
terminal illness becomes too much to bear.  
 
The global trend toward approaching the issue of assisted dying from a rights-based perspective 
is particularly relevant in a South African context with our extensive rights-based jurisprudence 
that has emerged through the transition into a constitutional democracy. Thus, although the issue 
of assisted dying has been debated for centuries around the world, the approach toward doctor-
assisted dying is changing in light of the increased focus on rights globally and South Africa 
cannot, and based on previous cases, will not, immunize itself from these developments.  
Significant legal developments have already occurred in South Africa to remedy the unjustifiable 
infringements of rights that occurred as a result of other limiting measures such as the 
prohibitions on abortions and same-sex marriages. Despite conflicting cultural and religious 




beliefs, legislation was promulgated in order to remedy the unjustifiable limitation of rights that 
occurred as a result of these prohibitions. Similarly, the issue of doctor-assisted dying needs to 
be addressed in order to protect the rights of those who are suffering as a result of the severe 
limitation of the rights to life, dignity and autonomy. 
 
As evidenced above through an analysis of the limitation of rights enquiry, the prohibition on 
assisted dying constitutes a limiting measure that substantially infringes on certain fundamental 
rights, namely the rights to life, dignity and autonomy. The prohibition on assisted dying became 
entrenched in the jurisprudence of South Africa through the development of the criminal law, 
which has seen perpetrators facing criminal charges for merciful acts of compassion in assisting 
their loved ones to be released from their suffering. Despite lenient sentencing, the prohibition on 
assisted dying and the criminal charges that arise therefrom place tremendous strain on the 
family of a terminally ill patient who wishes to end their life with dignity, but requires assistance 
in doing so. Moreover, the prohibition on assisted dying severely limits the options that are 
available to a terminally ill person who wishes to end their life with dignity, as persons in this 
position are often faced with the decision of ending their own life prematurely (while still 
physically able to do so) or losing any form of control they would have over the manner and 
timing of their death at a later stage in the progression of their illness. 
 
The prohibition on assisted dying thus strikes at the core of the rights to life, dignity and 
autonomy, and does not merely infringe on the periphery of the aforementioned rights. This 
limitation of rights is not considered constitutionally justifiable in that it cannot be justified in 
accordance with s36 of the 1996 Constitution. Although the prohibition on assisted dying is 
sourced in the law of general application, it cannot be said that the purpose of the limiting 
measure is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.’662 Moreover, there are alternative, less-restrictive means 
available to achieve the same purpose as the prohibition on assisted dying that will not constitute 
such a severe impairment of constitutionally protected rights. These measures can be effectively 
implemented and enforced through prescriptive legislation. 
 
                                               
662 Section 36 of the Constitution. 




Although there are strong arguments to be made in opposition to the legalised practice of doctor-
assisted dying, compelling statistical evidence from permissive jurisdictions indicates that a 
strict, prescriptive legislative framework can operate to protect the vulnerable in society and can 
also protect the rights and interests of medical practitioners while simultaneously respecting the 
right of terminally ill patients to choose an assisted death if they no longer wish to endure 
intolerable pain and suffering. This evidence is derived from reports compiled from the data 
collected in accordance with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the Washington Death with 
Dignity Act. Moreover, these findings rebut the notion that permitting assisted dying will result 
in a slippery slope that may lead to the unregulated practice of involuntary euthanasia. 
 
Once it is established that an unjustifiable limitation of constitutionally protected rights arises as 
a result of the prohibition on assisted dying, legislative intervention is required. Foreign 
legislation provides meaningful guidance in establishing a legislative framework that can be 
implemented in South Africa to regulate the practice of doctor-assisted dying, by building on the 
Draft Bill on End of Life Decisions Act, as proposed by the South African Law Commission. By 
establishing clear definitions, procedures and safeguards, the legislation can effectively operate 
to balance the rights of those who seek medical assistance in dying and the rights of those who 
object to the practice thereof based on moral or religious beliefs. Only terminally ill, mentally 
competent adults who have requested a doctor-assisted death on repeated occasions and have 
completed a written certificate of request will be able to access the doctor-assisted dying 
envisaged by the legislation. 
 
As a result of unequal access to resources within the South African health care system and 
competing cultural and religious beliefs in South Africa, care needs to be taken to ensure that the 
legislation operates effectively to protect the rights of all parties involved. Just as the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act has operated effectively within the confines of the South African 
health care system to protect the rights of women who choose to have an abortion, the assisted 
dying legislation should similarly function in a way that protects the rights of terminally ill 
patients who choose a doctor-assisted death. 
 




When signing the End of Life Option Act into law, Governor of California, Jerry Brown, summed 
up the need to have legislation that regulates the practice of assisted dying in this powerful 
concluding statement in a letter to members of the California State Assembly: 
 
In the end, I was left to reflect on what I would want in the face of my own death. I do not know 
what I would do if I were dying in prolonged and excruciating pain. I am certain, however, that it 
would be a comfort to be able to consider the options afforded by this bill. And I wouldn’t deny 
that right to others.663 
 
Although there has been reluctance to engage with the discourse on assisted dying in South 
Africa, the recent judicial decisions have sparked a movement toward change which cannot be 
ignored. The rights to life, dignity and autonomy that form the foundation of the limitation of 
rights enquiry are not merely hypothetical rights, but are the rights of real patients who are 
suffering as a result of the current prohibitory regime.  
 
Death is an integral part of life and should result in the completion of a dignified life rather than 
the negation thereof. A permissive regime for assisted dying is thus required in South Africa and, 
although it will prove challenging to implement, a strict legislative framework can regulate and 
control the practice of assisted dying in order to relieve terminally ill, mentally competent adults 
of the suffering that strips them of their constitutional right to a dignified life. 
 
We should always debate ideas that appear to strike at the centre of our humanity. Ideas and 
proposals should be tested. I believe that consensual “assisted death” for those that ask for it is 
quite hard to oppose, especially by those that have some compassion. But we do need in this 
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664 Sir Terry Pratchett “Shaking Hands with Death” (2010) delivered as the Richard Dimbleby Lecture, published by 
Corgi Books 2015. 
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Annexure A: Lecretia Seales' first affidavit in the proceedings 
 
Palliative care and pain medication is not guaranteed to address all pain - if pain relief is required 
in high doses, Ms Seales was concerned that it would impact on her awareness of herself and her 
loved ones. Concerned that death would be slow, unpleasant, painful and undignified and the 
person may be forced to experience a death that is no way consistent with the person they are and 
the way they have lived their life.  
 
I know that if I take my own life, I will need to do so alone and in secret to avoid the possibility 
of my loved ones being implicated. I hate the thought of going through that alone, with my loved 
ones having to find me and not being able to say goodbye to them properly. If I wait too long to 
make this decision, I could become physically unable to take my own life other than by refusing 
food and water. I do not want to die that way but dying that way may still be more bearable than 
having to suffer through to the bitter end without choice. 
 
It seems incomprehensible to me that I can exercise a choice to end my life when I am able, and 
still have quality of life, but can’t get any help to do so at a later point when my life no longer 
has any quality left for me. I want to live as long as I can but I want to have a voice in my death 
and be able to say “enough.” 
 
I want to be able to die with a sense of who I am and with a dignity and independence that 
represents the way I have always lived my life. I desperately want to be respected in my wish not 
to have to suffer unnecessarily at the end. I really want to be able to say goodbye well. 
 
 
 

